COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73308 STATE OF OHIO : : JOURNAL ENTRY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : : AND v. : : OPINION DIVINE G. EPPS : : DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: DECEMBER 10, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court, No. CR-332915. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Esq. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Mark J. Mahoney, Esq. Assistant County Prosecutor Justice Center - Courts Tower 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: Darin Thompson, Esq. Assistant Public Defender 1200 West Third Street, N.W. 100 Lakeside Place Cleveland, OH 44113 -2- TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J.: Defendant-appellant Divine God Epps, a/k/a James L. Edwards, appeals his conviction in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for aggravated robbery, kidnapping and aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2911.01, R.C. 2905.01 and R.C. 2903.01 respectively. We find no merit to this appeal and affirm. The facts pertinent to the issues in this appeal are as follows. On January 23, 1996, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned a four-count indictment against appellant. Counts one and two charged appellant with aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.11, alleging that on February 11, 1974, appellant purposefully caused the death of Sylvia Greenbaum while committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery and kidnapping. Count three charged appellant with kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01 and count four charged appellant with aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01. On August 25, 1997, the trial court held a hearing on appellant's motion to suppress any oral and written statements he had made in connection with this case, motion to dismiss the indictment as time-barred and motion in limine. At the hearing, Michael Quinn, a detective with the Waukegan, Illinois Police Department, testified that appellant, using an alias of James L. Edwards, was arrested on January 4, 1996 in connection with an armed robbery that had occurred earlier the same day in Waukegan. Appellant was brought to the police station, -3- booked and then interviewed by Detectives Quinn and Mark Tkadlatz of the Waukegan Police Department. Detective Quinn testified that prior to interviewing appellant, he read appellant his Miranda rights, using a preprinted Rights Warning Waiver form prepared by the Waukegan Police Department. Appellant advised Detective Quinn that he understood his rights and then signed a written waiver of rights, which stated: The above statement of my RIGHTS (sic), and they have been explained to me. Any questions I have with respect to them have been explained to me and I understand what my rights are. I'am (sic) willing to make a statement and answer any questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I'am (sic) doing. No coercion of any kind has been used against me. Detectives Quinn and Tkadlatz then interviewed appellant for approximatelyone and one-half hours. Upon questioning, appellant admitted his involvement in the robbery in question. Detective Quinn then asked appellant if he had been involved in any other crimes that could be cleared up at that time. Appellant then gave an oral statement regarding his involvement in other robberies and murders dating back to 1973. Detective Quinn testified that he then typed a three-page statement from the detectives' notes of the interview, read the statement to appellant and gave appellant an opportunity to read it himself. After reading it, appellant signed each page of the statement, using the alias James Edwards. The statement included -4- the following details regarding appellant's involvement in a crime that occurred in Shaker Heights, Ohio in 1974: I went to Cleveland. In 1974 I was in this part of town called Shaker Heights, and there was this white elderly lady getting into her car. I walked up to her to ask her for some spare change, and she said something nasty and spat in my face. I had this .22 cal[iber] pistol on me so I pulled it out and unloaded it on her while she was in the car. I then drove the car up the street a little bit with her in the car and left it sitting on the side of the road. I then had to leave Cleveland. *** When I would do these things, I would do them by myself and I wouldn't tell anyone. It's hard to explain, but its like it gave me a `god feeling.' Like I could do this shit and not be preoccupied with the consequences of my actions. It was like a kind of `freedom.' Upon obtaining this information, Detectives Quinn and Tkadlatz turned their reports and appellant's statement over to their supervisor, who contacted the Cleveland Police regarding the confession made by appellant. Appellant was indicted on January 23, 1996 and extradited from Illinois in May, 1997 to face trial on the charges. At the suppression hearing, appellant testified that the arresting officers did not advise him of his Miranda rights and that he told them many times that he did not wish to talk to them. Appellant admitted, however, that Detectives Quinn and Tkadlatz read him his Miranda rights, that he understood his rights and that he signed the Rights Waiver Form. According to appellant, he told Detectives Quinn and Tkadlatz that he did not want to talk, and decided to talk only after Detective Quinn threatened to arrest appellant's wife as a possible accomplice to the burglary. -5- Appellant testified that during his interrogation by the detectives he admitted his involvement in the burglary in Waukegan, but denied being involved in any other crimes. According to appellant, he told Detective Quinn that he was aware that a woman had been killed in Shaker Heights in 1974, but denied that he was involved in the murder. Appellant testified that the specific details of the crimes outlined in his statement, including the murder in Shaker Heights, were provided by the detectives and not by him. Appellant also denied ever telling Detectives Quinn and Tkadlatz that he had to leave Cleveland to avoid prosecution, and testified that he told them that he left because he had an argument with his son's mother. Appellant testified that the only trouble he ever had in Cleveland was an arrest on a burglary charge, and that following his arrest in Illinois, he wrote back to Cleveland and requested a trial on the charge. According to appellant, the charge was ultimately dismissed. Appellant admitted at the suppression hearing that he had read and signed each page of the three-page statement even though, according to appellant, it contained numerous inaccuracies. Appellant testified that he signed the statement even though he knew it was inaccurate because he thought his breath and body stank, and he was tired and wanted to end the interrogation. The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress, finding the testimony of Detective Quinn more credible than that of appellant and that there was nothing coercive about the interview -6- process. In response to appellant's motion in limine, however, the court ordered that the only portions of the statement that could be admitted into evidence were appellant's statements regarding the 1996 armed robbery in Waukegan, Illinois, the 1974 murder in Shaker Heights and his reason for committing the offenses. The trial court also denied appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment as time-barred, finding that appellant's statement that he left Cleveland to avoid prosecution for murder and his use of an alias were sufficient evidence to toll the statute of limitations. At trial, the state called several witnesses who had investigated the February 11, 1974 homicide of Sylvia Greenbaum. Commander Lloyd Bratz testified that on that day in 1974 he was a uniformed patrol officer and received a radio assignment to respond to 3987 East 121st Street in Cleveland to investigate a suspicious auto with a possible body inside. Upon arrival, Officer Bratz observed a body slumped over the front floorboard of a 1971 Cadillac Eldorado. He also observed a purse in the backseat of the car. The purse was open and its contents were scattered throughout the interior of the car. Officer Bratz testified that the glove compartment was also open and it appeared as if someone had looked through it. After determining that the victim was already deceased, Officer Bratz secured the scene, and then dispatched the Cleveland Police Homicide Unit and the Scientific Investigation Unit to the scene. Detective Michael Savage testified that he was one of the assigned detectives from the Homicide Unit who responded to the -7- scene on February 11, 1974. Detective Savage requested that the Scientific Investigation Unit send a photograph and fingerprint officer to the scene and then identified the victim as Sylvia Greenbaum. Detective Savage testified that he observed a pair of new shoes in the trunk of the car and that he later learned that the victim was last seen shopping at a shoe store on Shaker Square on February 11, 1974. Detective Savage testified that as a result of their investigation, the detectives determined that the victim had likely parked her car in a parking area on the roof of the shoe store and was approached by her assailant as she was either entering her car or standing by the trunk, shot and then forced down on the floor of the car. Retired police officer Paul Kordich testified that he was the crime scene technician with the Special Investigation Unit who photographed the victim's car and dusted it for prints. Officer Kordich testified that he lifted and preserved a right thumb fingerprint from the inside front passenger window of the victim's car. Detective Edward Prince, a latent fingerprint expert with the Cleveland Police Department, testified that this print was identical to that of appellant. Chief Deputy Coroner Robert Challener, M.D., testified that the victim was shot five times on her right side and died of internal bleeding as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. Detective Daniel Rowley, a firearms examiner with the Forensic Laboratory Unit of the Cleveland Police Department, testified that the five bullets recovered from the victim's body were of .22 -8- caliber and three of the five bullets were fired from the same weapon. Finally, Homicide Detective Edward Kovacic testified that leveland Police Department records show that appellant was arrested n Cleveland on December 12, 1973 and on March 9, 1974 on separate urglar y charges. When he was arrested in December of 1973, ppellant listed his address as 11701 Dove Avenue in Cleveland. etecti ve Kovacic testified that the distance between where the ictim's car was found and 11701 Dove Avenue is only about two locks. Detective Kovacic also noted that the record and photo heet for appellant's December 12, 1973 arrest contains the notation 10-31-77 Nolled. Appellant did not call any witnesses in his defense. The jury ound appellant guilty of all charges and the trial court sentenced im to life imprisonment on counts one and two, and consecutive ermsof incarceration of five to fifteen years on count three and even to twenty-five years on count four. Appellant timely ppeale d, presenting the following assignments of error for our eview: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING AS TIME-BARRED THE COUNTS OF KIDNAPPING AND AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, AND THE COUNTS OF AGGRAVATED MURDER BASED THEREON, BASED UPON APPELLANT'S AVOIDANCE OF PROSECU- TION, WHERE THE RECORD CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES THAT APPELLANT NOTIFIED THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OF HIS RESIDENCE NINETEEN (19) YEARS BEFORE THE PROSECU- TION WAS COMMENCED. II. APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, KIDNAPPING AND AGGRAVATED MURDER WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE -9- AND THEREFORE VIOLATED HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF OTHER ACTS WHICH OCCURRED OVER TWENTY (20) YEARS AFTER THE CRIME WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURRED. In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the rial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment s time-barred. Specifically, appellant asserts that the trial ourt should have dismissed the kidnapping and aggravated robbery harges as barred by the six-year statute of limitations in R.C. 901.13, and the aggravated murder charges because they included as lement s the offenses of aggravated robbery and kidnapping, for hich the statute of limitations had run. R.C. 2901.13 provides that: Except as otherwise provided in this section, a criminal prosecution shall be barred unless it is commenced within the following periods afteran offense is committed *** for a felony other than aggravated murder or murder, six years. .C. 2901.13 further provides that this time period is tolled when person flees to avoid prosecution: The period of limitation shall not run during any time when the accused purposely avoids prosecution. Proof that the accused absented himself from this state or concealed his identity or whereabouts is prima facie evidence of his purpose to avoid prosecution. Appellant argues that the six-year statute of limitations found n R.C. 2901.13 is applicable to the kidnapping and aggravated obbery charges. Appellant acknowledges that his absence from Ohio rguably tolled the statute of limitations, but asserts that the -10- olling provisions of R.C. 2901.13 do not apply in this case because he record conclusively establishes that he informed appellee of is whereabouts in 1977 when he notified the prosecutor's office hat he was serving a prison sentence in Illinois and requested a rialon his outstanding burglary charges. Accordingly, appellant rgues that the statute of limitations on the kidnapping and ggravated robbery charges expired in 1983, six years subsequent to his notification. Here, the prosecution was not commenced until anuary 23, 1996, when the indictment was returned. Therefore, ppellant argues that the prosecution was barred by the express anguage of R.C. 2901.13. Appellee responds that the statute of limitations did not begin unning until January 4, 1996 when appellant was identified as a uspect. This argument is without merit. R.C. 2901.13 expressly tates that the period of limitation for an offense begins after n offense is committed, (emphasis added), not after a suspect is dentified. Ohio courts have repeatedly held that the plain ording of the statute requires that felony prosecutions (other than urder or aggravated murder) must be brought within six years from he date the offense is committed. State v. Hensley (1991), 59 hio St.3d 136, 137. Appellee's position is directly contrary to he plain language of the statute and the case law interpreting it, nd we emphatically reject it. We find, however, that the tolling provisions of R.C. 2901.13 pply because appellant admitted that he left Cleveland to avoid rosecution and he used an alias to conceal his identity. At the -11- uppression hearing, appellant admitted that he read and signed the hree-page typed statement prepared by Detective Quinn. This tatement clearly contains appellant's confession to a murder in haker Heights in 1974 and his reason for leaving Cleveland: to voidprosecution for the murder. Moreover, appellant's signature s James Edwards on the statement makes it apparent that after eaving Cleveland, appellant used an alias to disguise his identity. Appellant's argument that appellee knew of his whereabouts as arlyas 1977 is not persuasive. The only evidence that appellant otified appellee of his Illinois address in 1977 is appellant's elf-serving testimony during the suppression hearing. The trial ourt, after hearing this testimony, concluded that it was not redible. At a suppression hearing, the evaluation of the evidence nd the credibility of the witnesses are issues for the trier of act.State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, paragraph one of he syllabus. Moreove r, even though the record and photo sheet for ppellant's December 12, 1973 burglary charge contains the notation 10-31-77 Nolled, there is no evidence that the burglary charge was olled in response to any notification from appellant that he was ow residing in Illinois. Accordingly, the record does not stablish that appellant put appellee on notice of his whereabouts n 1977. The state bears the burden of proving that the time when the rime was committed comes within the appropriate statute of imitation. State v. Mitchell (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 613, 616. -12- ere, given that appellant admitted that he left Cleveland to avoid rosecution and that he used an alias to conceal his identity, ppellee met its burden of proving that the statute of limitation as tolled and the prosecution was timely. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. In his second assignment of error, appellant challenges the ufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for idnapping, aggravated robbery and aggravated murder. Appellant rgues that since his convictions for kidnapping and aggravated obbery are not supported by sufficient evidence, his convictions or aggravated murder, which incorporate the elements of kidnapping nd aggravated robbery, are similarly not supported by sufficient vidence. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a onviction requires a court to determine whether the state has met ts burden of production at trial. State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 hio St.3d 380, 390 (Cook, J. and Lundberg Stratton, J., oncurring). On review for sufficiency, courts are to assess not hether the state's evidence is to be believed, but whether, if elieved, the evidence against a defendant would support a onviction. Id.The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the vidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational rierof fact could have found the essential elements of the crime roven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio t.3d 259, paragraph two of the syllabus. -13- R.C. 2905.01 sets forth the elements of kidnapping. It rovides in relevant part: (A) No person, by force, threat, or deception, *** shall remove another from the place where the other person is found or restrain the liberty of the other person, for any of the following purposes: (2) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter; (3) To terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim ***. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the rosecution, we conclude that appellee presented sufficient evidence n each of the essential elements of kidnapping. Specifically, ppellant's own statement indicates that after shooting the victim, e drove the car up the street a little bit with her in the car **. Because the medical evidence showed that the victim died of nternal bleeding, the jury could reasonably infer that the victim as alive while appellant drove away from the scene of the shooting. ikewise, Detective Savage testified that the detectives concluded hat the victim was likely approached by her assailant as she was ntering her car or standing by the trunk, shot and then forced down n the floor of the car. Thus, a jury could permissibly find that ppellant restrained the liberty of the victim. Finally, the victim as last seen in the Shaker Square shopping district, although her ar and body were found on East 121st Street. A jury could easonably conclude, therefore, that appellant removed the victim rom the place where she was found. -14- Appellee similarly presented sufficient evidence to support ppellant's conviction for aggravated robbery. R.C. 2911.01(A) rovides that: (A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following: (1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the offender possesses it, or use it; (2) Have a dangerous ordnance on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control; (3) Inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on another. The court instructed the jury that theft offense was defined s follows: [W]ith a purpose to deprive the owner of property, knowingly obtaining or exerting control over the property in any of the following ways: (1) without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent; (2) beyond the scope of implied or expressed consent of the owneror person authorized to give consent. It can also be by deception, or it can be by threat. Although the evidence of aggravated robbery in this case is ircumstantial, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to he prosecution, there is sufficient evidence from which a jury ouldreasonably find appellant guilty. First, appellant admitted hat he had a gun. Second, the photographic and testimonial vidence clearly demonstrates that the perpetrator of these crimes mptied the victim's purse and ransacked the glove compartment. herefo re, based on the condition of the purse and the glove -15- ompartment, a jury could reasonably find a theft of the victim's roperty. Finally, appellant admitted in his statement that he took he victim's car--an admission of a completed theft offense that is, n itself, sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated obbery. Because appellant's convictions for kidnapping and aggravated urder are supported by sufficient evidence, there is no merit to ppellant's argument that his conviction for aggravated murder, hich incorporates the offenses of kidnapping and aggravated obbery, is not supported by sufficient evidence. Appellant's econd assignment of error is overruled. In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the rial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of other cts. Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court should ot have admitted, over defense counsel objection, evidence that he as involved in an armed robbery when he was arrested in Waukegan, llinois in January, 1996--twenty-two years after the offense for hichhe was on trial occurred. Appellant asserts that the nature f this act was sufficiently similar to the crime for which ppellant was on trial that the jury reached a verdict based on a onclusion that appellant was a person likely to do such acts, ather than on the evidence. Appellee argues that the evidence was admitted only to show how ppellant came into police custody and, even if it was admitted in rror, any error was harmless, considering the amount of evidence inking appellant to the offenses he was convicted of. -16- Evid.R. 404(B) states: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Evidence of crimes or other acts is admissible only when it is elevant to one of the matters listed in the rule, such as motive r intent. State v. DeMarco (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 191, 194. The rinciple underlying Evid.R. 404(B) is that evidence of other acts s simply so prejudicial that to allow it in outweighs its value as elevant evidence. State v. Prokos (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 39, 43. In a criminal case in which a defendant-appellant alleges that t was prejudicial error to allow the jury to hear certain estimony, the reviewing court must first determine if it was error o allow the jury to hear the testimony, and if so, whether such rrorwas prejudicial or harmless. State v. Davis (1975), 44 Ohio pp.2d 335, paragraph three of the syllabus. A review of the record does not reflect that the testimony was ffered for any of the permissible purposes under the rule, nor was here any instruction given by the trial court to enable the jury o use the testimony for a proper purpose allowed by Evid.R. 404(B). herefore, we find that it was error for the trial court to permit he testimony regarding appellant's 1996 armed robbery offense ecause it bore no relation to the crimes as charged. Having determinedthat the testimony in question was error, we ust determine whether the error was prejudicial or harmless. -17- avis, 44 Ohio App.2d at 343. In so determining, the court must eview the entire record, disregarding the objectionable material, nd determine whether there was otherwise overwhelming evidence of he appellant's guilt. State v. Woods (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 1, -6. If the court finds overwhelming evidence of the appellant's uiltaside from the disputed material, then it must hold that the rror was not prejudicial and harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, nd affirm the trial court. Davis, supra. at 344. We have carefully reviewed the record before us as a whole, isregarding the references to appellant's involvement in an armed obbery on January 4, 1996, and conclude that the record emonstrates overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt aside from he disputed evidence. Accordingly, any error in allowing the estimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's third assignment of error is overruled. Appellant also presents two pro se issues for our review: 1. Whether the lower court erred in denying the motion to uppress the statement made by the defendant while in police ustody. 2. Whether or not appointed trial counsel was ineffective in is representation of the defendant. In his first pro se assignment of error, appellant argues that he trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the tatements he made to Detectives Quinn and Tkadlatz of the Waukegan olice Department. Appellant argues that after the arresting fficers read him his Miranda rights, he told them he had nothing -18- o say. Therefore, appellant argues, Detectives Quinn and Tkadlatz oerced a confession from him in violation of his right to remain ilent and the trial court should have suppressed the confession. There is no support in the record for appellant's argument. n fact, at the suppression hearing, appellant testified that the rresting officers did not ever advise him of his Miranda rights. oreover, the trial court heard appellant's testimony regarding the ircumstances surrounding his statement and concluded that his estimony was not credible. Indeed, the trial court found that etectives Quinn and Tkadlatz fully advised appellant of his onstitutional rights, that he waived these rights and that there as nothing coercive about the interview process. The trial court assumes the role of trier of fact during roceedings on a motion to suppress. State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio t.3d 357, 366; State v. Tolbert (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 86, 90. t a suppression hearing, the evaluation of the evidence and the redibility of the witnesses are issues for the trier of fact. tate v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, paragraph one of the yllabu s. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to uppress, this court must accept the trial court's factual findings f they are supported by competent credible evidence. State v. eaver (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 427, 429. Upon review of the record, we find that the factual findings f the trial court are supported by the competent and credible estimony of Detective Quinn. Accordingly, we find no error in the rial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress his -19- tatement. Appellant's first pro se assignment of error is verruled. In his second pro se assignment of error, appellant contends hat his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when is trial counsel failed to call the Waukegan Police Department fficers who arrested appellant on January 6, 1996 for armed robbery o testify at the suppression hearing. Appellant contends that the estimony of these officers would have established that appellant nvoked his right to remain silent and, therefore, that his ubsequent confession was not voluntary. Courts presume that duly licensed attorneys perform ffectively. Vaughn v. Maxwell (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 299, 301. To revail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant ust show that his counsel substantially violated an essential duty nd that appellant was prejudiced thereby. Strickland v. Washington 1984), 466 U.S. 668. To succeed on his claim, appellant must atisfy the following two-prong test: first, there must be a etermination as to whether there has been a substantial violation f any of defense counsel's essential duties to his client; next, nd analytically separate from the question of whether the efendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated, there must be a etermination as to whether the defense was prejudiced by counsel's neffectiveness. State v. Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396-97. There is nothing in the record to substantiate appellant's elf-serving claim that if called to testify, the arresting officers ould have testified that appellant invoked his right to remain -20- ilent. Moreover, appellant has presented no evidence that he was rejudi ced by trial counsel's failure to call such witnesses. ather, appellant merely speculates that there is a strong ossibility that the trial court would have ruled differently on is motion to suppress if it had heard the officers' testimony. Accordingly, appellant has failed to show that his counsel was neffec tive. Appellant's second pro se assignment of error is verruled. -21- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein axed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court irecting the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into xecution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any ail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court or execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate ursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE JUDGE ORTER, P.J. and YKE, J., CONCUR. .B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See pp.R. 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); oc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become he judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 6(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the ourt's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court f Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's .