COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73374 STEVE ROPER, ET AL. : : Claimants-Appellees : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION TOWN & COUNTRY INVESTMENT : FUND II : : Respondent-Appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: OCTOBER 8, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CASE NO. CV-316673 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Claimants-Appellees: DENNIS J. KASELAK (#0029133) 1350 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115 For Claimants-Appellees: TIMOTHY R. STERKEL (#0062869) 1414 South Green Road Cleveland, Ohio 44121 SPELLACY, J.: Respondent-appellant Town & Country Investment Fund II ( appellant ) appeals from the trial court's order denying appellant's motion to vacate the underlying arbitration award. -2- Appellant assigns the following error for our review: THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRORED [SIC] IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD. Finding appellant's assignment of error to lack merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. I. The Town & Country Investment Fund II ( the Fund ), which was created by claimant-appellee Steven Roper, is an Ohio partnership whose purpose was to create a profitable investment fund for certain real estate professionals. The Fund Agreement included the following mandatory arbitration clause: ARTICLE X - ARBITRATION Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. Several years after its inception, the Fund's partners became suspicious of Mr. Roper's management of the Fund. At the end of 1982, the partners submitted a demand for binding arbitration against Mr. Roper and his wife, claimant-appellee Mildred Roper. In their demand for arbitration, the partners alleged that the Ropers had mismanaged and converted partnership funds for their own use; in addition, the partners demanded an accounting. The initial arbitration panel made a finding and an award in favor of the Fund and against the Ropers. The court of common -3- pleas confirmed the arbitrator's award, as did this court in Basler v. Roper (June 11, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 52380, unreported. Additional litigation ensued when the Ropers sold property awarded to the Fund during the initial arbitration. In Town & Country Investment Fund II v. Roper (Dec. 16, 1993), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 62873, 65777, unreported, this Court affirmed a jury award in favor of the Fund and against the Ropers in the amount of One Hundred and Forty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($146,500.00). On October 1, 1989, the Ropers filed the subject demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association. In their arbitration demand, the Ropers asserted the following claims for relief: (1) distribution of the Ropers' pro-rated share of the principal of the fund; (2) reimbursement of the funds the Ropers' advanced to the Fund; and (3) a full accounting and final liquidation of the Fund. On October 27 to October 29, 1992, the arbitration hearing took place. Thereafter, the arbitrator issued three interim orders. On December 22, 1994, the arbitrator issued Interim Order III. Among other findings and awards, Interim Order III provided that the Ropers be awarded Thirty Dollars ($30.00) per share of their interest in the Fund. Subsequently, appellant raised several issues which it claimed were necessary to an accurate final accounting. On July 11, 1996, the arbitrator issued his final order, which included an accounting and disposition of the outstanding issues. The arbitrator found -4- that the issues raised by appellant had already been litigated and, therefore, were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. On October 9, 1996, appellant filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award. On September 22, 1997, the trial court denied appellant's motion to vacate arbitration award. Therefrom, appellant's filed the instant appeal. II. In its sole assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to vacate the arbitration award. Appellant claims that the arbitration award should have been vacated because: (1) the arbitrator refused to hear evidence pertinent and material to a complete and accurate accounting; and (2) the arbitrator so imperfectly executed his powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. R.C. 2711.10 provides: In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas shall make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration if: * * * (C) The arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. (D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. -5- * * * This court has noted that judicial review of an arbitration award must be "very narrow." Cuyahoga Community College v. Dist. 925, Serv. Emp. Internatl. Union AFL-CIO (1988), 42 Ohio App.3d 166, 170. In addition, arbitration awards are presumed valid and an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of an arbitrator selected by the parties. See Marra Constructors, Inc. v. Cleveland Metroparks Sys. (1993), 82 Ohio App.3d 557, 562, citing Findlay City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Findlay Edn. Assn. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 129, paragraph one of the syllabus. Initially, appellant argues that the arbitration award should have been vacated, pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(C), because the arbitrator failed to hear numerous issues necessary for a complete and accurate accounting. This argument is not supported by the record. In fact, in his final order, the arbitrator indicated that he fully considered the disputed issues; however, the arbitrator ruled that these issues had been previously litigated and, thus, barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Appellant then argues that the arbitrator's decision was legally erroneous, and should have been vacated pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(D). Ohio law recognizes that when parties agree to submit their disputes to binding arbitration, they have bargained for the arbitrator's determination concerning the issues submitted and agree to accept the result regardless of its legal or factual -6- accuracy. Marra Constructors, Inc., 82 Ohio App.3d at 562-563 (emphasis added), citing Goodyear v. Local Union No. 200 (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 516; Huffman v. Valletto (1984), 15 Ohio App.3d 61, 63. As this court stated in Huffman, 15 Ohio App.3d at 63: When the arbitrators considered all the issues and rendered their second award, the court was obliged to enter judgment accordingly, despite the arbitrators' legal error. That result may seem inequitable, but any different result would destroy the integrity of binding arbitration. When disputing parties agree to submit their controversy to binding arbitration, they agree to accept the result, even if it is legally or factually wrong. [Citations omitted.] If the parties could challenge an arbitration decision on the ground that the arbitrators erroneously decided legal or factual issues, no arbitration would be binding. Binding arbitration precludes judicial review unless the arbitrators were corrupt or committed gross procedural improprieties. In the instant case, appellant maintains that the disputed issues were not previously litigated; therefore, appellant asserts that the arbitrator erroneously found these issues to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Assuming arguendo that appellant's argument is correct, the trial court was still required to affirm the arbitrator's decision. We note that appellant failed to provide any evidence that the arbitrator was corrupt or committed gross procedural improprieties, or that any other ground existed to vacate the arbitration award in this case. Appellant merely argues that the arbitrator's award was legally defective. Based upon the above-cited law, we hold that -7- the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to vacate the arbitration award. Accordingly, appellant's assignment of error is without merit and its appeal is overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, ADM. J. and JOSEPH J. NAHRA, J. CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY JUDGE N.B. This is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(B) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for -8- review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .