COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA No. 72246 F. TIMOTHY DEEGAN : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-appellant : : AND vs. : : OPINION MARCIA J. DEEGAN, ET AL. : : Defendant-appellees : : : JANUARY 29, 1998 DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. D-231389 : JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: For defendant-appellees: JOHN V. HEUTSCHE, ESQ. JOYCE E. BARRETT, ESQ. 500 Courthouse Square 800 Standard Building 310 Lakeside Avenue, West 1370 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113-1021 Cleveland, OH 44113 PATTON, J. The domestic relations court found plaintiff-husband F. Timothy Deegan in contempt for failing to comply with certain -2- provisions of a separation agreement that he and defendant-wife Marcia Deegan had incorporated into a judgment entry of divorce. The only issue properly before us is whether the court adequately substantiated husband's ability to pay attorney fees connected with the contempt citation. When the court granted the parties' divorce in May 1995, it ordered both husband and wife to transfer to the other their interests in certain marital properties. As applicable to the issue raised in this appeal, wife agreed to transfer to husband her interest in the marital home and husband in turn agreed to execute a note payable to wife in the sum of $325,000, due and payable on December 15, 1995. Husband also agreed to transfer his interest in a gasoline station known as C&D Products. In her motion to show cause, wife complained husband failed to transfer both properties as agreed. Morever, wife complained husband failed to provide proof that he named her the beneficiary of a life insurance policy with a face value of $70,000.1 A magistrate heard the motion to show cause and issued a decision in which he recommended husband be held in contempt for his failure to transfer the properties and name wife the beneficiary of the life insurance policy. The magistrate also decided husband should pay wife $2,000 for her attorney fees. Husband filed objections to the magistrate's decision stating: 1 Husband also filed a motion to show cause in which he likewise complained wife failed to transfer to him her interest in certain marital properties. The court found that motion well- taken, found wife in contempt and entered judgment accordingly. Wife does not appeal from that ruling. -3- For cause plaintiff states the court did not take testimony regarding either plaintiff or defendant Deegan's income or expenses nor either party's ability to pay her or his own attorney fees and expenses, and that absent such testimony such an award of fees is improper. The court overruled those objections and, with one minor modification not relevant to this appeal, adopted the magistrate's decision. Husband raises several assignments of error, but we may consider only one of those assignments because he did not properly object to them. Husband's objection, set forth above in its entirety, simply challenges the court's authority to require husband to pay wife's attorney fees absent some finding of his ability to pay. Civ.R. 53(E)(3)(b) states that objections shall be specific and state with particularity the grounds of the objection. Moreover, the rule states, [a] party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's adoption of any finding of fact or conclusion of law unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion under this rule. Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(E)(3)(b), we confine our review to the single issue raised in the objection. R.C. 3105.18(H) grants the court authority to award attorney fees at any stage of the [divorce] proceedings, including any proceeding to enforce a prior order or decree. Attorney fees may be awarded in connection with contempt as a sanction either for failure to comply with a court order or to compensate the aggrieved party for damages sustained by the contemnor's noncompliance. See Roach v. Roach (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 315, 323. We review -4- attorney fee awards for an abuse of discretion. Oatey v. Oatey (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 251, 263; Swanson v. Swanson (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 85, 90. R.C. 3105.18(H) directs the court to consider whether the party has the ability to pay the attorney fees awarded for a party's failure to obey a court order. The better practice is for the court to make a specific finding on this point, but under the circumstances, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by inferring husband's ability to pay without making an express finding. Under limited circumstances, the court may use its own knowledge and experience in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees. See Goodev. Goode (1991), 70 Ohio App.3d 125, 134. We think that knowledge extends to the financial positions of the parties, particularly in a case such as this when the substantial assets of the parties are apparent on the record and clearly indicate husband had the ability to pay the attorney fees. Indeed, husband wisely makes no direct argument that he could not personally afford to pay the attorney fees. Wife may also have had the ability to pay her own attorney fees, but that ability is irrelevant here. Importantly, the court ordered husband to pay attorney fees as a sanction for contempt. The punitive aspect of that contempt order would be nullified if wife's independent ability to pay those fees could override the court's desire to order payment of attorney fees as punishment. As previously discussed, husband stipulated to the reasonableness of wife's attorney fees and made no argument that he could not afford -5- to pay those fees. Given the circumstances, the court's decision to have husband pay those fees cannot be considered an abuse of discretion. The assigned error is overruled. Judgment is affirmed. -6- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants his costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court direct ing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DYKE, P.J. NAHRA, J., CONCURS. JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .