COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA No. 73097 IN THE MATTER OF: : MICHAEL SZYMCZAK : : JOURNAL ENTRY : : AND : : OPINION DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : JULY 23, 1998 : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS : Civil appeal from : JUVENILE COURT : Case No. 9790925 : JUDGMENT : JUDGMENT VACATED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: For defendant-appellant: DARLENE AMATO-BRUSNAHAN, ESQ. LYNN STEWART, ESQ. PAMELA A. SKOCIC, ESQ. Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services 3955 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, OH 44115 LAWRENCE R. FLOYD, ESQ. Suite 105 3645 Warrensville Center Road Shaker Heights, OH 44122-5210 LINDA S. PAVARINI, ESQ. 26631 Lakeshore Boulevard Euclid, OH 44132 STANLEY MORGANSTERN, ESQ. MICHAEL A. PARTLOW, ESQ. Morganstern, MacAdams & DeVito 400 The Burgess Building 1406 West Sixth Street Cleveland, OH 44113 -2- JOHN T. PATTON, J.: In March 1997, the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services ( CCDCFS ) filed a complaint in the juvenile court seeking to have the child declared abused as defined in R.C. 2151.031(A). The complaint alleged that in 1994, CCDCFS documented acts of sexual abuse committed by the child's father. The complaint further alleged that the domestic relations court had granted the father unsupervised visitation (apparently as part of ongoing post-decree domestic relations divorce proceedings), and this unsupervised visitation would place the child at risk of serious harm. When it appeared to CCDCFS that the domestic relations court actually denied the father's request for unsupervised visitation, CCDCFS asked the court for permission to withdraw the complaint. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice after hearing the father complain that CCDCFS should not be able to hold the sexual abuse allegations over him when those alleged acts of abuse had never been proven and, in fact, were alleged to have occurred in 1991. CCDCFS then filed a motion for reconsideration asking the court to modify the dismissal to without prejudice. The court granted reconsideration and changed the dismissal to without prejudice. The issue raised in the appeal is whether the juvenile court had authority to vacate its order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Our jurisdiction is limited by R.C. 2505.02, which only permits us to hear appeals from final orders or, more specific to this case, to an order that affects a substantial right made in a -3- special proceeding. A dismissal without prejudice relieves the court of all jurisdiction over the matter, and the action is treated as though it had never been commenced. See Zimmie v. Zimmie (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 94, 95; DeVille Photography, Inc. v. Bowers(1959), 169 Ohio St. 267, 272; Conley v. Jenkins (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 511, 517. If the action had never been commenced, it follows that nothing could have been determined with the kind of finality required by R.C. 2505.02. An adjudication by a juvenile court that a child is neglected or dependent as defined by R.C. Chapter 2151, followed by a disposition awarding temporary custody to a public children services agency, is a final order within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02. See In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 155, syllabus. If, as here, the court refused to make any finding of neglect under R.C. 2151.031, it follows that nothing had been adjudicated so that a final, appealable order existed. In the parlance used by R.C. 2505.02, the dismissal without prejudice did not affect the father's substantial rights. Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 60; Walters v. Enrichment Ctr. of Wishing Well, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 118, 122; Benaco Tooling, Inc. v. Bancorp Holdings, Inc. (Mar. 21, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 69015, unreported. On the face of the matter, we would lack a final, appealable order since a dismissal without prejudice is not a final, appealable order. Despite what we have said about the finality of the court's order dismissing CCDCFS's complaint without prejudice, we -4- nonetheless must consider whether the court had initial authority to reconsider and reverse its prior decision to dismiss CCDCFS's complaint with prejudice. For if the court had no authority to dismiss the matter without prejudice after having dismissed the matter with prejudice, the ostensibly non-appealable order dismissing without prejudice would be void. In Pitts v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 378, paragraph one of the syllabus states, the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure do not prescribe motions for reconsideration after a final judgment in the trial court. A court may only grant relief from judgment by means of Civ.R. 50(B), Civ.R. 59, or Civ.R. 60(B). Id.at 380. The courts have considered this holding to preclude a court from sua sponte vacating a judgment. See Sperry v. Hlutke (1984), 19 Ohio App. 3d 156, 158; In re Guardianship of Maurer (1995), 108 Ohio App. 3d 354, 357; Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Forest Cartage Co. (1990), 68 Ohio App. 3d 333, 337. In this case, the court reconsidered an otherwise valid final judgment without having a motion for relief from judgment before it. This is tantamount to a sua sponte vacation of judgment. It follows that the court's order changing the dismissal with prejudice to a dismissal without prejudice must be considered a nullity. The original order dismissing the complaint with prejudice must stand. CCDCFS makes two arguments in support of the court's reconsideration. First, it argues the court had no power to grant a dismissal with prejudice because the Rules of Juvenile Procedure -5- do not provide for such a dismissal. Second, it argues Juv.R. 45(B) gives the juvenile court sufficient leeway in which to reconsider and vacate a dismissal with prejudice. The Rules of Juvenile Procedure are to be applied in all proceedings coming within the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. See Juv.R. 1(A). There are exceptions to that rule, see Juv.R. 1(C), but none of these exceptions apply in this case. Because the Rules of Juvenile Procedure are not all-encompassing in substance, the Rules of Civil Procedure generally apply to juvenile court proceedings to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the juvenile rules. See Civ.R. 1(C)(7). However, we are cautioned that proceedings in the juvenile division are the least amenable to coverage by the Civil Rules. See State ex rel. Fowler v. Smith (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 357, 360, citing 4 Harper, Anderson's Ohio Civil Practice (1987), 57, Section 147.04(g). To that end, Juv.R. 45(B) permits the juvenile court to proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with the Rules of Juvenile Procedure or local rule. Although the Rules of Juvenile Procedure do not explicitly grant the juvenile courts authority to dismiss a complaint with prejudice, that authority is implicit in the rules since they otherwise provide for dismissals without prejudice. For example, Juv.R. 34(A) states that if the juvenile court fails to conduct a dispositional hearing within ninety days after adjudicating a child abused, neglected or dependent, it shall dismiss the complaint without prejudice. If the General Assembly thought it necessary to -6- make specific provision that a dismissal should be without prejudice, it stands to reason that it did so in order to delineate such a dismissal from a dismissal with prejudice. This action certainly implies that the General Assembly believed the juvenile courts had authority to dismiss a complaint with prejudice. We agree that Juv.R. 45(B) gives the juvenile court leeway to proceed in the absence of a specific rule, but CCDCFS's argument that a juvenile court may vacate its own rulings goes too far. Juvenile courts are understandably endowed with a certain degree of flexibility in order to promote the best interests of the child. See Juv.R. 1(B)(4). Nevertheless, the Rules of Juvenile Procedure are to be construed to effect the just determination of every juvenile court proceeding by ensuring the parties a fair hearing and the recognition and enforcement of their constitutional and other legal rights. See Juv.R. 1(B)(1). CCDCFS's argument would, in essence, countermand all rules relating to the finality of judgments. In this context, we note the authority granted the court by Section 2151.35(B), Revised Code, to conduct its hearings in an informal manner does not abrogate the principles of fundamental fairness which underlie formal procedural rules. In re Allen (1967), 10 Ohio App.2d 120 (internal citation omitted). It has long been the policy of Ohio courts that judgments must be accorded finality, even if those judgments are not perfect [f]or obvious reasons, courts have typically placed finality above perfection in the hierarchy of values. See Strack v. Pelton (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 175. -7- Accordingly, we find the court's decision to grant reconsideration is a nullity. It follows that the original order to dismiss the complaint with prejudice remains in full force and effect. The assignment of error is sustained. Judgment vacated. -8- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Juvenile Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOSEPH J. NAHRA, P.J., MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, J., CONCUR. JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .