COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 73015 STATE OF OHIO : ACCELERATED DOCKET : : JOURNAL ENTRY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT : : AND v. : : OPINION WOODFIN FARMER, JR. : : PER CURIAM : DEFENDANT-APPELLEE : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MARCH 26, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court, CR-350867. JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Esq. Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney James E. Valentine, Esq. 8th Floor Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 For Defendant-Appellee: Richard A. Oviatt, Esq. 950 Standard Building 1370 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113-1701 -2- PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-appellant, State of Ohio ( State ), appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court which granted the motion to suppress of defendant-appellee, Woodfin Farmer ( appellee ). For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand. The record reflects that in the early morning hours of January 31, 1997, Cleveland police officers were on patrol when they came upon a Porsche located in the parking lot of a gas station at the intersection of East 116th and Miles Avenue in the city of Cleveland. Officer Chris Hamrick, one of the two officers in the police cruiser, testified that he observed an individual later identified as Milton Loftus leaning through an open passenger window of the Porsche vehicle where appellee was seated. While he could not be more specific, the officer further testified that he observed some movement taking place inside the car. Loftus, upon seeing the police cruiser, began walking away from the vehicle and in the course of doing so was observed throwing or dropping an object to the ground. The object was later retrieved by the officer and identified as a small plastic bag containing suspected rocks of crack cocaine. Additional rocks that had fallen out of the bag were also in the area where the bag was retrieved. After placing Loftus in the police cruiser, Officer Hamrick testified that appellee and the driver of the Porsche, Keith Stokes, were approached and asked to exit the vehicle. Upon exiting, Officer Hamrick testified that he observed in plain view a small object on the floor of the vehicle on the passenger's side. -3- After Stokes consented to a search of the Porsche, a single rock of suspected crack cocaine was retrieved from the vehicle. No other contraband was found. Appellee was eventually indicted for possession of drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.11 and possession of criminal tools, in violation of R.C. 2923.24. Appellee filed a motion to suppress that was granted. The state now appeals and assigns the following errors for our review: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE WHERE THE POLICE ACTED PROPERLY IN FINDING THE DRUGS IN QUESTION. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE WHERE THE DISCOVERY OF THE EVIDENCE WAS INEVITABLE. I. In its first assignment of error, the state contends that the search of the vehicle in which appellee was a passenger was proper and based upon a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Appellee, on the other hand, argues that the stop was unjustified and based upon a mere hunch that a drug transaction had taken place. In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of the trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness credibility. State v. Smith (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 284; State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19. Accordingly, we are bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. -4- State v. Klein (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 488. Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine, as a matter of law and without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal standard. Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a police officer is justified in conducting a brief investigatory stop of an individual only if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio(1968), 392 U.S. 1. In order for a law enforcement officer to make a valid and constitutional stop of an automobile, there must exist a reasonable suspicion by the officer that criminal activity is being carried on. See Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 663. The officer does not need probable cause for an arrest in order to make an investigative stop but needs only specific and articulable facts with which to warrant the officer's further investigation. State v. Brandenburg (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 109; see, also, State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177. In determining the appropriateness of an investigative stop, a reviewing court must view the stop in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances, giving due weight to the officer's experience and training. State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88; State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291. Notwithstanding, reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for making a stop--something more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch. State v. Jones (1990), 70 Ohio App.3d 554, 556-557. Indeed, the Jones court held -5- that an investigatory stop was unjustified where three or four persons standing around a car parked in a high-drug area, with one person on the passenger side leaning into the car, scattered in different directions upon seeing police approach. Id. The observation of an individual in a car, without more, does not give rise to a reasonable belief that the individual is involved in criminal activity. State v. Parr (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 626, 627. Mere presence in an area of high crime activity does not suspend the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. State v. Chandler (1990), 54 Ohio App.3d 92, 97. In this case, the officer testified that he suspected that Loftus was transacting a drug deal with the appellee and Stokes. Leaning into an open passenger window in a high-crime area and then taking off upon seeing police officers is insufficient in and of itself to justify an investigatory stop. See State v. Jones, supra. Nonetheless, we are confronted with an additional element in this case not present in the Jones case; namely, that Loftus discarded an item later retrieved and suspected to be crack cocaine. See State v. Mincey (Dec. 27, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 59913, unreported at 2. Thus, the officer`s suspicion that a drug transaction was taking place was certainly reasonable and the subsequent search constitutionally valid. Accordingly, the state's first assignment of error is well taken and is sustained. II. -6- Due to our disposition of the state's first assignment of error, we need not address the state's second assignment of error. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). -7- This cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. It is, therefore, considered that said appellee recover of said appellant his costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. TERRENCE O'DONNELL, PRESIDING JUDGE DIANE KARPINSKI, JUDGE TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's .