COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA No. 72580 STATE OF OHIO : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-appellee : : AND vs. : : OPINION ALONZO QUINNIE : : Defendant-appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : JULY 9, 1998 OF DECISION : : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS : Criminal appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CR-345622B : JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: For defendant-appellant: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, ESQ. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor RICHARD J. BOMBIK, ESQ. MICHAEL A. SULLIVAN Assistant County Prosecutors 8th Floor, Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 PATRICIA J. SMITH, ESQ. 4403 St. Clair Avenue Cleveland, OH 44103 -2- JOHN T. PATTON, J.: Defendant-appellant Alonzo Quinnie [aka Alonzo Qunnie] ( defendant ) appeals the jury verdict finding him guilty of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary, with a gun specification with each offense. Defendant concedes he was at the scene on the night in question but claims he did not participate. This case arises from events which occurred early in the morning on May 30, 1996. Defendant was with his friends Trell and Mackie drinking and getting high. They went to Trell's cousin's house, kicked in the door, and stole a safe from the basement. They took the safe to Trell's father's house and pried the safe open. To their dismay, they found only loose change and some marijuana seeds. At this point, in front of defendant, Mackie, and several others, Trell pulled his gun out and stated it was time to go over to decedent's house. Trell, Mackie, and defendant proceeded to decedent's apartment. On the way, the trio stopped at Trell's father's other house and Trell went inside and retrieved a trench coat and defendant's shotgun, which he had been holding for defendant. Defendant claims he asked Trell and Mackie to take him home, but they continued to decedent's apartment anyway. At decedent's apartment, Trell unscrewed the light bulb outside the front door. According to defendant, Trell asked him to kick down the door but he refused because he had feelings for decedent's girlfriend and he did not want her to see his face. -3- Trell took defendant's shotgun and gave it to Mackie. Trell and Mackie then kicked down the two doors and entered decedent's apartment. In his written statement taken by the police, defendant stated he ran to the corner to see if I saw any people or any cars. At trial he contradicted this statement and testified he went to the corner to look for a ride home. Within a minute defendant heard a gunshot from inside decedent's apartment. This caused defendant to run across the street and observe his partners' actions from a distance. Defendant saw a light go on in the apartment and heard rumblings from inside. He then heard decedent's girlfriend screaming, which caused him to go to the door of the apartment. Defendant stated at trial that he peered inside and saw decedent's feet. He said Mackie was running back and forth inside the apartment and Trell had run out of the apartment and drove off. Mackie then ran out of the apartment, smashed in the window of decedent's car, stole some CD's, and he and defendant ran down the street. At trial, several witnesses testified for the state. Clinton Robinson testified he was long-time friends of defendant and Trell. He stated he and a friend met up with defendant, Trell, and Mackie on the night in question for the purpose of opening the safe. Robinson said he was present, along with several others, when the safe was opened and they found change and marijuana seeds inside. This upset Trell and Trell stated it was time to hit decedent's house. Both defendant and Mackie agreed. Robinson stated he saw -4- two guns inside Trell's father's house; a .38 and a sawed off shotgun. A short time later, Robinson said everybody left. While going to his mother's house, Robinson testified he drove past decedent's apartment and saw Trell, Mackie, and defendant. Soon thereafter, he said he heard a gunshot and he saw Trell run into his mother's garage, then jump into a car and drive off. The next witness to testify was Aisha Sparks. She stated she was having a relationship with Trell and was present when the safe was opened. Sparks testified she heard Trell, Mackie, and defendant discussing that it was time to do a lick; i.e., robbery. Tim Larkin testified he was driving around with Robinson on the night in question and corroborated Robinson's testimony. He was also present when the safe was opened and he heard Trell say let's go get [decedent]. On appeal, defendant presents a single assignment of error which states as follows: THE EVIDENCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, AGGRAVATED BURGLARY AND AGGRAVATED MURDER. Defendant argues the state did not prove he was a look-out or co-conspirator. He claims he abandoned his role in these crimes prior to their commission. In support of these propositions, defendant submits he left the scene before the co-conspirators kicked in the doors and he was threatened by Trell, who had a gun, for not participating. Defendant maintains he did not act as a look-out but rather went to the corner to look for a ride home. Defendant claims the state presented insufficient evidence to the -5- contrary because no state's witnesses saw defendant enter the apartment. Plus, decedent's wife stated she heard only two voices and saw two people in the apartment. She also said she knew defendant and did not recognize his voice that evening. Additionally, defendant argues there was no physical evidence linking defendant to being present in the apartment. The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether * * * after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319. In State v. Cooper (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 163, vacated in part on other grounds (1978), 438 U.S. 911, the Ohio Supreme Court held that once a criminal intent has been formed, coupled with an overt act toward the commission of an offense, abandonment is no defense. Applying this reasoning to the facts of this case it is clear defendant did not abandon these crimes. Three witnesses heard Trell indicate at his father's house it was time to go rob decedent. In fact, Aisha Sparks stated she heard Trell, Mackie, and defendant discussing robbing decedent. Defendant stated at trial that while driving to decedent's house Trell retrieved a trench coat and his .12 gauge shotgun and gave it to him. Thereinafter, Robinson and Larkin testified they saw defendant with Trell and Mackie outside decedent's apartment. Defendant also admits he was outside decedent's apartment. -6- Defendant formed the criminal intent when he discussed the crime with his co-conspirators at Trell's father's house. He then made two overt acts toward the commission of these crimes: (1) he obtained a weapon, and (2) he proceeded to decedent's apartment, the site where the crimes occurred. Thus, by the time defendant claims he abandoned these crimes he had already formed the criminal intent and committed two overt acts toward the commission of these crimes. If defendant's true intent was to abandon these crimes, he had many opportunities to do so before he formed the intent and obtained the weapon while on the way to decedent's apartment. Defendant did not abandon these crimes. We reject defendant's argument that after going to decedent's front door he then abandoned the crimes and went to the corner to look for a ride home. First, defendant's written statement to the police at the time of his arrest stated he ran to the corner to see if I saw any people or any cars. This statement implies defendant acted as a look-out for his co-conspirators rather than attempt to find a ride home. Second, defendant never left or abandoned the scene of the crime. He ran to the corner because he had feelings for decedent's wife and as stated in his written statement he didn't want her to see his face. However, defendant returned to the apartment after hearing a gunshot. He then saw Mackie run around inside the apartment and break into decedent's car and steal some tapes and CD's. Defendant also stated he peered into the apartment and observed decedent's feet by the bedroom. Defendant's abandonment, at best lasted a few minutes, between the -7- time he ran to the corner and he heard a gunshot until he ran back to the apartment. Defendant did not abandon these crimes, he merely abandoned the possibility of being identified by decedent's wife. Consequently, the defense of abandonment is not applicable. We find defendant was a full participant in the crimes he was charged with and after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, it is clear any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of aggravated murder, robbery, and burglary proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, defendant's sole assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, J., CONCURS. TERRENCE O'DONNELL, P.J., CONCURS WITH CONCURRING OPINION ATTACHED. JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22(E). See, also S.Ct.Prac.R. II, Section 2(A)(1). COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72580 -2- STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : CONCURRING : v. : OPINION : ALONZO QUINNIE : : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE: July 9, 1998 O'DONNELL, TERRENCE, J., CONCURRING: I concur in the well-reasoned opinion of the majority, but write separately to express a further basis for my judgment that appellant did not abandon his involvement in the commission of these crimes. The state alleged that Quinnie aided or abetted in the commission of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated murder. One aids or abets in the commission of a crime if he assists, encourages, directs or acts in concert with others prior to, during, or subsequent to the commission of the crime. See State v. Scott (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 155; State v. Lockett (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 48; State v. Sims (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 56; State v. Cartellone (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 145. Here, the evidence in the record before us demonstrates that Quinnie joined Litrell Chapman and Willis McNeal at Chapman's father's house, accepted a black overcoat to wear during the crime, provided his sawed-off shotgun to McNeal to be used during the crime, and rode to David White's apartment with Chapman and NcNeal at 3:00 A.M. on the morning of May 30, 1996. He was present when Chapman unscrewed the light bulb from a light fixture over the -3- apartment door, and allegedly remained outside while they kicked in the door looking for money. After hearing a gunshot, he returned to White's apartment and saw White's feet in the bedroom doorway; Quinnie then fled with McNeal, saw McNeal dispose of the sawed-off shotgun, and climbed over a fence to retrieve it before escaping with McNeal in a vehicle driven by Chapman's younger brother, Gartrell Chapman. Following their escape, the trio met briefly at Chapman's father's house, where Chapman admitted shooting White; then Quinnie and McNeal returned to the scene and were stopped by police but not arrested. At no time did Quinnie, who assertedly abandoned the venture, act as if he withdrew with intent to renounce his participation. In my view, these actions are inconsistent with someone who abandoned his role in a criminal venture. In order to abandon a criminal conspiracy, one must either thwart the conspiracy's success under circumstances which manifest a complete and voluntary renunciation of a criminal purpose, or advise all co-conspirators of the abandonment or inform any law enforcement authority of the existence of the conspiracy and of his participation in it. See R.C. 2923.01(I); State v. Dapice (1989), 57 Ohio App.3d 99. Clearly, Quinnie did not do any of these things; he merely chose not to participate in the actual entry into White's apartment and resultant killing, but this does not amount to abandonment of the venture, nor does it exonerate him from accountability for his actions. .