COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72893 STATE OF OHIO, : : Plaintiff-Appellee : JOURNAL ENTRY : and vs. : OPINION : ANTHONY D. CRAWFORD, : : Defendant-Appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : JUNE 11, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: : Criminal appeal from : Common Pleas Court : Case No. CR-350561 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: Stephanie Tubbs Jones Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Francine B. Goldberg James E. Valentine Assistant County Prosecutors The Justice Center - 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendant-appellant: Daniel Scully Assistant Public Defender 100 Lakeside Place 1200 West Third Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- NAHRA, P.J.: Appellant, Anthony Crawford, appeals his conviction after trial for violating R.C. 2925.03, selling one gram or less of crack cocaine with a specification that the crime occurred within 1,000 feet of a school, and for violating R.C. 2925.11, possession of one gram or less of crack cocaine. The trial court determined that the violations were allied offenses of similar import and sentenced appellant to one year in prison for violating R.C. 2925.03. Appellant was charged and arrested after an undercover police operation conducted by officers of the South East Area Law Enforcement ( SEALE ) Narcotics Task Force. The SEALE officers utilized a confidential reliable informant ( CRI ) to make street purchases of crack cocaine while under surveillance. At trial, Detective James Mendolera testified that the CRI was searched, given marked money, and instructed to buy cocaine near the intersection of East 131st and Rexwood Streets. Mendolera stated that he kept the CRI under surveillance, saw the CRI approach appellant and speak to him for approximately 15 seconds. Mendolera testified that he did not see a physical exchange take place between the CRI and appellant. However, after the CRI met appellant, he did not have the marked money but did have crack cocaine. Appellant eluded police on the day of the transaction, was later identified, and arrested the next day. The marked money was not recovered from appellant's person or found in a search of his home. -3- At trial, the prosecution called a civil engineer, Kenneth Tyrpack, to testify as to the distance from the intersection where appellant was seen with the CRI to Cranwood Elementary School. Tyrpack prepared a computer-generated map using county tax maps which detailed the area 1,000 feet from the boundary of the school. The map was admitted as an exhibit over appellant's objection. I. Appellant's first assignment of error reads: THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AGAINST HIM AND/OR TO PRESENT WITNESSES IN HIS OWN DEFENSE AS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF OHIO BY OVERRULING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO REVEAL THE IDENTITY OF THE CONFIDENTIAL POLICE INFORMANT WHOM HE ALLEGEDLY SOLD COCAINE TO, SINCE NO ONE OTHER THAN THE INFORMANT OBSERVED THE ALLEGED TRANSACTION OCCUR AND THERE WAS NO OTHER DIRECT EVIDENCE TENDING TO SHOW THAT HE SOLD COCAINE TO THE INFORMANT. The syllabus in State v. Williams (1983) 4 Ohio St.3d 74, 446 N.E.2d 779, reads: The identity of an informant must be revealed to a criminal defendant when the testimony of the informant is vital to establishing an element of the crime or would be helpful or beneficial to the accused in preparing or making a defense to criminal charges. In State v. Brown (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 649, 653, 597 N.E.2d 510, 513, the Supreme Court stated that the burden is on the defendant to show that the disclosure of an informant's identity outweighs the government's interest in keeping an informant's identity secret. The question of disclosure of a confidential informant becomes a balancing of competing interests. The defendant's right to confront his or her accusers, and the state's right to preserve the -4- anonymity of informants. State v. Phillips (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 294 [56 O.O.2d 174]. The underlying thought process relative to the informants' privilege is discussed in State v. Roe (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 243, 246: *** The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials, and, by preserving their anonymity, encourage them to perform that obligation. See Roviaro v. United States (1957), 353 U.S. 53, 59. In this case, Detective Mendolera testified that he searched the CRI, gave the CRI marked money to purchase crack cocaine, saw the CRI meet with appellant, heard the CRI speak with appellant over a radio transmitter, and saw the CRI return from the meeting without the marked money and with crack cocaine. Appellant, in his brief, recognizes that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to convict appellant. Since appellant cannot show that the identity of the CRI would be vital to establish an element of the crime, appellant must demonstrate that the identity of the CRI would be helpful or beneficial to [him] in preparing or making a defense to criminal charges. Williams, supra, syllabus. Appellant argues that the identity of the informant would be beneficial to his case because the only direct evidence of the drug sale could be presented through the CRI. Detective Mendolera's testimony established the sale and, thus, we are not persuaded by this argument, especially in light of appellant's admission that sufficient evidence was presented to convict appellant. -5- For these reasons, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. II. Appellant's second assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING STATES (SIC) EXHIBIT NO. 1, INTO EVIDENCE BECAUSE ITS AUTHENTICITY WAS NOT ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL. At trial, Tyrpack, a civil engineer, testified that he obtained the county tax maps, utilized a computer program to scale and draw a map indicating a 1,000-foot perimeter around Cranwood Elementary School, and that based on his calculations, the intersection of East 131st and Rexwood Streets is located within 1000 feet of the school. The map he produced was admitted over objection as State's exhibit no. 1. On cross-examination, Tyrpack testified that he never actually measured the distance himself but relied on the accuracy of the county tax maps and admitted the accuracy of his determination was dependent upon the accuracy of the county maps. Appellant's trial counsel objected to the admission of the exhibit on two grounds, 1) it had not been properly authenticated and 2) it was duplicitous and merely served to bolster the testimony of the civil engineer. Appellant's objection to this testimony is not well taken. Tyrpack, an expert witness, is entitled to rely on the materials and processes regularly used within his trade. He offered an opinion as to the distance of the intersection to the school. See, Evid.R. 702. Tyrpack also properly authenticated the materials he -6- used in preparing the map by acknowledging they were copies of the county tax maps. See Evid.R. 901. Although an actual measurement of the distance at issue was not taken, Tyrpack's opinion evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to determine whether or not the transaction occurred within 1,000 feet of the school. Appellant argues that the map prepared by Tyrpack was prejudicial and served only to bolster Tyrpack's opinion testimony. The admission of relevant evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343, syllabus para. 2. The exhibit prepared by Tyrpack was relevant and we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in admitting the exhibit into evidence. Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOSEPH J. NAHRA PRESIDING JUDGE PATTON, J., and MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, J., CONCUR. N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R.22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .