COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73318 S/O ex rel., : LTV STEEL COMPANY INC. : : ACCELERATED DOCKET Plaintiff-Appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : : AND CUYAHOGA CHILD SUPPORT : ENFORCEMENT : OPINION : Defendant-Appellant : PER CURIAM : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: APRIL 30, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-312207 JUDGMENT: Reversed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Appellee LTV Steel Co.: For Appellant CCSEA: JOHN T. BILLOCK, ESQ. ROBERT E. MATYJASIK, ESQ. LESTER W. ARMSTRONG, ESQ. CAROL SHOCKLEY, ESQ. Belkin, Billick, Harold 8th Floor Justice Center & Wiencek 1200 Ontario Street 23200 Chagrin Blvd. Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Suite 450 Cleveland, Ohio 44122 For U.S. Steel Workers of America: MARK A. ROCK, ESQ. TODD M. SMITH, ESQ. Schwartzwald & Rock 616 Bond Court Bldg. 1300 East Ninth Street Cleveland, Ohio 44114 -2- PER CURIAM: This is an accelerated appeal under App.R. 11.1, which by its nature imports that our decision in this appeal will be in brief, conclusory form. Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 158. We, therefore, conclude the following assigned error is well taken, and we reverse the trial court's decision: THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO GRANT DECLARATORY RELIEF WHERE JURISDICTION HAD PREVIOUSLY ATTACHED IN ANOTHER COURT. Appellee, LTV Steel Company, Inc. (LTV), filed a declaratory judgment action against appellant, Cuyahoga Child Support Agency (CSEA), seeking to avoid compliance with a requirement that lump- sum payments to employees must be held for 30 days. Prior to this action, CSEA had filed numerous show cause actions in juvenile and domestic relations court against various employees-obligors and their employer LTV. Apparently, LTV Steel, under a collective bargaining agreement, had made lump sum payments to these employees-obligors in contravention of the 30 day rule. The bargaining agreement called for these payments to be made within 10 days. In CSEA's motions it cited R.C. 3113.21(D)(1)(b)(x) which provides that, when an employee is subject to a withholding order, the court shall send the employer a notice that includes: *** a requirement that, no later than the earlier of forty-five days before the lump-sum payment is to be made or, if the obligor's right to the lump-sum payment is determined less than forty-five days before it is to be made, the date on which that determination is -3- made, the employer notify the child support enforcement agency of any lump-sum payments of any kind of five hundred dollars or more that are to be paid to the obligor, hold the lump- sum payments of five hundred dollars or more for thirty days after the date on which the lump-sum payments otherwise would have been paid to the obligor, if the lump-sum payments are workers' compensation benefits, severance pay, sick leave, lump-sum payments of retirement benefits or contributions, annual bonuses, or profit-sharing payments or distributions, and, upon order of the court, pay any specified amount of the lump-sum payment to the child support enforcement agency. (Emphasis added.) CSEA argued that the payments were subject to the thirty day hold requirement. LTV argued that because the payments are not included in any of the types of payments listed in the statute, they were not subject to the thirty day hold requirement. LTV filed a declaratory judgment action in common pleas court asking the court to determine that the hold requirement in R.C. 3113.21(D)(1)(b)(x) applied only to the types of payments specifically listed in the statute, and that the statute did not apply to the lump sum payments made to LTV employees. LTV also sought preliminary and permanent injunctions staying the motions to show cause and the hearings thereon. After denying CSEA's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for relief, the trial court granted LTV's motion for summary judgment.1 1 The United Steelworkers of America (USWA) joined the action as amicus curiae and submitted a brief in support of LTV's motion for summary judgment. -4- After reviewing this case, we conclude the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief where jurisdiction had previously attached in juvenile and domestic relations court. The jurisdictional priority rule provides that, when two state courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the court whose power is first invoked by the commencement of proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, to adjudicate the whole issue and to decide the parties' rights. State ex rel. Red Head Brass, Inc. v. Holmes Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 149, 151 (citations omitted.) However, the rule does not apply if the second case does not involve the same parties and the same cause of action. Id. See also State ex rel Dannaher v. Crawford (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 391, 393. This court has determined that the jurisdictional priority rule is applicable to two cases involving substantially the same parties. CWP L.P. v. Vitrano (May 15, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 71314, unreported, discretionary appeal not allowed (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 1415. LTV and CSEA were parties in both the declaratory judgment action and the show cause motions. Furthermore, the declaratory judgment ruling in this case clearly affects the resolution of the underlying show cause motions. In fact, LTV admits that it sought the declaratory judgment in order to facilitate the resolution of the show cause motions. Accordingly, the declaratory judgment action involves the same issue as the show cause motions -- whether LTV should have -5- held the lump sum payments for thirty days as required by R.C. 3113.21(D)(1)(b)(x). Because we conclude that the declaratory judgment action sought by LTV involved the same issue and substantially the same parties as the show cause motions, the jurisdictional priority rule operates to preclude the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the action. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court. Judgment reversed. This cause is reversed. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee their costs herein taxed. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. ______________________________ PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J. ______________________________ JOHN T. PATTON, JUDGE ______________________________ JAMES D. SWEENEY, JUDGE -6- N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 25(A); Loc. App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E), unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the .