COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72059 DALE KNAZIK : : : Plaintiff-Appellant : : : -vs- : JOURNAL ENTRY : AND SALLY KNAZIK : OPINION Defendant-Appellee DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : JANUARY 22, 1998 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. D-95885 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Sally Knazik Patrick M. Farrell, Esq. P. O. Box 655 Hildebrand, Williams & Farrell Fyffe, Alabama 35971 21430 Lorain Road Fairview Park, Ohio 44126 -2- ROCCO, J.: Defendant-appellant Dale Knazik appeals from the order of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, which overruled his objections to a magistrate's report and adopted the magistrate's recommendation. The magistrate determined appellant owed $15,285 in arrearages to his ex-wife, plaintiff- appellee Sally Knazik, on his child support obligations and recommended an attachment on appellant's wages of $102 per month until the arrearage was paid. Appellant contends the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. This court has reviewed the record, determines appellant's contention lacks merit, and therefore affirms the trial court's order. The record reflects appellant and appellee were married in 1973. They had two children: Javin Michael, born June 27, 1973 and Brian Matthew, born July 3, 1976. Appellant and appellee obtained a dissolution of their marriage on November 6, 1978. By the terms of the separation agreement made a part of the dissolution decree, appellee received custody of the children; appellant was to pay child support to appellee in the amount of $30 per week for each of his sons, plus all reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses. In April 1980, appellee filed a motion to show cause in the trial court. In her affidavit attached to the motion, appellee stated that beginning in January 1979, appellant's child support payments became sporadic and that as of April 1980, appellant had -3- paid less than One Thousand Dollars of the amount he owed for child support. Moreover, appellee averred appellant had not paid a medical expense incurred by Brian. In conjunction with the motion to show cause, appellee also filed a motion for attorney fees. The matter was heard by a referee in late May 1980. The referee made the following determinations: 1) appellant owed $4,760 in child support but had paid appellee only $1,420; 2) thus, appellant was in arrears in the amount of $3,340; and 3) addition- ally, appellant owed appellee $101.40 for Brian's unpaid medical expense. The referee therefore recommended appellant be ordered to pay the foregoing amounts and further recommended appellant pay $100 toward appellee's attorney fees. On July 16, 1980, the trial court adopted the referee's recommendations. The trial court ordered appellant to pay the child support arrearage to the Bureau of Support and the other amounts directly to appellee. On November 25, 1980, appellee filed another motion to show cause, averring appellant still was making child support payments on only a sporadic basis and had refused to pay either Brian's medical expense or the portion of her attorney fee. In response, appellant filed a motion for change of custody. On February 23, 1981, the trial court issued a consent judgment entry. The entry stated that the parties ha[d] agreed to dismiss both motions upon [appellee's] receipt of the sum of $201.40 ***. -4- On January 24, 1995, the Cuyahoga County Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) filed in the trial court a notice that, pursuant to its statutory authority, it had conducted an investigation into appellant's child support obligation. The notice indicated appellant was in arrears. The record reflects the matter came before an administrative officer for hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the administrative officer determined that although appellant's sons were now emancipated, appellant was in arrears on his child support obligation as of July 3, 1994 in the amount of $31,960 since he had paid appellee directly $10,710 but owed $42,670. On March 10, 1995, appellant filed a motion in the trial court to correct the record regarding arrearage. In his affidavit attached to the motion, appellant stated he had paid child support in accordance with the terms and conditions of the dissolution decree. Appellant also subsequently filed his objection to the administrative officer's determination with a request for a hearing on the matter. On March 8, 1996, a hearing was held before a magistrate. Appellant appeared with counsel. Although served with notice of the hearing, appellee did not appear since she had, by that time, moved out of state. Appellant testified in his own behalf and also presented as a witness his current wife, whom he had married in 1987. The magistrate accepted into evidence two voluminous notebooks containing photo copies of appellant's tax returns, financial records, and checks from 1980 to 1994. On May 1, 1996, -5- the magistrate issued her proposed findings and recommendations as follows: 1) appellant owed child support in the amount of $3,340 as of June 1980, plus $39,330 from June 1980 to July 1994; 2) appellant presented evidence of payments to appellee totaling $27,335; 3) a support arrearage existed in the amount of $15,285 because appellant had consistently underpaid ; 4) appellant's motions should be granted; and 5) appellant should pay $100 per month plus a 2% fee by means of a wage notice on his income source until the arrearage was paid. On May 15, 1996, appellant filed objections to the magis- trate's report, arguing the decision was against the weight of the evidence as the magistrate had failed to properly consider his evidence. On October 24, 1996, the trial court sustained appellant's objections and ordered the matter returned to the magistrate for an amended/supplemental decision. On November 20, 1996, the magistrate issued her amended decision. Therein, she stated with more specificity the evidence adduced at the March 1996 hearing; however, the magistrate issued the same recommendations as she had previously, i.e., appellant's arrearage was in the amount of $15,285, appellant should pay $100 per month plus a 2% fee toward it, and the payments should be made through a wage notice on his income source. On December 4, 1996, appellant renewed his objections to the magistrate's amended report, again arguing the decision was against the weight of the evidence. Subsequently, the trial court issued -6- its order overruling appellant's objections and adopting the magistrate's findings and recommendations. Appellant has filed a timely appeal from the trial court's order, asserting the following as his sole assignment of error: THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVI- DENCE WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE INTRODUCED TO SHOW THAT THE APPELLANT HAD FAILED TO PAY HIS CHILD SUPPORT. Despite the manner in which appellant has framed the forego- ing, appellant simply argues the magistrate's finding and decision that he still owes $15,285 in child support was unsupported by the evidence adduced at the hearing. Appellant bases his argument upon his own testimony and the testimony of his current wife and, further, upon appellee's failure either to continue to pursue her legal remedies following the July 1980 order or to appear at the March 1996 hearing. Appellant's argument remains unpersuasive. Ordinarily, an appellate court will not overturn a judgment of the trial court that is supported by competent, credible evidence. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77; C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279. Moreover, the evaluation of evidence and the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trier of fact. Myers v. Garson (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 610; Ostendorf-Morris Co. v. Slyman (1982), 6 Ohio App.3d 46. Appellant made the determination of the CSEA administrative hearing officer a part of the record in this case prior to the May 1996 hearing. Cf., Rowe v. Rowe (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 607; -7- Maloney v. Maloney (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 9. The CSEA officer indicated that as of July 1994, appellant owed $42,670 in child support. He also indicated appellant documented only $10,710 in money paid directly to appellee. Appellant then challenged the determination in the trial court by filing a motion, attaching both a copy of the administrative determination and his own affidavit in which he stated he had never been in arrearage. At the May 1996 hearing, there is no indication the magistrate used the administrative determination of an arrearage as evidence; rather, the magistrate merely verified the figures contained in the administrative determination by calculating the total amount of child support appellant owed, adding the $3,340 amount set forth in the July 1980 judgment entry, which revealed appellant had been in arrears, to the amount due pursuant to the original divorce degree between the end of May 1980 until the youngest child, Brian, turned eighteen in July 1994, viz., $39,900. These two amounts totalled $42,670, as the hearing officer had indicated. The magistrate's amended report clearly reveals she considered appellant's evidence of payments but that by the time of the hearing, appellant had documented only $27,355 in cash payments to appellee. Moreover, the magistrate accurately noted that appellant did not testify as to the amount of cash payments directly paid to [appellee]. Furthermore, the magistrate stated appellant's current wife had no personal knowledge of appellant's payments to appellee prior to 1987 when the two were married. Finally, the magistrate stated as follows: -8- *** [Appellant] consistently recorded payments made to [appellee] between January 30, 1981 and July 3, 1994. No evidence of payment was sufficiently submitted to show [appellee's] payments from May 28, 1980 to January 29, 1981. The Magistrate finds even if [appel- lant] made cash payments to [appellee] from May 28, 1980 to July 3, 1994 and believed he would not have recorded them as he had done with the other payments, which included the recording of ATM cash withdrawals noted from copies and receipts of his check registers, his failure to record same was incredible in light of the evidence presented. (Emphasis in original; underscoring added.) From the foregoing, it is clear the magistrate simply did not believe appellant's assertions that since 1978, he had paid child support in accordance with the terms and conditions of the dissolution decree. In view of appellant's careful assembly of his financial records of approximately fourteen years and the magistrate's equally careful consideration of appellant's evidence, this court cannot find the decision that appellant still owed $15,285 on his obligation to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. Taylor v. Taylor (Nov. 23, 1994), Summit App. No. 16738, unreported; Slusher v. Slusher (Mar. 13, 1992), Clark App. No. 2848, unreported; cf., Rowe v. Rowe, supra; Maloney v. Maloney, supra; Ours v. Ours (Apr. 4, 1997), Lake App. No. 96-L-134, un- reported. Accordingly, appellant's sole assignment of error is over- ruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. -9- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Division of Domestic Relations, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES PORTER, P.J., AND JOHN T. PATTON, J., CONCUR JUDGE KENNETH A. ROCCO N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc. App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E), unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .