COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72594 WALTER E. BANDLOW, : : Plaintiff-Appellant : JOURNAL ENTRY : and vs. : OPINION : JOSEPH G. SCHNEIDER, ET AL., : : Defendants-Appellees : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : MAY 7, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: : Civil appeal from : Common Pleas Court : Case No. 317885 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: Walter E. Bandlow, Pro Se 17503 Lakewood Heights Boulevard Lakewood, Ohio 44107 For defendants-appellees: Thomas L. Brunn, Jr. 1370 Ontario Street 520 Standard Building Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- NAHRA, J.: Appellant, Walter Bandlow, appeals the trial court's decision granting appellees, Joseph Schneider, Beverly Schneider, Thomas Brunn, and the law firm of Meyers, Hentemann, Schneider & Rea, Co., L.P.A.'s, unopposed motion for summary judgment. This case arises out of legal representation of Mr. Bandlow over the course of 13 years. Bandlow first contacted Beverly Schneider in the spring of 1982 contemplating marriage and seeking a prenuptial agreement. This agreement was drafted and signed on June 18, 1982. Approximately 11 years later, appellant and his wife began to experience marital problems and his wife filed for divorce on September 12, 1993. As a result, appellant contacted Beverly Schneider for representation, but she informed him that there was a possibility she might be called as a witness and, consequently, could not represent him. In the alternative, however, she would be glad to talk to her husband about representation, seeing as he was affiliated with another firm. Mr. Schneider, a partner at Meyers, Hentemann, Schneider, & Rea Co., L.P.A., undertook representation, and filed a notice of appearance. Mr. Schneider continued to represent appellant until trial neared, at which time Thomas Brunn filed a notice of appearance to act as co-counsel. A trial on the matter was held on April 12, 1995. The next day a settlement agreement was reached and journalized. Mr. Schneider and Mr. Brunn continued to represent appellant throughout further divorce proceedings and on October 11, 1995, a -3- contempt hearing was held to determine why appellant was not making monthly payments to his wife. During direct examination appellant expressed his displeasure with his representation, asserting that his attorneys, Mr. Schneider and Mr. Brunn, coerced him into signing the settlement agreement. At this point in the hearing, Brunn, sensing a malpractice claim, moved the court for a continuance so that he could obtain representation for himself. This motion was denied and a brief recess was granted. Upon returning from the recess, Brunn related to the court the following: MR. BRUNN: I went out and told Mr. Bandlow that the hearing will go forward and that the only reason we had this brief recess was I was concerned that Mr. Bandlow was accusing me of malpractice; and henceforth, I thought he might be better off with another lawyer. And the sons said they already decided a long time ago, meaning to me they have another lawyer who is just waiting for this hearing to terminate and come back and file some kind of either a lawsuit against me or some other thing. So, I renew my motion forthwith to terminate the hearing at this point and have Mr. Bandlow have new counsel and let me have counsel and let me be able to defend myself. I am being directly accused of malpractice by his sons, not necessarily by him per se. The magistrate denied Brunn's oral motion to terminate the hearing. Two days later, on October 13, 1995, Brunn filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the appellant. This motion was granted and journalized on October 25, 1995. One year and three days later, on October 29, 1996, appellant filed a complaint for legal malpractice. Appellant alleged appellees breached their duty of care and competence, failed to communicate legal advice, and were negligent in preparing a legal -4- document. On November 29, 1996, appellant filed an amended complaint adding claims for breach of fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, and breach of contract. On January 15, 1997, Brunn filed a motion for summary judgment on behalf of all defendants arguing plaintiff's claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Over the next several months appellant filed for numerous extensions of time to file a motion in opposition to appellees' motion for summary judgment, all of which were granted. On April 22, 1997, appellant filed a motion to designate pro se action as complex litigation. On April 28, 1997, the trial court granted appellees' unopposed motion for summary judgment, stating that appellant's claims were time barred. The trial court also denied as moot appellant's motion to designate action as complex litigation. Appellant timely filed notice of appeal and assigns one error for our review. Appellant's sole assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RECORD SHOWED THE COMPLAINT WAS TIME BARRED. Although appellant's amended complaint contains a number of claims, the sum of their parts amount to a claim of malpractice and is governed by the one-year statute of limitations located in R.C. 2305.11(A). Monastra v. D'Amore (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 296, 303- 304, 676 N.E.2d 132. See, also, Bunce v. Parkside Lodge of Columbus (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 253, 260, 596 N.E.2d 1106, 1110-1111. As a result, the dispositive issue is whether -5- appellant's legal malpractice claims against appellees were barred prior to filing his complaint on October 29, 1996. When a motion for summary judgment is filed, the non-moving party is required to go beyond the pleadings by way of affidavit, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, and designate facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. V. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 323. See, also, Goodall v. Sysco Food Services of Cleveland, et al. (Sept. 18, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 72423, unreported. Unsupported allegations in the adverse party's pleadings are insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Siegler v. Batdorff (1979), 63 Ohio App.2d 76, 82. See, also, Carroll v. Spitzer Buick Co. (Oct. 3, 1991), Cuyahoga App. No. 59074, unreported. The motion for summary judgment was filed on January 15, 1997, and was not granted until April 28, 1997. The appellant filed no opposition to the motion. The court could thus accept as true the facts evidenced therein. For the purposes of determining the accrual date of R.C. 2305.11(A) in a legal malpractice action it is necessary to review the particular facts of the action and make the following determinations: when the injured party became aware, or should have become aware, of the extent and seriousness of his or her alleged legal problem; whether the injured party was aware, or should have been aware, that the damage or injury alleged was related to a specific legal transaction or undertaking previously rendered him or her; and whether such damage or injury would put a -6- reasonable person on notice of the need for further inquiry as to the cause of such damage or injury. Omni-Food & Fashion, Inc., et al. v. Smith (1988) 38 Ohio St.3d 385, 528 N.E.2d 941, paragraph two of the syllabus. The Ohio Supreme Court in Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 54, 538 N.E.2d 398, syllabus, reaffirmed the Omni-Food holding and further refined the standard of determining when the statute of limitations on a legal malpractice claim begins to run. The court held: Under R.C. 2305.11(A), an action for legal malpractice accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when there is a cognizable event whereby the client discovers or should have discovered that his injury was related to his attorney's act or non-act and the client is put on notice of a need to pursue his possible remedies against the attorney or when the attorney-client relationship for that particular transaction or undertaking terminates, whichever occurs later. As to Mrs. Schneider, she was engaged by appellant to prepare a prenuptial agreement in 1982. Mrs. Schneider performed the services. Once these services were rendered, the relationship between Mrs. Schneider and appellant terminated. In 1993, appellant again contacted Mrs. Schneider in order to engage her as his attorney for divorce proceedings. Mrs. Schneider elected not to accept appellant's offer due to a conflict of interest and, consequently, recommended her husband for the job. As a result, it is clear that any malpractice action against Mrs. Schneider was not timely filed. Thomas Brunn filed a notice of appearance and, consequently, became counsel for appellant just prior to the divorce hearing which began on April 12, 1995. During these proceedings a -7- settlement was reached and journalized. Brunn continued to represent appellant in all relevant areas pertaining to the divorce up to and including the October 11, 1995 motion for contempt hearing. It was during this hearing that Bandlow expressed his displeasure with his attorneys and that Brunn realized he might be sued for malpractice. When Brunn filed a motion to withdraw on October 13, 1995, after Bandlow had complained of the representation, the relationship was terminated. In any event, it was terminated no later than when the motion to withdraw was granted on October 26, 1990. As a result, the complaint as filed by appellant was time barred. Concerning Mr. Schneider, appellant maintains that his malpractice claims are not time barred because Mr. Schneider never formally withdrew from the case, and appellant received a statement of services from Mr. Schneider which contained billings through December 20, 1995. Appellant's contention that Mr. Schneider's statement of services letter contained evidence of billings through December 20, 1995, is misleading. This statement was mailed on December 20, 1995, however, the last itemized billing entry occurred on August 7, 1995. Although appellant never formally withdrew from the case, it is clear from the record that he performed no services after that date. Consequently, appellant's filing of his claims as to Mr. Schneider on October 29, 1996, are time barred as well. -8- Accordingly, since the claims against Brunn and Mr. Schneider are time barred, it follows that a claim against the law firm of Meyers, Hentemann, Schneider & Rea, Co., L.P.A., also falls outside the applicable statute of limitations. Judgment affirmed. -9- It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PORTER, P.J., and ________________________________ JOSEPH J. NAHRA SPELLACY, J., CONCUR. JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R.22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .