COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72953 HOOVER HEATING AND AIR : ACCELERATED DOCKET CONDITIONING : : Plaintiff-appellee : JOURNAL ENTRY : AND -vs- : OPINION : ROBERT HOFFMAN : PER CURIAM : Defendant-appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: JANUARY 22, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Bedford Municipal Court Case No.97-CVI-0530 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: DOUGLAS R. FOUTS, ESQ. DENNIS A. ROTMAN, ESQ. 33790 Bainbridge Road, #205 C.A.C. Building, Suite 300 Solon, Ohio 44139 1148 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115 -2- PER CURIAM: Defendant Robert Hoffman appeals from the judgment of the Bedford Municipal Court which awarded plaintiff Hoover Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. $871.37 in its action on an account. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. On July 16, 1996, Hoover Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. (hereafter Hoover Heating ) filed this action against Hoffman, agent for the owner of an office building, seeking to recover a total of $871.37 for four unpaid service calls. Hoffman filed an answer and counterclaim in which he claimed that he had paid plaintiff $536.83 upon a previous invoice, which also included a diagnostic fee, and that the subsequent service calls were for the same problem and did not result in a successful repair of the unit. Hoffman therefore sought recovery of $536.83, the amount of one of the service calls. The matter proceeded to a hearing before a referee of the court. Jerold Hoover, owner of Hoover Heating testified that on June 27, 1996, Hoffman requested service for the air conditioning at the office building. Hoover undertook a diagnostic evaluation of the unit and Hoffman the gave the okay on ninety per cent of the work and said that he was going to take care of the rest of the work. From this diagnostic test, Hoover learned that the contactors, timers, and miscellaneous parts had to be replaced. He also learned, based upon the serial number of the unit, that it was fifteen years old. In addition, it was operated under extreme conditions, including operating at lower than seventy degrees, and -3- operating for twenty hours per day. Jerold Hoover testified that he told Hoffman that due to the age of the unit and the work required of it, it would have to be replaced. He acknowledged, however, that the diagnostic test which he performed indicated that the compressor was operating properly, and could not be relied upon to determine precisely how long the thermostat would last. Approximately one month later, Hoffman again called Hoover for service on the unit. At the conclusion of this call, Hoover advised Hoffman that the unit was old and not big enough to meet the requirements of the building. Hoffman stated that he just wanted it fixed. This service call resulted in charges of $221.63. On July 23, 1996, Hoffman again called Hoover for service. Hoover found the thermostat to be faulty. Hoffman gave Hoover permission to complete the repair, and Hoover subsequently sent Hoffman a bill for $186.62. On August 5, 1996, Hoffman called Hoover and complained that the unit was not working. Hoover discovered that the fan motor needed repair, and also advised Hoffman that the unit was working very hard. Charges at this time were $390.17 and Hoffman authorized payment. Later that afternoon, Hoffman called again to report that it was not working. Thereafter, Hoover found it to be low on Freon. Charges at this time were $72.95. A few weeks later, Hoffman again called for service. Hoover stated that the unit was old, and that he did not want to see Hoffman expend additional money in an attempt to repair it. -4- Hoffman then indicated that he would contact someone else to per- form the repair. Hoffman testified that Hoover did not tell him that the unit needed replacing until the final service call. He further stated that if Hoover had told him to replace the unit initially, he would have done so. He stated that the unit is less than ten years old and was expected to last for twenty years. Hoffman also stated that it would have been more economical to simply replace the unit than to continue to pay Hoover for service calls which failed to successfully repair the unit. The magistrate subsequently rendered a finding for Hoover Heating on the complaint and further found for Hoover Heating on Hoffman's counterclaim. In relevant part, the referee found as follows: Plaintiff was called on several occasions to perform diagnostic and/or repair work on a rooftop unit at defen- dant's rental property. A diagnostic was performed, and work was approved by defendant and performed by plaintiffs. The bill for those services is not in dispute. A second call was made to plaintiffs for service. Plain- tiff indicated that the unit was older, and was not big enough to properly service the are needed in defendant's building. The smaller unit was straining to service the area, and the age and strain was resulting in repairs being necessary. The weight of the credible evidence and testimony indi- cates that plaintiff recommended a new unit, but that defendant declined to install a new one to save costs, preferring simply to pay for repairs as needed. The evidence shows that three more calls were made by plaintiff on July 23, with a cost of $186.62; August 5 for $390.17 and again on August 5 a just labor bill for $72.95, all of which defendant has refused to pay. -5- Defendant failed to present any credible evidence or testimony which would support his claim that plaintiff's workmanship was negligent or improper. Hoffman filed objections to the report of the referee. On June 18, 1997, the trial court overruled Hoffman's objections and entered judgment in accordance with the findings and conclusions of the referee. Hoffman now appeals and assigns a single error for our review. Hoffman's assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S REPORT, AS THE MAGIS- TRATE'S FINDINGS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. Within this assignment of error, Hoffman complains that the trial court erred in accepting Hoover Heating's version of the events surrounding the service calls and asserts that the charges incurred were unreasonable since they did not correct the problems with the air conditioning unit. In Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 79- 80, the Supreme Court noted that while an appellate court in some instances is duty-bound to reverse a judgment as being against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court must be guided by the presumption that the findings of the trier-of-fact were indeed correct. The Court stated: While we agree with the proposition that in some instan- ces an appellate court is duty-bound to exercise the limited prerogative of reversing a judgment as being against the manifest weight of the evidence in a proper case, it is also important that in doing so a court of appeals be guided by a presumption that the findings of the trier-of-fact were indeed correct. The underlying rationale of giving deference to the find- -6- ings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony. The interplay between the pre- sumption of correctness and the ability of an appellate court to reverse a trial court decision based on the manifest weight of the evidence was succinctly set forth in the holding of this court in C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279 [8 O.O.3d 261]: "Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence." See, also, Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Selz (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 169, 172; In re Sekulich (1981), 65 Ohio St.2d 13, 16 [19 O.O.3d 192]. We are of the opinion that the court of appeals failed to give the trial court's decision a presumption of correct- ness in the case at bar. We believe that an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court when there exists, as in this case, competent and credible evidence supporting the findings of fact and conclusions of law rendered by the trial judge. A care- ful review of the record reveals that the trial court's findings are corroborated by competent and credible evidence. Id., at 80. Thus, cognizant of the scope of our review, we note that this matter presents an evidentiary conflict, as Hoover testified that he made the limitations of the unit clear to Hoffman from the out- set and Hoffman testified that Hoover did not do so. We are there- fore bound to apply the presumption of correctness and defer to the credibility determination of the lower court. Moreover, Hoffman's testimony does reveal his belief that the system was relatively new and could be repaired. Further, while Hoffman complains that Hoover Heating's charges were useless and -7- were unreasonable, we note that the evidence indicates that the repairs involved different aspects of the system rather than repeated attempts to correct the same problem, and no evidence was offered to demonstrate that the charges were unreasonable or that any of the repairs were performed in an unworkmanlike manner. The assigned error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Bedford Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. ANN DYKE, PRESIDING JUDGE DIANE KARPINSKI, JUDGE JAMES D. SWEENEY, JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App. R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court -8- pursuant to App. R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .