COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73091 WILLIAM H. MALOOF : : JOURNAL ENTRY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : : AND v. : : OPINION JACK L. HOLLINGSWORTH : : DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: JULY 23, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV-336311. JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-appellee: Kerin Lyn Kaminski, Esq. Karen L. Giffen, Esq. Cavitch, Familo, Durkin & Frutkin 14th Floor, The East Ohio Building Cleveland, Ohio 44114 For Defendant-appellant: David B. Shillman, Esq. David B. Shillman Co., L.P.A. 720 Leader Building Cleveland, Ohio 44114 -2- SWEENEY, JAMES D., J.: Defendant-appellant Jack Hollingsworth appeals from the motion for summary judgment granted in favor of the plaintiff-appellee William Maloof. For the reasons set forth below, this case is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further consideration. The appellant represented the appellee during a portion of the appellee's divorce proceedings. During the pendency of the appellee's divorce, a judge of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, entered an order granting the appellant's motion seeking attorney fees from his client, the appellee. On June 19, 1997, the appellee filed this declaratory judgment ction against the appellant seeking: 1) to have a judgment entered y the Domestic Relations Court declared void; 2) to have the liens il ed in connection with the judgment entry declared void; 3) an rder permanently enjoining the appellant from enforcing the udgment; and, 4) an order requiring the appellant to release all iens. It is this Domestic Relations Court order that the appellee ought to have the Court of Common Pleas, General Division, declare oid. The record reveals that on July 9, 1997, the appellant filed motion for summary judgment. The appellee responded on July 21, 997, by filing a brief in opposition and a cross-motion for ummary judgment. On August 15, 1997, the trial court entered an rder stating: -3- The court finds as a matter of law that the judgment rendered against Plaintiff [appellee] is void ab initio for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Summary judgme nt and declaratory judgment is hereby awarded in favor of Plaintiff [appellee] and against Defendant [appellant]. Final. On August 25, 1997, subsequent to the final order, the ppellant filed a reply to his own motion for summary judgment and brief in opposition to the appellee's motion for summary udg ment. On August 27, 1997, the trial court issued an order tating that after a review of the appellant's brief in opposition o the appellee's motion for summary judgment, the order in favor f the appellee was reaffirmed. The appellant sets forth four assignments of error. The fourth assignment of error will be considered first: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S MOTI ON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRIOR TO EX PIRATION OF THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH APPELLANT WAS PERMITTED TO RESPOND TO THAT MOTION UNDER APPLICABLE LOCAL RULE. The appellant argues that Local Rule 11(I) permits a thirty- ay response time to a motion for summary judgment and that it was rror for the court to rule on the appellee's motion without ermitting the response time to lapse. Local R. 11(I) of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga ounty, General Division states: (I) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, motions for summary judgment shall be heard on briefs and other mate rials authorized by Civil Rule 56(C) without oral arguments. The adverse party may file a brief in opposition with accompanying materials, within thirty (30) days after service of the motion. -4- In Higgins v. McDonnell (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 199, this ourt considered this very section of Local R. 11 of the Court of ommon Pleas of Cuyahoga County, General Division. This court ound that in the absence of a court order fixing a time for ea ring on a motion for summary judgment, a trial court errs in ranting the motion without allowing the full 30-day period after ervi ce of the motion in which to file opposition, as permitted nder the local rule, or informing the nonmoving party that the ime limitation set forth in the local rule is shortened. In the case sub judice, the appellee filed his cross-motion or summary judgment on July 21, 1997. The court issued its ruling n that motion on August 15, 1997, well before the lapse of the hirty- day response time permissible under the local rule. The ri al court erred in failing to either inform the appellant that he response limitation time set forth in the Loc.R. 11(I) would be hortened, or allow the full thirty days to elapse prior to ruling. The appellee asserts that the court did, in fact, issue a ubsequent ruling which stated a review of the appellant's brief in ppo sition was considered. However, once an appealable or final udgment in a case has been journalized, it cannot be modified by he trial court except as provided under Civ.R. 50(B) (motion otwithstanding the verdict), Civ.R. 59 (motion for a new trial), r Civ.R. 60(B) (motion for relief from judgment). In re uardianship of Maurer (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 354 citing to Pitts . Dept. of Transp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 378. -5- The appellant's fourth assignment of error is well taken. The irst, second, and third assignments of error are moot pursuant to pp.R. 12. Judgment reversed and remanded. -6- This cause is reversed and remanded. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant(s) recover of aid appellee(s) his costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to arry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate ursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. xceptions. NN DYKE, P.J., and ERRENCE O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. ______________________________ JAMES D. SWEENEY JUDGE .B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See pp.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will e journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court ursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with upporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days f the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for eview by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the ourn alization of this court's announcement of decision by the .