COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73121 STATE OF OHIO : JOURNAL ENTRY : AND Plaintiff-appellee : OPINION : -vs- : : PEDRO APONTE : : Defendant-appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: AUGUST 13, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-348852 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, ESQ. CUYAHOGA COUNTY PROSECUTOR BY: KESTRA SMITH, ESQ. ASSISTANT COUNTY PROSECUTOR 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: JOHN B. GIBBONS, ESQ. 2000 Standard Building 1370 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 DYKE, J.: Appellant, Pedro Aponte, appeals his conviction for corruption of a juvenile with drugs, R.C. 2925.02. For the following reasons, -2- we affirm. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial. The judge heard the following testimony: Detective Hutchinson of the Cleveland Police Department Nar- cotics Unit testified that the police had received complaints of drug sales taking place in the area of West 50th and Eichorn, during after school hours. On January 9, 1997, Hutchinson parked in an undercover vehicle on Eichorn. He observed a group of young men on the corner of 50th and Eichorn. The men ranged in age from ten to twenty-five. Hutchinson testified that he observed appellant cross the street and meet with Larry Colon and another male, Sanchez. Appellant was wearing a Cleveland Indians starter jacket with a white hooded sweatshirt underneath. Appellant, Colon and Sanchez were 150 feet away from Hutchinson's vehicle. Using binoculars, Hutchinson observed appellant pull something out of his pocket. Colon handed appellant some cash. Then, appellant sprinkled an object into Colon's hand. Colon put the object in the breast pocket of his coat. Hutchinson further testified that Colon and Sanchez went one way and appellant went another. Hutchinson broadcast a description of Colon and Sanchez. Detective Hutchinson followed appellant. Appellant went into a house on West 50th. Hutchinson received a broadcast that other officers had found nine small rocks of cocaine in Colon's breast pocket. Hutchinson testified that two hours later, appellant emerged -3- from the house wearing a white t-shirt with no jacket. Appellant drove away with another male. Appellant was stopped and arrested by police. No drugs were found on appellant's person or in the vehicle. With permission of appellant's father, the police obtained the Indians jacket and white sweatshirt from the home. Hutchinson testified that he booked appellant. Appellant told the police he was eighteen years old and his birth date was November 23, 1978. Appellant said that he knew Larry Colon, did not know Colon's age, but knew Colon was, not as old as I am. Colon's booking card stated that Colon was fifteen years old and Colon's birth date was August 19, 1981. Sergeant Heffernan of the Cleveland Police Department testi- fied that he received a radio broadcast from Hutchinson describing Colon and Sanchez. Heffernan arrested Colon and found crack cocaine in the upper pocket of Colon's jacket. Larry Colon testified as a defense witness. Colon stated that he just happened to have four small rocks on him. Colon obtained the rocks from someone on 130th. Appellant did not give him the rocks. Appellant gave him change to buy philly blunts at the store. Colon had known appellant a couple of months, and had talked to appellant a couple times. Detective Hutchinson testified on rebuttal that Colon never crossed the street to go to the store. Appellant's sole assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL PURSUANT TO RULE 29(A), OHIO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AS THERE WAS INSUFFI- CIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THE -4- OFFENSES (SIC) CHARGED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, an appellate court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 520, State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259. The essential elements of corrupting a minor with drugs, are: the defendant knowingly furnished or administered a controlled substance to a juvenile who was at least two years the offender's junior, when the offender knew the age of the juvenile or was reckless in that regard. R.C. 2925.02(A)(4)(a). Detective Hutchinson testified that he observed Colon hand appellant cash, and appellant sprinkled something into Colon's hand. Colon put the objects into his breast pocket. When police arrested Colon, nine small rocks of crack cocaine were found in Colon's breast pocket. Appellant was eighteen years old and Colon was fifteen. Based upon this evidence, reasonable minds could conclude that appellant furnished the crack cocaine to a juvenile who was at least two years younger than appellant. See Jenks, supra. Appellant asserts that there was no evidence proving that he knew Colon was a juvenile at least two years younger than appel- lant, or was reckless in that regard. A defendant has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist. R.C. 2901.22(B). -5- . . . A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that such circum- stances are likely to exist. R.C. 2901.22(C). Something is probable when there is more reason for expectation or belief than not, whereas something is likely when there is merely good reason for expectation or belief. State v. Pack (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 632. If the defendant is aware that it is possible that certain circumstances exist, the defendant is reckless with respect to those circumstances. State v. Edwards (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 357. There was evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that appellant was aware that it was possible or likely that Colon was a minor two years younger than appellant. Appel- lant knew Colon was younger than himself. Appellant and Colon had known each other for several months and had several conversations. It was generally known by residents in the area that school child- ren were involved in drug sales after school. The trial judge saw Colon when Colon testified, and could determine if it appeared that Colon could possibly be two years younger than appellant. Colon was in fact fifteen years old, two years and eight months younger than appellant. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that appellant was aware of the possibility that Colon could be a minor two years younger than appellant and appellant perversely disregarded this known risk, with indifference to the consequences. There was sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could find all the essential elements of corrupting a juvenile with drugs beyond a reasonable doubt. -6- Accordingly, appellant's assignment of error is overruled. The decision of the trial court is affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. BLACKMON, A.J, AND O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. ANN DYKE JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App. R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App. R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .