COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73041 STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION WILLIAM HARRIS : : Defendant-Appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION JULY 16, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. CR-321264 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor BY: REBECCA J. MALECKAR (#0055927) Assistant Prosecuting Attorney The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: PAUL MANCINO, JR. (#0015576) 75 Public Square, Suite #1016 Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2098 SPELLACY, J.: Defendant-appellant William Harris ( appellant ) appeals from the trial court's imposition of a sentence after appellant was -2- found to be a probation violator. Appellant assigns the following errors for review: I. DEFENDANT WAS PLACED TWICE IN JEOPARDY WHEN HE WAS SEPARATELY SENTENCED AS A PROBATION VIOLATOR FOR NEW OFFENSES FOR WHICH HE HAD BEEN SENTENCED. II. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE COURT REFUSED TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUITY OF SENTENCE TO GIVE CREDIT TO DEFENDANT ON HIS TWO YEAR SENTENCE. Finding the appeal to lack merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. I. On April 3, 1995, appellant was indicted for one count of drug trafficking and one count of possession of criminal tools. On August 31, 1995, appellant pled guilty to the drug trafficking count. The possession of criminal tools charge was dismissed. The trial court sentenced appellant to a two-year term. Execution of the sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on four years probation and was to serve six months at the Salvation Army work release program. The six months at the work release program was to commence upon the completion of appellant's sentence in two other cases. The trial court ordered the sheriff's department to place a detainer on appellant and to return appellant to the Cuyahoga County Jail upon completion of the other prison sentences and then transport appellant to Harbor Light as soon as a bed became available. Appellant signed an order acknowledging that he was on probation. However, the sheriff's department did not place a detainer -3- upon appellant. When he was released after serving his sentence, appellant did not report to the work release program. Appellant was aware no detainer had been placed upon him as he inquired about a detainer prior to his release. Appellant subsequently was convicted of four additional offenses. A hearing was held to determine if appellant was a probation violator in the instant case. The trial court found appellant was not a probation violator for failing to report to his probation officer or for not serving the six months at the work release program. Appellant was found to be a probation violator for committing crimes during the probationary period. The trial court imposed the original two-year sentence to be served consecutively with the sentences imposed in the other four cases. II. In his first assignment of error, appellant contends his sentence for violating his probation for committing new offenses constituted double jeopardy. Appellant's only argument is that, because he already had been found guilty and penalized, any further prosecution for the offense placed him twice in jeopardy. The prohibition against double jeopardy protects a defendant from multiple trials and multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. McMullen (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 244. The purpose of the double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of Section 10, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution is to prohibit the state from seeking, in two or more separate proceedings, to impose punishment for a single offense. State v. -4- Adams (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 492. R.C. 2951.09, in effect at the time appellant was placed on probation, states that a judge may terminate probation and impose any sentence that originally could have been imposed. Violation of probation is a separate and distinct act and does not constitute multiple punishments for the same offense. McMullen, supra. A defendant's failure to abide by the law is sufficient to revoke probation. State v. Shores (Nov. 4, 1993), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 65176, 65177, 65178, 65179, unreported. Even if the terms of the probation are not expressly stated by the trial court, a defendant's failure to comply with the law is sufficient for the revocation of probation. Lakewood v. O'Meara (1987), 35 Ohio App.3d 95. Appellant was placed on four years probation for the drug trafficking offense. Appellant was aware he was on probation. During the period of his probation, appellant committed numerous offenses. The omission of the sheriff's department to place a detainer upon appellant does not excuse his behavior or grant him immunity from punishment for this offense by his commission of new offenses while on probation. Appellant violated his probation and the trial court imposed the original sentence. Appellant was not twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. III. Appellant's second assignment of error asserts that the doctrine of continuity should be applied to give credit toward his -5- two-year sentence from the time of his release from prison until the time of his sentencing on the probation violation. Appellant argues that, because he was unconditionally released through no fault of his own, he assumed his probation had ended and, therefore, he could not have violated the terms of his probation. The doctrine of continuity has been applied by some federal courts to permit a defendant to be credited for the time elapsed after an early release, whether the release was erroneous or not. The defendant's release must not have occurred due to his or her own fault. See Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1984). The doctrine of continuity has no application to the instant case. Appellant was aware he was on probation for four years as he had signed an order to that effect at the time he originally was sentenced. As stated above, the commission of new offenses while on probation, supervised or not, is sufficient reason for the probation to be revoked and for a term of imprisonment to be imposed. Appellant's second assignment of error lacks merit. Judgment affirmed. -6- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. TERRENCE O'DONNELL, P.J. and TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J. CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY, JUDGE N.B. This is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D), 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(B) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days -7- of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .