COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72899 ARTHUR JERNIGAN : JOURNAL ENTRY : AND Plaintiff-appellant : OPINION : -vs- : : BARBARA JERNIGAN : : Defendant-appellee : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: JULY 2, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division Case No. CP-D-236590 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: NEAL P. LAVELLE, ESQ. 522 Leader Building Cleveland, Ohio 44114 For Defendant-Appellee: ANTHONY P. SOUGHAN, ESQ. 1200 Illuminating Building 55 Public Square Cleveland, Ohio 44113 DYKE, J.: -2- Appellant, Arthur Jernigan, appeals the judgement entry of divorce dated June 26, 1997, terminating his remarriage to appellee, Barbara Jernigan. For the following reasons, we affirm. The parties were married on June 19, 1971. On June 30, 1983, the parties divorced. Each party was awarded a one-half interest in the marital home. The divorce decree provided that the husband would continue to reside in the home with the minor son. When the son turned eighteen, the home would be sold and the parties would divide the proceeds. The parties testified that the wife never moved out of the marital home, even after the divorce. The wife testified she only spent a few nights away from home, while the husband testified that she spent many nights away. The wife married Najib Nasr on April 6, 1983, and divorced Nasr on May 3, 1984. The husband did not know about the wife's marriage to Nasr until June, 1984, when the parties were remarried. According to the husband, the last time the parties had marital relations was in 1982. The wife testified that they had intercourse in 1983 and 1984. From 1971 to 1983, the wife did not work outside the home. From 1983 to 1993, she worked temporary clerical jobs. From 1993 to 1995, she did clerical and telemarketing work for Leichtung. Her highest annual income was $13,000 to $15,000, and highest hourly wage was $7.00. She has some ability to speak Spanish, but is not fluent. She had two years of college and was considering -3- returning to college. Appellant was forty-three years old at the time of the divorce. The husband earned $50,000 per year at LTV Steel. The magistrate decided to consider the duration of the marriage as twenty-five years for determining spousal support. $13,000 annual income was imputed to the wife. The magistrate ordered the husband pay spousal support of $1,000 per month for a period of eight years, to terminate upon the death, remarriage or cohabitation of the wife. The magistrate found that support was necessary for eight years so that the wife could maximize her earning ability and possibly return to school. The magistrate found that the parties' action of cohabitating in the marital residence after the marriage evidenced an agreement to rescind the prior property division. The magistrate awarded the home to the husband-appellant, and ordered him to pay one half of the equity to the wife. The magistrate computed the husband's pension earned during the marriage as the amount earned from 1971 to 1996. Appellant-husband objected to the magistrate's decision. The trial judge found that under the facts of this case, it was proper to consider the length of the previous marriage in the spousal support determination. It was not proper to tack the two marriages in determining the property division. The parties were awarded half the home under the prior divorce decree. The duration of the marriage was 1984 to 1996 for distributing the pension. -4- We note that appellee filed a notice of cross appeal but raised no assignments of error. I. Appellant's first assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY DETERMINING APPELLANT'S SPOUSAL SUPPORT OBLIGATION BY TACKING THE PARTIES (SIC) TWO MARRIAGES TOGETHER WHERE THERE HAS BEEN AN INTERVENING MARRIAGE BY THE DEPENDENT SPOUSE TO A THIRD PARTY. This court can only overturn an award of spousal support if the trial court abused its discretion. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, Holcomb v. Holcomb (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 128. An abuse of discretion involves more than an error of judgment; it implies that the domestic relations court's attitude was unreasonable, unconscionable or arbitrary. Id. When the parties remarried after a five or six month separation, and the parties resided in the marital home during the separation, the trial court can consider the duration of both the first and second marriage in awarding spousal support. Moore v. Moore(1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 75, Krisher v. Krisher (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 159. The duration of the parties' first marriage may be relevant to the need for spousal support. Id. The trial court may consider any other relevant factor in awarding spousal support, under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(n). Id. In this case, the lost educational and economic opportunities of the wife during the entire twenty five year relationship was an other factor under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(n). The total time the -5- parties were married was relevant in determining the wife's need for support. Appellant argues that this case is distinguishable from Moore and Krisherbecause in this case there was an intervening marriage. Appellant correctly states the general rule that the duty to support terminates as a matter of law when the spouse remarries. Dunaway v. Dunaway (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 227. The trial court did not award appellee spousal support for the prior marriage, however. The trial court considered the length of the prior marriage in determining support for the second marriage. See Moore, supra. The parties still resided in the marital residence, even though the wife had married another man. Under the unusual circumstances of this case, we can not say that the trial court abused its discretion in considering the duration of the parties' first marriage. Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. II. Appellant's second assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING EIGHT YEARS OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT AT $1,000.00 PER MONTH FOR AN ELEVEN YEAR MAR- RIAGE WITHOUT SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT THAT ARE ESPECIALLY RELEVANT AND EQUITABLE. The record indicates that the trial court considered the factors set out in R.C. 3105.18(C) in fashioning the award of spousal support. See Holcomb, supra. The trial court considered the parties' earning abilities; income; age; standard of living; -6- education; duration of the marriage; time and expense necessary to obtain an education or job experience; and lost production capacity as a result of marital responsibilities. See R.C. 3105.18. Appellant asserts that the evidence does not support the trial court's finding that appellee lost employment opportunities during the marriage. Appellee testified that she worked only temporary jobs during the marriage, so that she could take care of the child- ren. We find that there was some competent, credible evidence from which the court found that appellee had lost employment or educa- tional opportunities. See Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77. We can not say that the trial court abused its discretion in its award of spousal support. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled. The decision of the trial court is affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. BLACKMON, A.J., AND ROCCO, J., CONCUR. ANN DYKE JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App. R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App. R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .