COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72417 STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION ANTHONY GEDDAS : : Defendant-Appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION MARCH 19, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. CR-328177 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor BY: GEORGE J. SADD (#0005981) Assistant Prosecuting Attorney The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: BROOKS J. CHAPIN (#0067268) 930 Leader Building 526 Superior Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 -2- SPELLACY, J.: Defendant-appellant Anthony Geddas ( appellant ) appeals from his plea of guilty to a charge of aggravated assault. Appellant assigns the following error for review: I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH OHIO CRIMINAL RULE 11 BY ACCEPTING A GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT INFORMING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT THAT HE WOULD BE WAIVING HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHTS TO TRIAL. Finding the appeal to lack merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. I. Appellant was indicted for one count of felonious assault with a violence specification stemming from an incident on June 7, 1995, in which appellant was involved in a fight which caused serious physical harm to the victim. On November 21, 1995, appellant appeared before the trial court and entered a plea of guilty to aggravated assault with a violence specification in violation of R.C. 2903.11. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced appellant to a three to five year sentence. II. In his assignment of error, appellant contends his plea of guilty should be set aside because the trial court did not inform appellant that, by pleading guilty, he would be waiving his constitutionally guaranteed right to a trial. Appellant argues that an apparent misstatement by the trial court created confusion as to what appellant was waiving. In particular, appellant points to the following statement by the trial court: -3- Each of you understand that you have the right to a trial in your case before a jury. You may waive a jury trial and yet have a full and complete trial before a jury. And at and during such a trial, you're presumed to be innocent until your guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand that? (Tr. 9). Appellant asserts that he could not have knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered his plea by responding affirmatively to this question. Further, appellant argues he was never informed by the trial court that he would be waiving all of his constitutional rights by pleading guilty. Crim.R. 11(C) provides in pertinent part: (2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and: (a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation. (b) Informing him of and determining that he understands the effect of his plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea may proceed with judgment and sentence. (c) Informing him and determining that he understands that by his plea he is waiving his rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against himself. The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey certain information to the defendant in order to allow him or her to make a voluntary and intelligent decision of whether or not to plead -4- guilty. State v. Ballard (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480. Two separate standards are applied when a reviewing court considers a claim that a trial court did not satisfy its duty under Crim.R. 11. State v. Anderson (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 5, 8-9. With respect to constitutional rights, a trial court must strictly comply with the dictates of Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Colbert (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 734. However, a trial court need not use the exact language found in that rule when informing a defendant of his constitutional rights. Rather, a trial court must explain those rights in a manner reasonably intelligible to the defendant. Ballard, supra, at paragraph two of the syllabus. A trial court must ensure that a criminal defendant realizes what he or she is giving up by entering a plea of guilty. The standard is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 31. For nonconstitutional rights, scrupulous adherence to Crim.R. 11(C) is not required. Rather the trial court must substantially comply provided no prejudicial effect occurs before a guilty plea is accepted. State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 86. Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implication of his plea and the rights he is waiving. State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108. Even though a constitutional right is involved requiring a -5- heightened standard of review, an appellate court may still look to the totality of the circumstances when considering the sufficiency of a plea. A defendant may learn of information from sources other than the trial court, including his or her attorney. State v. DeArmond (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 239. Appellant's attorney informed the trial court that appellant was entering into the plea in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner and desired to enter the plea of guilty to the lesser offense of aggravated assault. The attorney stated that he had explained to appellant his constitutional rights. Based on the foregoing, it is clear appellant understood that not only was he waiving his right to a jury trial but that he was waiving the constitutional rights which were explained to him by his attorney and by the trial court. Appellant also was aware he was pleading guilty to aggravated assault, a lesser included offense of felonious assault. Therefore, based upon the totality of the circumstances, there was compliance with Crim.R. 11 in the instant case. Because Crim.R. 11 was complied with, appellant was not prejudiced in any manner by the trial court's misstatement or by its failure to explicitly explain that appellant was waiving his constitutional rights. Appellant's assignment of error lacks merit. Judgment affirmed. -6- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, ADM. J. and MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, J. CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY JUDGE -7- N.B. This is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(B) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .