COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72234 JULIUS BACSA, : : Plaintiff-Appellant : JOURNAL ENTRY : and vs. : OPINION : MAYO'S PUB BAR, ET AL., : : Defendants-Appellees : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : FEBRUARY 19, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: : Civil appeal from : Common Pleas Court : Case No. 302722 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED : IN PART, AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: Paul Mancino, Jr. 75 Public Square, Square 1016 Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2098 For defendant-appellee, Robert C. Wentz Mayo's Pub Bar: 1420 Standard Building 1370 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- For defendant-appellee, Paul T. Kirner Rigid Enterprises, Inc.: KIRNER & BOLDT Timber Ridge Corp. Center 8025 Corporate Circle N. Royalton, Ohio 44133 -3- NAHRA, J.: Appellant, Julius Bacsa, appeals a jury verdict in his favor against appellee, Mark Wokojance, and a directed verdict in favor of appellees Mayo's Pub Bar, Paul Mayo, and Nina Mayo (hereinafter the Mayo appellees ). In March, 1995, Wokojance assaulted appellant in Mayo's Pub Bar, located in North Royalton, Ohio. Appellant brought an action for civil assault against Wokojance and an action in negligence against the Mayo appellees. At trial, appellant called himself, appellee Wokojance, and appellee Nina Mayo as witnesses. Appellant testified that Wokojance assaulted him, stating that Wokojance threw him to the floor, hurting his wrist and nose. Appellant stated that he received treatment for his injuries at Deaconess Hospital, later saw Dr. Jeffrey Morris at Beachwood Orthopedics where his wrist was placed in a cast, and that he received an MRI and underwent physical therapy. Wokojance testified that he pleaded guilty to criminal assault as a result of a plea bargain in which he did not serve jail time. Wokojance further testified that appellant had been the aggressor and he acted in self-defense. Nina Mayo testified that she was an employee, officer, and forty-nine percent shareholder of Rigid Enterprises, Inc., an Ohio corporation, which owned Mayo's Pub. At the close of appellant's case, the court granted the Mayo appellees' motion for a directed verdict. After Wokojance presented -4- his defense, the court refused to admit appellant's medical bills totaling over $3,800.00 into evidence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant and awarded him $1,000.00. I. Appellant's first assignment of error reads: 1. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE COURT WOULD NOT ALLOW ADMISSION OF ITEMIZED STATEMENTS CONCERNING MEDICAL TREATMENT RECEIVED BY PLAINTIFF. (Tr. 24, 25, 60, 61, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72). Appellant argues that the court erred by not allowing his itemized medical bills where he testified as to the cause of his injuries and treatment and authenticated the bills as being sent to him for the treatment received. Issues of admissibility of evidence are reviewed to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Fiorini v. Whiston (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 419, 424, 635 N.E.2d 1311, 1314. (Citing Rigby v. Lake Cty. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 569 N.E.2d 1056.) The first paragraph of the syllabus of Wagner v. McDaniels (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 184, 459 N.E.2d 561, states: 1. Proof of the amount paid or the amount of the bill rendered and of the nature of the services performed constitutes prima facie evidence of the necessity and reasonableness of the charges for medical and hospital services. (Detunno v. Shull, 166 Ohio St. 365, modified.) R.C. 2317.421 states: In an action for damages arising from personal injury or wrongful death, a written bill or statement, or any relevant portion thereof, itemized by date, type of service rendered, and charge, shall, if otherwise admissible, be prima-facie evidence of the reasonableness of any charges and fees stated therein for medication and prosthetic devices furnished, or medical, dental, hospital, and funeral services rendered by the person, firm, or corporation issuing such bill or statement, -5- provided, that such bill or statement shall be prima facie evidence of reasonableness only if the party offering it delivers a copy of it, or the relevant portion thereof, to the attorney of record for each adverse party not less that five days before trial. Appellee Wokojance makes two separate arguments that the court properly excluded the medical bills. First, appellant did not present testimony that the treatment he received was reasonably necessary for his injuries and appellant's testimony was insufficient to prove the reasonableness of the treatment. Second, the bills were not authenticated and are hearsay not subject to a recognized exception. In arguing that appellant failed to introduce testimony to support the necessity of the medical treatment received, Wokojance notes that appellant was unable to testify as to the exact dates he received treatment as well as the names of all his treating physicians. Additionally, Wokojance notes that appellant testified as to unrelated injuries for which he did not receive treatment. Under Wagner, supra, the medical bills themselves are evidence of the necessity and reasonableness of the charges for services. See, e.g., Coleman v. Drayton (Mar. 24, 1994), Franklin App. No. 93APE10-1402, unreported; Ronk v. Hall (Dec. 31, 1987), Delaware App. No. 87-CA-9, unreported. In the syllabus of Wood v. Elzoheary (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 27, 462 N.E.2d 1243, this court stated: 2. Proof that medical care was reasonably necessary is part of a claimant's burden to show that the liability event proximately caused the claimed damage. Proof that the liability event caused the claimed injury need not include expert opinion testimony when the causal relationship is a matter of common knowledge. -6- 3. Proof that described medical care was reasonably necessary for identified injuries may not require expert testimony when that treatment is a matter of common knowledge. In this case, appellant's testimony that his wrist and nose were injured from an assault in a bar and the steps he took for treatment is sufficient to support his claimed injuries and the treatment received. The treatment he testified to for his injuries is not so unexpected or so unusual as to be beyond the realm of common knowledge. Accordingly, the medical bills proffered by appellant should have been admitted. Wokojance also argues that the medical bills were not properly authenticated and are inadmissable as hearsay not subject to a recognized exception. In Wood, supra, after the court found that the plaintiff's evidence allowed itemized medical bills to be introduced, the court stated that: Defendant acknowledged that the disputed bills were accurate; the defense objection concerned their reasonable necessity. Even if the physical bills were never authenticated, the stated amounts were proper evidence of reasonable costs for reasonably necessary care. Wood, 11 Ohio App.3d at 29-30, 462 N.E.2d 1243, 1247 (emphasis added). We agree with the Wood court's analysis that the bills need not be authenticated except as evidence they are the bills received by the claimant. This view is in accordance with R.C. 2317.421 which states bills for medical treatment are to be considered prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of the charges. -7- We find appellant's first assignment of error well taken. As the jury's verdict was for approximately 25% of the appellant's proffered medical bills, the court's exclusion of the bills was prejudicial. Accordingly, we remand this cause for a new trial on the issue of damages. II. Appellant's second assignment of error reads: II. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT FURTHER CLAIMS THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE OWNERS OF MAYO'S PUB BAR. (DEFENDANT-APPELLEES MAYO'S PUB BAR, RIGID ENTERPRISES, PAUL MAYO AND NINA MAYO.) Appellant argues that the court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of the Mayo appellees because evidence exists which could lead a jury to impose liability on the Mayo appellees. Civ.R. 50 provides in pertinent part: (A) Motion for Directed Verdict. *** (4) When granted on the Evidence. When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue. In this case, appellant argues that his testimony that Wokojance and the bartender spoke prior to the assault would allow a jury to infer that the bartender knew of the pending assault and did nothing to prevent it. Appellant further argues that his testimony that the bartender offered him no aid after the assault bolsters his argument that the bartender had prior knowledge. -8- A business owner may be held liable for the criminal acts of a third party. In Simpson v. Big Bear Store Co. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 130, 652 N.E.2d 702, the syllabus reads: A business owner has a duty to warn or protect its business invitees from criminal acts of third parties when the business owner knows or should know that there is a substantial risk of harm to its invitees on the premises in the possession and control of the business owner. The duty does not extend to premises not in the possession and control of the business owner. We find appellant's testimony that Wokojance and the bartender spoke prior to the assault insufficient to meet the standard of knowledge as set forth in Simpson, supra. Appellant did not present evidence which would allow reasonable minds to conclude that the bartender knew or should have known of an impending assault on appellant by Wokojance. Accordingly, the court properly granted the Mayo appellees' motion for a directed verdict. Appellant's second assignment of error is not well taken. -9- This cause is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs divided equally between plaintiff-appellant and defendants-appellees. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PORTER, P.J., and _____________________________ JOSEPH J. NAHRA PATTON, J., CONCUR. JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R.22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .