COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72968 MIRA LAZOVIC, ET AL. : : : JOURNAL ENTRY PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES : : AND v. : : OPINION STATE AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY : : : DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court, CV-312392. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs-Appellees: Carl J. Zaffiro, Esq. 5555 Mayfield Road Lyndhurst, OH 44124 For Defendant-Appellant: Robert G. Hurt, Esq. 7029 Pearl Road Suite 310 Middleburg Heights, OH 44130 -2- TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J.: This court is asked to decide whether the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas properly granted summary judgment to plaintiffs-appellees, Mira and Radosav Lazovic (collectively appellees ), and against appellees' insurer, defendant-appellant, State Auto Insurance Company ( State Auto ), on appellees' complaint seeking a declaration that appellees were covered for injuries sustained as a result of a hit-and-run accident. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. On July 7, 1995, Mira Lazovic sustained injuries when the car she was driving collided with the concrete median barrier as she was trying to avoid a car door lying in the roadway on Interstate 71. In her deposition, she testified that she observed the car door fall from a big black truck and, in an attempt to avoid hitting the door, she swerved to the right, eventually hitting the concrete barrier. While witnesses Doris Clendennen, David Goodyear and Anne Bryden all testified that they observed the car door on the roadway, none testified as to having seen the door fall from the unidentified truck. Mira Lazovic subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action against her insurer, State Auto, seeking a declaration that she was entitled to uninsured motorist coverage for the injuries she sustained. The complaint included a derivative claim on behalf of Radosav Lazovic, Mira's husband, for loss of services. State Auto -3- counterclaimed appellees were not entitled to coverage. In the competing motions for summary judgment that followed, Statefor declaratory judgment as well, claiming that1Auto argued that none o corroborate that an unidentified vehicle was responsible for the accident and, therefore, no coverage was available. Appellees, on the other hand, maintain that regardless of whether anyone witnessed the car door fall from the truck, all three witnesses observed the car door in the roadway as well as the ensuing accident. This testimony, they claim, is sufficient corroboration entitling them to uninsured benefits. Finding appellees entitled to coverage, the trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment and denied State Auto's similar motion. State Auto timely appeals and assigns the following error for our review: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO APPELLEE AND DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO APPELLANT. In its sole assignment of error, State Auto challenges the propriety of the trial court's decision granting summary judgment to appellees. Specifically, it maintains that none of the witnesses saw the unidentified vehicle which caused the accident 1Appellees' complaint also included a claim for damages, which has not yet been resolved. We are concerned, at this juncture, with the court's decision as it pertains to the parties' complaint for declaratory judgment pursuant to the trial court's determination that there was no just reason for delay. See Civ.R. 54(B); see, also, General Acc. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 22-23. -4- and, therefore, appellees are not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court conducts a de novo review of the trial court's decision. A court reviewing the granting of a summary judgment must follow the standards set forth in Civ.R. 56(C) ***. Aglinsky v. Cleveland Builders Supply Co. (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 810, 814. Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from such evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and, reviewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to the party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327. Uninsured motorist coverage is available under appellees' policy of insurance with State Auto in the following circumstances: We will pay compensatory damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury caused by an accident. The policy defines uninsured motor vehicle as: *** a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type: *** Which is a hit and run vehicle whose operator or owner cannot be identified and which hits: -5- A. You or any family member; B. A vehicle which you or any family member are occupying; or C. Your covered auto. While actual physical contact was, at one time, a prerequisite to uninsured motorists coverage,2 the Supreme Court of Ohio in Girgis v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 302, found such a requirement to be against public policy and adopted in its place a corroborative-evidence test. Id. at 305. This test requires independent third-party testimony that the negligence of an unidentified vehicle was the proximate cause of the accident. Id. The Girgis court adopted this test in an attempt to ameliorate the harsh effect created by the physical contact requirement by allowing an insured to prove through independent third-party testimony that an unidentified vehicle was the proximate cause of the accident for which the insured seeks recovery. Id. at 307. State Auto urges this court to interpret Girgis narrowly and require the third-party witness to actually observe the unidentified vehicle while it is committing the negligent act responsible for the insured's injuries. In this regard, because none of the witnesses to the accident in this case actually saw the car door fall from the unidentified truck, State Auto maintains that appellees are unable to satisfy the corroborative evidence test and therefore coverage is unavailable. 2See Yurista v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 326; Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Reddick (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 119. -6- It is corroborating evidence, however, not eyewitness testimony or evidence, that is required to support a claim. See England v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. (Dec. 23, 1997), Franklin App. No. 97APE07-894, unreported at 6. Corroborating evidence is evidence which supplements evidence that has already been given and which tends to strengthen or confirm it. It is additional evidence, of a different character to the same point. Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed. 1990), 344; see, also, State v. Economo (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 56. Here, Mira Lazovic was confronted with a car door on a busy interstate highway during morning rush hour traffic. Witnesses to the accident observed the car door but were unable to testify, as did Mira Lazovic, that the car door fell from an unidentified truck. That failure, however, does not defeat appellees' ability to satisfy the corroborative-evidence test. Taking into considerationthe time of day the accident occurred as well as its location, it can reasonably be inferred that the car door either came off of or fell from an unidentified vehicle shortly before Mira Lazovic's evasive maneuver. It would be illogical to assume that a car part, such as the car door at issue in this case, lying on a highway could have come from anything other than another vehicle. To conclude otherwise would lead to an absurd result. Consequently, there was no error in finding that appellees were entitled to uninsured motorist coverage under the policy of insurance issued by State Auto. -7- Accordingly, State Auto's sole assignment of error is not well taken and is overruled. Judgment affirmed. -8- It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOSEPH J. NAHRA, P.J. and JAMES D. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR. TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's .