COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73145 JAMES WILLIAMS : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : -vs- : JOURNAL ENTRY : AND RICHARD CHUDNER : OPINION : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OCTOBER 22, 1998 OF DECISION : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Cleveland Municipal Court Case No. 97- CVI-5350 JUDGMENT : Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: Lawrence Rafalski, Esq. P.O. Box 93701 Cleveland, Ohio 44101-5701 For defendant-appellant: Joseph R. Wantz, Esq. Henry A. Hentemann, Esq. Richard C. Talbert, Esq. Meyers, Hentemann, Schneider & Rea 2100 Superior Building 815 Superior Avenue, N.E. Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Gerard D'Souza, Esq. 1480 Warren Road #614 Lakewood, Ohio 44107 -2- Attorneys continued: Ronald J. Ziehm, Esq. Gareau & Dubelko 23823 Lorain Road Suite 200 North Olmsted, Ohio 44070 -3- MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, J.: D ellant, Richard Chudner, appeals the decision of he Clevelandefendant-appt Municipal Court, Small Claims Division, to magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law finding in favor of plaintiff-appellee, James Williams, in the amount of $1,500. Defendant-appellant raises two errors for review. This court, finding no error, affirms the decision of the trial court. On March 3, 1997, plaintiff-appellee, James Williams, filed an action in the Cleveland Municipal Court, Small Claims Division, against defendant-appellant, Richard Chudner, for $2,730 in damages resulting from an automobile accident that occurred on February 4, 1997. Plaintiff-appellee also brought this action against defendant-appellant's insurance carrier, State Farm Insurance Company. Plaintiff-appellee claimed defendant-appellant was negligent in making an illegal U-Turn directly in front of him causing the collision. On March 31, 1997, defendant-appellant filed a counterclaim arguing plaintiff-appellee's own negligence was the cause of the accident. As a result, defendant-appellant sought $3,000 in compensatory damages.1A hearing was held on April 4, 1997. On June 20, 1997, the magistrate entered judgment for plaintiff-appellee in the amount of $1,500 and denied defendant-appellant's counterclaim. Moreover, the magistrate dismissed State Farm Insurance Company 1Although untimely filed, the court, in the interest of justice, permitted a counterclaim for $2,500. No objections were filed. -4- without prejudice and issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Defendant-appellant timely filed objections to the magistrate's decision/report. On August 7, 1997, the trial court denied defendant-appellant's objections and adopted the magistrate's report. On September 8, 1997, defendant-appellant filed his notice of appeal. On November 21, 1997, defendant- appellant filed a Statement of the Evidence pursuant to App.R. 9(C). On December 3, 1997, the trial court denied defendant- appellant's Statement of Evidence and adopted the magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law as the statement of the evidence. Since a review of the record is necessary in considering defendant-appellant's first assignment of error, we will first address the trial court's action as set forth in defendant- appellant's second assignment of error: II. THE TRIAL COURT'S ADOPTION OF THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION WITH FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE PURPOSE OF APP.R. 9 AND, THEREFORE, PREVENTS THE APPELLATE COURT FROM DETERMINING THE MERITS OF APPELLANT CHUDNER'S APPEAL. Defendant-appellant argues the trial court erred when it denied his Statement of the Evidence since plaintiff-appellee did not object to its introduction. Moreover, defendant-appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law. We disagree. It is well settled that an appellant bears the burden of providing a transcript to an appellate court. Knapp v. Edwards -5- Laboratories (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 197. If a transcript is unavailable, an appellant is obligated to provide a complete record pursuant to App.R. 9(C), (D) or (E). App. R. 9(C) provides: "If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including his recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee no later than twenty days prior to the time for transmission of the record pursuant to Rule 10, who may serve objections or propose amendments thereto within ten days after service. Thereupon, the statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be forthwith submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval. The trial court shall act thereon prior to the time for transmission of the record pursuant to Rule 10, and, as settled and approved, the statement shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal." (Emphasis added). In the present case, defendant-appellant filed his notice of appeal on September 8, 1997. Accordingly, the record should have been submitted within forty (40) days of that date. However, an extension of time was granted until November 21, 1997 in which to file the record. As we understand App.R. 9(C), defendant-appellant then had to submit the Statement of Evidence twenty days prior to that date, i.e., November 1, 1997. In this case, defendant-appellant submitted a Statement of the Evidence pursuant to App.R. 9(C) on November 21, 1997. Accordingly, defendant-appellant's Statement of Evidence was untimely and the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in its denial. We therefore accept the trial court's adoption of the magistrate's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as the record of the proceedings below for this appeal. See, e.g., Austin v. Squire -6- (1997), 118 Ohio App.3d 35; Channel Dry, Inc. v. Haver (1990), 70 Ohio App.3d 197. Defendant-appellant's second assignment of error is not well taken. Defendant-appellant states as his first assignment of error: I. THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND/OR IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. Defendant-appellant argues the trial court's refusal to consider relevant evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion and has resulted in an award which is against the manifest weight of the evidence. More specifically, defendant-appellant argues since plaintiff-appellee did not own the vehicle, he was required to present evidence of a bailment. The testimony of plaintiff-appellee that his daughter gave him permission to drive, in light of the fact that the vehicle had fictitious license plates at the time of the accident, is insufficient to establish the necessary requirement of bailment. Finally, defendant-appellant argues there was absolutely no evidence submitted by plaintiff-appellee with regard to damages to his vehicle. Initially, we note that small claims courts are not bound by the Rules of Evidence. Evid.R. 101(C)(8). As stated in the Staff Notes: *** Referees obviously require some reliable evidence to prove a claim, but a referee, exercising some discretion, should not deny a layman justice through a formalistic application of the law of evidence. A small claims division is intended as a layman's forum. After a review of the record in its entirety and keeping in mind the discretion afforded to referees/magistrates in small -7- claims court (especially with regard to the introduction of evidence), we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion and issued an award which is against the manifest weight of the evidence. First, claims that plaintiff-appellee did not have standing to bring this action are not supported by the record. The trial court held that the vehicle was titled to plaintiff-appellee's daughter and that he had exclusive control of the vehicle. Defendant- appellant's argument concerning bailment is misplaced since there are no competing interests to the same automobile. R.C. 4505.04; Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 150. While the magistrate's reference to Hoegler v. Hamper (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 280 is inapplicable, there was sufficient evidence in the record upon which plaintiff-appellee can bring this cause of action. Moreover, the magistrate acknowledged that plaintiff-appellee failed to present estimates of the damage to his vehicle. However, the magistrate did review the pictures of the damage to plaintiff- appellee's vehicle and reviewed the Yellow Used Car Book for December of 1996 to find the trade-in-costs of that vehicle would be $1,325 to $1,950; the retain cost ranged from $2,500 to $3,200. It is well established that judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. -8- Foley Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279. While it would be desirable to have repair estimates from which to formulate an award for compensatory damages, we find that when keeping in mind the relaxed evidentiary requirements present in a small claims court, there was sufficient evidence in the record demonstrating a basis upon which the magistrate could make its award. Defendant- appellant's first assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed. -9- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cleveland Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCURS; TIMOTHY E. MCMONAGLE, P.J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY JUDGE MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc. App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E), unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A) is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .