COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72412 STATE OF OHIO : : : JOURNAL ENTRY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : : AND v. : : OPINION DUANE BURNS : : : DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: JUNE 11, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court, No. CR-336974. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Esq. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Leo Gorie, Esq. Assistant County Prosecutor Justice Center - Courts Tower 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: Robert R. Clarico, Esq. The Brownhoist Building 4403 St. Clair Avenue Cleveland, OH 44103 TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J.: Defendant-appellant, Duane Burns, appeals his conviction in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas as a result of his plea of guilty entered May 16, 1996 to the charge of aggravated drug -2- trafficking (R.C. 2925.03), which contained a furthermore clause alleging his previous conviction of a felony drug offense. Appellant entered his plea as a result of a plea bargain agreement with the State of Ohio. In this appeal, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by violating the mandate of Crim.R. 11 in failing to properly inform him of the elements of his offense and in accepting his plea without determining he understood the nature of the charges against him. We find the appeal without merit and affirm. The facts pertinent to the issue on appeal are as follows. On April 2, 1996, appellant was charged in a three-count indictment. Count one charged appellant with aggravated drug trafficking (R.C. 2925.03); count two charged appellant with drug abuse (R.C. 2925.11), each count contained a furthermore clause alleging appellant had been convicted of a previous felony drug offense; count three of the indictment charged appellant with possession of criminal tools (R.C. 2923.24). At his arraignment appellant entered a plea of not guilty. On May 16, 1996, in court, appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to aggravated trafficking pursuant to R.C. 2925.03, a non-aggravated felony of the second degree as amended in count one. The state entered a nolle prosequito counts two and three of the indictment. At this hearing, the court conducted a colloquy with appellant wherein the court enumerated the rights which are waived upon the entry of a guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 11 and verified appellant's understanding of the proceedings by questions put to -3- him. On June 20, 1996, the court sentenced appellant to a term of incarceration of two to fifteen years and granted his motion to waive the mandatory fine. The judgment was journalized by the court on July 1, 1996. This court granted appellant's motion for a delayed appeal on April 8, 1998. Appellant raises the following single assignment of error for our review. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH CRIM.R. 11 WHEN IT ACCEPTED APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT DETERMINING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES. In his sole assignment of error, appellant challenges the lower court's compliance with Crim.R. 11 alleging that the trial court failed to ensure that he understood the charges to which he was entering a guilty plea. Specifically, appellant contends that the court failed to determine whether he understood the exact facts against him when it failed to advise him of the legal definition of sell or offer to sell a controlled substance. When a trial court or appellate court is reviewing a plea submitted by a defendant its focus should be on whether the dictates of Crim.R. 11 have been followed. State v. Kelley (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 128. Crim.R. 11(C) states in pertinent part: Pleas of guilty and no contest in felony cases. *** (2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and: -4- (a) determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation; (b) informing him of and determining that he understands the effect of his plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea may proceed with judgment and sentence; (c) informing him of and determining that he understands that by his plea he is waiving his rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against himself. The standard for determining whether a trial court properly accepts a plea is whether the court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11. State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 86. Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant objectively understands the implication of his plea and the rights he is waiving. State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108. A defendant who challenges his guilty pleas on the basis that it was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made must show prejudicial effect. Id. In State v. Rainey (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 441, the court stated that [i]n order for a trial court to determine that a defendant is making a plea with an understanding of the nature of the charge to which he is entering a plea, it is not always necessary that the trial court advise the defendant of the elements of the crime, or to specifically ask the defendant if he understands the charge, so long as the totality of the -5- circumstancesare such that the trial court is warranted in making a determination that the defendant understands the charge. See, also, State v Swift (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 407, 412. The record before us reveals that the trial judge scrupulously adhered to the requirements of Crim.R. 11 when enumerating the rights appellant was waiving as a consequence of his plea and verifying that appellant understood those rights. Further, the record shows, by the totality of the circumstances, that appellant understood the nature of the charges against him. The court asked appellant whether he fully understood the charge against him in count one to which he responded affirmatively. The court asked appellant if he understood that by pleading guilty to Count 1 as indicted [he] is admitting, ***, that [he] is guilty of each and every element of that offense as well as being the Duane Burns referenced in the prior conviction ***," to which appellant responded I do. Finally, the judge stated, *** Then having satisfied the Court that what [appellant] is about to do is both a knowing and a voluntary act on his part, I'm going to inquire of you at this time *** as to Count No. 1 which charges you with aggravated drug trafficking with a furthermore clause, how, sir, do you plead? [Appellant:] Guilty. Moreover, the record reveals appellant's prior felony drug conviction was for the same offense as charged in count one of his indictment to which he pled, drug trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03. -6- Consequently, we find that based upon the record before us, from the totality of the circumstances presented, the trial court was justified in making the determination that appellant voluntarily pled guilty to the offense and understood the nature of the charge against him. The trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11 and appellant's rights were adequately protected. Accordingly, we find appellant's sole assignment of error to be without merit. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. BLACKMON, A.J. and JAMES D. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR. TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's .