COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73386 STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-appellee JOURNAL ENTRY vs. AND EUGENE A. PRICE, OPINION Defendant-appellant DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: OCTOBER 29, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court, Case No. CR-350264 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor ROBERT GLICKMAN Assistant Prosecuting Attorney The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendant-appellant: JOHN J. GILL 205 Bradley Building 1220 West Sixth Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- KARPINSKI, J.: Defendant-appellant, Eugene Price, appeals from a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of theft. On appeal, defendant raises two assignments of error, arguing that the court erred (1) by not allowing him to dismiss his court-appointed counsel and (2) by allowing the state to withdraw its plea offer. For the reasons that follow, we find no merit to these arguments and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Defendant was indicted on one count of theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02. The charges arose from an incident when defendant was arrested for stealing four suit coats from a Kaufman's department store in North Olmsted. On the day trial was scheduled, the state offered a six-month sentence if defendant pled guilty to the indictment. The state further indicated that this offer would not be available again. Defendant rejected the offer and orally moved to dismiss his appointed counsel. In support of this motion, defendant argues that his arrest report was falsified and that his counsel refused to file a motion to dismiss the indictment. Because it was the day of trial, however, the court would not appoint new counsel and gave defendant the option of continuing with his appointed counsel or proceeding pro se. Defendant chose to stay with his appointed counsel. At trial, the state presented the testimony of David Winslow, a plain-clothes security officer, and Patrolman Michael Gasdick of the North Olmsted police department. Winslow testified that he -3- saw defendant place four coats in a bag and leave the store. While being detained after this event, defendant signed the following statement: I, Eugene Price, 46 years of age, freely admit, without threat or promise of any kind, that on 28 march, 1997, I took, from the possession of the Company, without making payment, without the permission of the Company, and with the intent to take for my own use or disposition without payment, the following property of the Company: 4 men's suits $1,150.00. I understand that the value of these articles is about $1,150.00. I make this statement voluntarily to LPO Winslow and LPM Rice whom I know to be representatives of the Company, I have read it, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and understanding. Winslow confirmed that defendant signed this acknowledgment. Officer Gasdick testified that when he interviewed defendant after the incident, defendant stated, I did it, I'm caught. (Tr. 240- 242.) After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the trial judge sentenced defendant to one year in jail. Defendant timely appeals and assigns two errors for review, the first of which states as follows: I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNSEL. In this assignment, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to remove his appointed trial counsel. In State v. Blankenship (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 534, the court summarized the law regarding a request to dismiss appointed counsel as follows: An indigent defendant has a right to competent counsel, not a right to counsel of his own choosing. Thurston v. Maxwell (1965), 3 Ohio St.2d 92,93, 32 O.O.2d 63, 64, 209 N.E.2d 204, 205-206. The right to competent counsel does -4- not require that a criminal defendant develop and share a meaningful relationship with his attorney. Morris v. Slappy (1983), 461 U.S. 1, 13, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617, 75 L.Ed.2d 610, 621. Rather, an indigent defendant is entitled to the appointment of substitute counsel only upon a showing of good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication, or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust result. State v. Pruitt (1984), 18 Ohio App.3d 50, 57 18 OBR 163, 170-171, 480 N.E.2d 499, 507-508. Additionally, the trial court's decision to deny the appointment of new counsel is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Pruitt, supra. Prior to trial, defendant made an oral motion for appointment of new counsel because his appointed counsel would not file a motion to dismiss the indictment based on an arrest report defendant claimed was falsified. Instead, defense counsel had filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the North Olmsted police after defendant was apprehended, including statements made by defendant. On appeal, defendant does not elaborate on what evidence was falsified. In the case at bar, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's oral motion to appoint new counsel. Defendant received competent representation from his trial counsel. The evidence against defendant was substantial. It included eyewitness testimony, defendant's written acknowledgment of criminal liability, and admissions of guilt to the police. Defendant has not established, moreover, any conflict of interest or complete breakdown of communication with his appointed counsel that gave rise to an unjust result. -5- In support of his argument, defendant argues that the trial court never inquired as to the extent of any conflict between defendant and his counsel when defendant made his oral motion. Specifically, defendant claims he was denied the opportunity to establish a record of conflict. This argument fails. The transcript reveals that the court specifically told defendant that he could file a motion with the court and make it part of the record. (Tr. 15.) No motion was filed. We must conclude, therefore, that defendant was not denied the opportunity to make a record of conflict between himself and his appointed counsel. Accordingly, defendant's first assignment is overruled. The second assignment states as follows: II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO WITHDRAW ITS OFFER TO LET DEFENDANT PLEAD OUT AND RECEIVE THE MINIMUM SENTENCE OF SIX (6) MONTHS. In this assignment, defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the state to withdraw its offer of a sentence of six months if defendant pled to the indictment. This argument is without merit. The state is not constitutionally required to plea bargain. Weatherford v. Bursey (1977), 429 U.S. 545; State v. Jackson (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 253. Considerable latitude is afforded the prosecutor in proposing plea agreements to defendants. Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978), 434 U.S. 357. Thus the state is not required to offer anything to a defendant and can withdraw an offer at any time. Mabry v. Johnson (1984), 476 U.S. 504. The state made it clear that the offer made during the pretrial would not be available later. Contrary to defendant's argument, there is -6- nothing unfair about the state withdrawing an offer after it is rejected by a defendant. While it is rational for the state to be willing to seek less jail time if a defendant accepts liability and saves state resources by entering a plea, it is equally rational and fair for the state to seek the maximum after defendant has rejected an offer and guilt is proven at trial. Accordingly, defendant's second assignment is overruled. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. ANN DYKE, P.J., and JOSEPH J. NAHRA, J., CONCUR. DIANE KARPINSKI JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .