COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72707 HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK, : : Plaintiff-Appellee : JOURNAL ENTRY : and vs. : OPINION : HOWARD H. SHANKER, ET AL., : : Defendants-Appellants : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : MAY 21, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: : Civil appeal from : Common Pleas Court : Case No. 232290 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: Larry R. Rothenberg WELTMAN, WEINBERG & ASSOCIATES CO., L.P.A. 323 Lakeside Avenue, West Suite 200 Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1099 For defendant-appellant, Scott H. Kahn Howard H. Shanker: Robert R. Kracht McINTYRE, KAHN, KRUSE & GILLOMBARDO CO., L.P.A. Tower at Erieview 1301 East Ninth Street, Suite 1200 Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1824 For defendant-appellant, Craig W. Relman L & M Properties Co.: CRAIG W. RELMAN CO., L.P.A. 23875 Commerce Park Road Suite 105 Beachwood, Ohio 44122 For defendant-appellant, William J. Kopp -2- U.S. of America: 1800 Bank One Center 600 Superior Avenue, East Cleveland, Ohio 44114 -3- NAHRA, J.: Appellants, Howard Shanker and Carol Rapisarda-Shanker, appeal the trial court's ruling granting appellee's, Huntington National Bank, motion for summary judgment, resulting in a decree in foreclosure. On May 5, 1995, the trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment finding that Huntington National Bank had a valid first mortgage on the subject real property and that it was entitled to foreclosure. On March 21, 1997, following an appeal to this court, the May 5, 1995, entry was determined to only be a partial resolution of the claims. The case was reinstated and referred back to the magistrate. On March 31, 1997, the magistrate entered a decree of foreclosure. Specifically, the magistrate stated that Huntington Bank, according to the terms of the mortgage, was due the sum of $480,000 plus accrued unpaid interest from May 1, 1991, through December 25, 1991, $36,370.04, and interest thereafter at 10.5% per annum on the principal sum of $480,000. Included in this decision, the magistrate found that Huntington could advance funds for the payment of real estate taxes, hazard insurance premiums or for protection of the subject property, the total amount of which would be ascertainable at the time of the sheriff's sale. This amount would then be added to the amount due on Huntington's first mortgage lien. The magistrate reserved for further order a determination of the exact amount due to Huntington for said advances. -4- On April 14, 1997, the appellants filed objections to the decision. On May 29, 1997, the trial court overruled the appellants' objections and adopted the decision of the magistrate. On June 16, 1997, an order of sale was issued to the sheriff. Appellants timely filed an appeal and assigns two errors for our review. Appellants' assignments of error are interrelated and will be treated together. They are: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION ENTERED ON MARCH 31, 1997. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY ENTERING THE FORECLOSURE DECREE. Appellants' principal argument rests on the proposition that the magistrate's decision and subsequent decree of the trial court were incomplete in that they failed to set an ascertainable value of the subject properties' deficiency. It is appellants' argument that because of these errors they were denied their right of redemption as set forth in R.C. 2329.33. The appellants argue further that they did not receive notice of judgment until after the time to exercise their right of redemption had expired. However, as explained below, their right of redemption continued until confirmation of the sheriff's sale. Pursuant to R.C. 2329.33, a judgment debtor, following the sale of real estate on execution or order of sale, may redeem his property at any time prior to the confirmation of said sale. R.C. 2329.33 provides: -5- In sales of real estate on execution or order of sale, at any time before the confirmation thereof, the debtor may redeem it from sale by depositing in the hands of the clerk of the court of common pleas to which such execution or order is returnable, the amount of the judgment or decree upon which such lands were sold, with all costs, including poundage, and interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum on the purchase money from the day of sale to the time of such deposit, except where the judgment creditor is the purchaser, the interest at such rate on the excess above his claim. The court of common pleas thereupon shall make an order setting aside such sale, and apply the deposit to the payment of such judgment or decree and costs, and award such interest to the purchaser, who shall receive from the officer making the sale the purchase money paid by him, and the interest from the clerk. See, also, Farm Credit Service of Mid-America, ACA v. Dues (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 760, 766, 663 N.E.2d 379, Women's Federal Savings Bank v. Pappadakes (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 143, 527 N.E.2d 792. Appellants clearly misunderstand the law and its application in believing that the proscribed three-day limitation for redemption by the court was their applicable limit. The three-day limit imposed at judgment merely tolled the time between judgment and the issuance of the order of sale to the sheriff. Redemption of foreclosed property is controlled by R.C. 2329.33, and since the property in question has yet to be the subject of a sheriff's sale, according to statute, appellants' have until confirmation of said sale to effectuate their redemption. Further, a review of the entire record demonstrates that the sum as entered in the decree and judgment was valid and clearly ascertainable. The magistrate's decision, as adopted, stated in definite terms the amount upon which the judgment was granted. The decision and decree contained the principal balance due, along with -6- the applicable interest, interest rate, and the exact date from which the interest was to begin. The potential additional allowances given to Huntington, in order to protect their interest in the subject property, are easily discoverable by appellants. This amount, coupled with the appropriately calculated principal and interest, equals the subject properties redemption value. It would be beyond reason to hold a trial court or magistrate to a standard that insists they state a definite sum of redemption. It is impossible to state the exact amount of redemption due to the fact that the amount is constantly evolving and changing over time. With each passing day the value increases because of the applicable interest rate and other charges that may accrue as the result of the mortgage default. As long as the redemption value of a foreclosed property is ascertainable through normal diligence, the value, as stated by a finder of fact, will be upheld. Accordingly, since the value of the appellants' foreclosed property was clearly ascertainable and appellants' have until the confirmation of sheriff's sale to redeem, their assignments of error are overruled. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOSEPH J. NAHRA JUDGE BLACKMON, A.J., and MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, J., CONCUR. N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R.22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .