COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA No. 72788 LATANYA HAWKINS : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-appellant : : AND vs. : : OPINION CATHERINE E. SHELL : : Defendant-appellee : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : June 4, 1998 OF DECISION : : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CV-302398 : JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: DAVID C. LANDEVER, ESQ. Weisman, Goldberg & Weisman 1600 Midland Building 101 Prospect Avenue, W. Cleveland, OH 44115 For defendant-appellee: CAROLE SISKOVIC, ESQ. Fillo & Siskovic 1520 Standard Building 1370 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 -2- PATTON, J. Plaintiff-appellant LaTanya Hawkins appeals the trial court's decision to grant a directed verdict in favor of defendant-appellee Catherine Shell. Plaintiff's complaint was filed as a result of injuries she received after being hit by a car driven by defendant. On April 14, 1995 at approximately 5:15 p.m. plaintiff left her place of employment and traveled home on an RTA bus. She exited the bus just beyond the bus stop and walked a short distance to a spot across the street from the apartment building where she lived. Shortly thereafter, she approached the curb to cross the street to her home. It was at this time that a woman in a sports car in the curb lane approached plaintiff's position from the east. Plaintiff stepped off the curb into the street and the woman in the sports car came to a complete stop, ten feet from her. Plaintiff proceeded to cross the street, passing in front of the sports car and entering the second east bound lane. At trial, plaintiff testified she did not cross the street at the crosswalk located one-hundred and twenty (120) feet away because [i]t was just kind of far away. Plaintiff continued into the second lane at a moderate pace. She stated she was looking to her left but never saw defendant's car approaching in the second lane. After getting past the curb lane and the sports car, plaintiff next remembers waking up lying in the street with severe pain in her head and left leg. Despite looking to her left for approaching cars, plaintiff testified she did not see defendant's -3- car or remember the impact. Defendant testified she was traveling home at approximately twenty to twenty-five miles per hour in the left lane. She stated she did not see [plaintiff] coming until she got right on the car. Defendant said she then braked and swerved to her left before impact. Defendant stated she has been taking Amitriptyline, a once-a-day medication for twenty-five years but that there were no driving restrictions on this medication. After both sides concluded their cases, defendant made a motion for directed verdict based on plaintiff illegally crossing the street outside a crosswalk. Plaintiff objected to the motion arguing the driver of a vehicle has a duty to maintain a lookout to reasonably be sure that people are not entering into the driver's path of travel. Over plaintiff's objection, the trial court granted defendant's motion. It is from the granting of this motion which plaintiff now appeals, submitting a single assignment of error. In her sole assignment of error, plaintiff states as follows: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. Plaintiff claims defendant violated a duty in avoiding a collision with plaintiff and failing to maintain a lookout. In support of this proposition, defendant cites Bell v. Gramarco (1988), 50 Ohio App.3d 61, where the court, based on facts similar to those in the instant case, held as a matter of law a defendant- motorist is charged with a duty to keep a lookout in front of, to -4- the sides of, and to the rear of his vehicle. The Bell court then reversed the trial court's granting of a directed verdict in plaintiff-pedestrian's favor. Plaintiff argues further the church- goers defendant stated she observed entering a nearby church and the brake lights of the stopped sports car provided defendant with notice to slow down. Thus, plaintiff claims defendant is not entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law. Defendant counter-argues R.C. 4511.48 and R.C. 4511.50 provide a pedestrian crossing a street other than in a crosswalk must yield to traffic and a pedestrian may not cross a street outside a crosswalk. Thus it is negligence per se to cross a street outside a crosswalk. Moreover, defendant argues plaintiff assumed the risk of injury when she chose to voluntarily jaywalk across a moderate thoroughfare of traffic. R.C. 4511.48 states in pertinent part as follows: (A) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles * * * on the roadway. (E) This section does not relieve the operator of a vehicle * * * from exercising due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon the roadway. However, a driver need not look for vehicles or pedestrians violating his right of way. Lumaye v. Johnson (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 141. Ordinarily, one need not look for danger unless there is reason to expect it. Deming v. Osinski (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 179, 180. Thus, the statutory and case law indicates that a driver -5- proceeding lawfully on a roadway has no duty to look for danger unless there is a reason to expect it. However, once a dangerous or a perilous situation is encountered, the driver must exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon the roadway. The trial court, in the instant case, correctly found that defendant did not violate any duties of care or do anything wrong. Defendant was traveling down a street she was familiar with, while it was light out, within the speed limit. There is no reason for defendant to expect a pedestrian would be walking across a busy four lane street, 120 feet from the nearest crosswalk. In addition, the record fails to indicate defendant was not paying attention, that she was distracted by something, or that she failed to exercise due care. Plaintiff violated R.C. 4511.48(A). She stopped one car when she stepped into the street but was either walking too slow or not paying attention in order to not see defendant approaching. Her willful violation of this statute is negligence per se. See Franklin v. Reed (Aug. 22, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 69800, unreported and Williams v. Putnam Transfer & Storage (Feb. 3, 1994) Cuyahoga App. No. 64659, unreported. Plaintiff cites Bell for the proposition that a driver has a duty of care to keep a lookout in the front of the vehicle. However, a close reading of Bell reveals the driver struck a child as the child proceeded through an unmarked crosswalk at a congested intersection. There existed in Bell a question of who had the preferential right of way, the child or the driver. Clearly, the -6- driver had a duty to look for pedestrians because there was a reason to expect pedestrians would regularly cross a street at an intersection. This reasoning is not applicable to the instant case because defendant was driving in an uncongested area far from any intersection. There was no reason for defendant to expect a pedestrian to wander into the middle of the road. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, we are guided by the following standard of review: If all the evidence relating to an essential issue is sufficient to permit only a conclusion by reasonable minds against a party, after construing the evidence most favorably to that party, it is the duty of the trial court to instruct a finding or direct a verdict on that issue against that party. Phillips v. Mufleh (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 289, 293. After construing the evidence most favorably in plaintiff's favor, we believe all the evidence relating to the essential issues permits a conclusion by reasonable minds against plaintiff. There is simply no evidence to support plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, plaintiff's sole assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court direct ing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, P.J. KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR. JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .