COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72914 CORA N. ZINGALE : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION MARIA HECKAMAN & ASSOCIATES, : et al. : : Defendants-Appellees : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT JULY 9, 1998 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-313329 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCE: For Plaintiff-Appellant: ROBERT E. GROSS, ESQ. SCOTT COGHLAN, ESQ. Ohio Savings Building 20133 Farnsleigh Road Shaker Heights, Ohio 44122 For Defendants-Appellees: DONALD G. DRINKO, SQ. Crosby, Belock, & O'Brien 55 Public Square, Suite 1475 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Bureau of Workers' Comp.: MARK E. MASTRANGELO, ESQ. Assistant Attorney General 615 West Superior Ave.,12th Fl. Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1899 PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J.: Appellant Cora Zingale appeals a decision by the trial court reversing her workers' compensation award in an administrative -2- appeal filed by her employer, Maria Heckaman & Associates ( Maria Heckaman ). Zingale assigns the following error for our review: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR APPELLEE BECAUSE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER APPELLANT'S INJURY OCCURRED IN THE COURSE OF AND ARISING OUT OF HER EMPLOYMENT. Having reviewed the record and the legal arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. Cora Zingale was employed as an office worker by Maria Heckaman, a temporary employment agency that provided temporary office employees to various businesses. On January 12, 1995, Zingale was assigned to Voice Tel, Inc. as a receptionist. Voice Tel, Inc. was located in the same office complex as Maria Heckaman, although in a different building. There were five buildings in the complex. Voice Tel was in Building IV and Maria Heckaman was in Building I. Zingale called the offices of Maria Heckaman and asked if she could receive her check in person instead of having it mailed to her home as was Maria Heckaman's regular procedure. Maria Heckaman agreed. While on her unpaid lunch hour from Voice Tel, Zingale drove her car to the parking lot of Building III. She exited her car and walked to Building I where she proceeded to Maria Heckaman's office and received her check. She exited the building and began walking toward her car. As she walked on the walkway between Buildings I and III, she slipped and fell, fracturing her left ankle. -3- Zingale's application for workers' compensation benefits was granted by the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. The award was affirmed by the Industrial Commission of Ohio, the District Hearing Officer, and the Staff Hearing Officer. Maria Heckaman appealed to the common pleas court under R.C. 4123.512. Maria Heckaman filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Zingale's injury did not occur in the course of, or arise from her employment since she was running a personal errand at the time of the injury. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Zingale's injury did not occur in the course and scope of her employment with Maria Heckaman. This appeal followed. In her assignment of error, Zingale challenges the trial court's decision granting Maria Heckaman's motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment may be granted only if no genuine issue of material fact exists. Civ.R. 56(C). Our standard of review for summary judgment is the same as that of the trial court. Consequently, we review cases de novo. Brown v. Scioto Cty Bd of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704, citing Midwest Specialties, Inc. v. Firestone Co. (1988), 42 Ohio App.3d 6. In applying the de novo standard, we review the trial court's decision independently and without deference to the trial court's determination. Id. at 711. Summary judgment is appropriate when the following have been established: (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one -4- conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in its favor. Brown, supra, citing Bostic v. Connor (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 144, 146; cf., also State ex rel. Coulverson v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 12, 14; Civ.R. 56(C). The burden of showing no genuine issue as to any material fact is on the party who requested the summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, citing Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, citing Hamlin v. McAlpin Co. (1964), 175 Ohio St. 517, 519-520. However, the non-moving party has the initial burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115. See Dresher v. Burt, supra at 295, [limiting syllabus 3 of Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. Of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108.] An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986), 477 U.S. 242. Under R.C. 4123.01, workers' compensation benefits are available for an accidental injury received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment. In its motion for summary judgment, Maria Heckaman alleged that Zingale's injury did not occur in the course of or arise out of her employment. Maria Heckaman contended Zingale was injured outside of her employment while running a personal errand. In support of its argument, Maria Heckaman cited Brown v. BP America, Inc. (1993), 85 -5- Ohio App.3d 194 and Beharry v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation (November 22, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 68050, unreported. In Brown, the court held that an employee who was injured on her way to the bank was not injured in the course of her employment despite the fact that the injury occurred during her working hours. The court pointed out that Brown was running a personal errand and was not on her employer's premises at the time of the injury. In Beharry, the court rejected the workers' compensation claim filed by an employee hit by a hit-and-run driver as she walked to a doctor's appointment during her unpaid lunch hour. Again, the court determined that Beharry was on a personal errand at the time of her injury. In her motion opposing summary judgment, Zingale argued she was acting within the course of her employment when she went to pick up her paycheck. She cited Parrot v. Indus. Comm. (1945), 145 Ohio St. 66, in which the Supreme Court held that a former employee who was injured while on his way to pick up his final paycheck was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the injury. Zingale argued that she was performing a service for Maria Heckaman by relieving Maria Heckaman from having to mail her paycheck to her residence and saving Maria Heckaman the cost of postage. She also argued that, while Zingale was not on Maria Heckaman's property at the time of her injury, she was injured while on her way to work and her injuries were sustained close in time to her returning to work at Voice-Tel, Inc. Citing Brown, Zingale also argued that since, as a temporary employee, she was -6- routinely assigned to work at locations other than the offices of Maria Heckaman, she should not be denied workers' compensation benefits because she was not injured on Maria Heckaman's property. In an effort to distinguish Brown, Zingale argued the Brown decision applies only to fixed situs employees, i.e. employees with fixed places of employment. Generally, an employee with a fixed place of employment cannot qualify for workers' compensation for injuries sustained while traveling to or from his place of employment because of the lack of a causal connection between the injury and the employment. MTD Products, Inc. v. Robatin (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 66. The Supreme Court has determined that the periodic relocation of job sites does not preclude a finding that an employee is a fixed-situs employee where the employee commences his substantial work duties only after arriving at a specific and identifiable workplace designated by his employer. Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 117, 119. Despite periodic relocation of job sites, each particular job site may constitute a fixed place of employment. Id. at 120. Though, as a temporary employee, Zingale was assigned to different workplaces from time to time, it is clear that her substantial employment duties did not commence until she arrived at the particular company to which she was assigned. Based upon the reasoning of Ruckman, we conclude Zingale was a fixed situs employee. Since she was injured while traveling to her place of employment, the MTD Products rule applies to render her ineligible for workers' compensation benefits. -7- We are mindful that an exception to this rule has been recognized where the travel serves a function of the employer's business and creates a risk that is different from or quantitatively greater than the risks which are encountered by the general public. Ruckman at 123. However, Zingale has not established that her decision to pick up her paycheck served a function of Maria Heckaman's business. While it may be true that Maria Heckaman was saved the cost of a postage stamp, the record reveals that Zingale's primary reason for picking up the check was to receive the check early. The record also reveals Maria Heckaman altered its normal procedure to allow Zingale to pick up the check. Because employee paychecks were normally mailed to employees' residences, Maria Heckaman had to make special arrangements to hold Zingale's check in order to accommodate her request. The inconvenience of making such special arrangements far outweighs the minuscule benefit of saving the cost of a single postage stamp. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Maria Heckaman was proper. Zingale's assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that Appellees recover of Appellant their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. DYKE, J., and ROCCO, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the .