COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71738 ANDREE MARIE SCALERO ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee ) JOURNAL ENTRY ) -vs- ) AND ) ROBERT L. SCALERO ) OPINION ) Defendant-Appellant ) Date of Announcement of Decision: JANUARY 22, 1998 Character of Proceeding: Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas Division of Domestic Relations Case No. D-242164 Judgment: Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. Date of Journalization: Appearances: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: DONNA RAMSEY-CAPUTO, ESQ. RICHARD D. MESSERMAN, ESQ. 13451 Pearl Road 1940 Huntington Building Strongsville, Ohio 44136 925 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115 JAMES M. PORTER, P.J.: -2- Defendant-appellant Robert L. Scalero appeals from the divorce decree of the Domestic Relations Court entered November 13, 1996. He contends the trial court erred in favor of the plaintiff- appellee Andree Marie Scalero in determining the value of Mr. Scalero's closely held business; in awarding spousal support including attorney fees to the wife; in awarding substantially all the liquid assets to the wife; in imputing value and income to Mr. Scalero; in awarding life insurance policies to the wife; and not allowing the husband credit for certain alleged financial misconduct of the wife in violating temporary restraining orders. We affirm the trial court's judgment in part and reverse and remand in part for the reasons hereinafter stated. Mr. and Mrs. Scalero were ages fifty-three and fifty-four, respectively at the time of the divorce. They were married on February 13, 1969 and have two emancipated children. They are both high school graduates without any college experience. After high school in 1962, Mr. Scalero enlisted in the Navy where he served as a machinist and was honorably discharged in 1964. Subsequent employment was at Telco, Ford and Parker Hannifin where he worked in hydraulics. In March 1981 he started his own business known as Fluid Systems Service, Inc., which serviced customers' hydraulic, pneumatic and electronic systems. On start- up, Fluid Systems leased a building at 5600 Lorain Avenue and ultimately purchased the building in 1986 for $40,000. Fluid Systems paid rent to the Scaleros as reflected on their tax returns. In August 1995, Fluid Systems needed more space and -3- entered into a lease-purchase option on a building at 1920 West 77th Street in Cleveland. Mrs. Scalero worked at minimum wage jobs for three years after marriage. Thereafter, she did not work outside the home except for five years as a part time bookkeeper and secretary at Fluid Systems while raising the minor children. She was not encouraged to work outside the home and started a small in-home cake baking business as a hobby which grossed between $500 and $1,000 per year. In 1995, she attended dental assistance school, but was unable to return because of back problems. She had no source of income except for the casual baking. Mr. Scalero was a hard worker (60 to 70 hours per week) and earned between $40,000 and $60,000 in the four years before the divorce. He would turn his weekly paychecks over to Mrs. Scalero to pay household bills. The parties owned their home and lived a comfortable lifestyle, which included parties to entertain business customers, Caribbean cruises and Las Vegas trips. Mrs. Scalero has suffered from back problems (scoliosis), fluid behind her eardrum requiring tubes in her ears and was under counseling for anxiety attacks. In recent years Mr. Scalero had back surgery and a heart attack in 1994 requiring angioplasty. Mrs. Scalero filed for divorce on August 10, 1995. Mr. Scalero moved out of the home on August 13 and obtained temporary restraining orders against his wife's expenditures. The court issued a temporary support order on November 16, 1995 requiring the husband to pay his wife $1,400 per month with 2% poundage plus one- -4- half of the residential mortgage, taxes and insurance. Mrs. Scalero continued to live in the marital residence. Following discovery and a number of pretrials, the case went to trial on September 18, 1996, continuing over nine days. The parties were able to stipulate to the value of most of their assets except for the value of the closely held business, Fluid Systems. Both parties presented expert testimony on the value of the business; Mr. Scalero's expert valuing it at $197,000 and Mrs. Scalero's expert at $325,000, representing a difference of $128,000. The key items in dispute were work in progress and off- the-book inventory over which the experts markedly disagreed. The trial court eventually arrived at a valuation of $240,000 for the business based in part on the husband's admissions in his pre-trial statement filed in November 1995 and financial documents he submitted to two banks for business loans. In the interest of keeping the business intact, the court awarded the entire business to the husband. Almost all the liquid assets (bank and retirement accounts, insurance, furniture and the house) were awarded to the wife. Thus, the net assets awarded to the husband were $305,050 and to the wife $265,618. The court found the parties' debt to be insignificant. The court filed a 28 page Judgment Entry with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law explaining its decision and the reasons for the allocations. The wife was also granted spousal support of $1,500 per month until her death, remarriage or cohabitation, subject to further order of the court. The court also awarded additional spousal support to the wife as attorney -5- fees in the amount of $23,000 and made various adjustments in arrearages. From the final decree the husband filed this timely appeal. We will address the defendant's assignments of error in the order asserted and together where they are interrelated to facilitate discussion. I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING UPON APPELLANT'S OPINION EXPRESSED IN A PRETRIAL STATEMENT AS TO THE VALUATION OF A CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION IN LIEU OF THE VALUATION EXPRESSED BY APPELLANT'S EXPERT. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UTILIZING A VALUATION DATE OTHER THAN THE DATE OF TRIAL. -6- V. THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPUTATION OF ADDITIONAL VALUE TO THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION BY REASON OF A SECURITY DEPOSIT AND RENTAL PAYMENTS WHEN SAID SECURITY DEPOSIT WAS ALREADY AN ASSET OF THE CORPORATION ON THE VALUATION DATE SELECTED BY THE COURT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CONTRARY TO THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. The major contention between the parties at trial was obviously over the valuation of the closely held business, Fluid Systems. This valuation was of utmost importance to the equitable distribution of the marital estate, a matter which is entrusted to the sound judgment of the trial court. Recently, in Bisker v. Bisker (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 608, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the issue of the division of marital property: A trial court is vested with broad discretion when fashioning its division of marital property. However, a trial court's discretion is not unbridled. The award need not be equal, but it must be equitable. A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court's decision is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. At a minimum, the trial court must address the factors listed in R.C. 3105.18 in arriving at its decision. To do otherwise is an abuse of discretion. ***. (Citations omitted.) Id. at 609. Furthermore, as part of a trial court's determination regarding the division of marital property, a trial court may in equity require valuation of the marital assets on the date of the de facto termination of the marriage. Berish v. Berish (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 318, 320. The determination as to when to apply a valuation date other than the actual date of divorce is within the -7- discretion of the trial court and cannot be disturbed on appeal absent a demonstration of an abuse of discretion. Gullia v. Gullia(1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 653, 666, followed in Reese v. Reese (May 22, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 71336, unreported at 11; Spychalski v. Spychalski (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 10, 15. Given the state of the evidence, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's choice of August 1995 as the valuation date for the closely held business. The evidence showed that defendant moved out of the marital home in August 1995, after being served with plaintiff's divorce complaint. The fiscal year for the company in 1995 conveniently ended on August 31, 1995. Further, as the trial court noted: The Court finds, however, that the proper valuation date to use with respect to this company is August 31, 1995. The Court is mindful that during the past year that this divorce litigation has been pending (the divorce was filed August of 1995) Mr. Scalero has been in complete control of the assets and liabilities of the company. By his control, Mr. Scalero has the ability to affect an asset approach valuation of the company by increasing his debt (which he actually did) and hence his liabilities, thus consciously decreasing the value of his assets and the value of the company during the year this divorce action was pending. (Journal Entry q13). This reasoning coincides with the reasoning set forth in Berish, supra regarding the trial court's broad discretion in using a de facto date in valuing marital assets (trial court must be given broad discretion in setting valuation date of assets as one party *** could withdraw all funds and, unilaterally and with -8- impunity, squander the fruits of the marital labor. Such a position would not only be antithetical to public policy, but also to prior case law ). Also, it appears that plaintiff and her expert did not receive the financial data for the 1996 fiscal year until the trial actually started. (Journal Entry q13). We also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's valuation of the company as discussed below. In the trial court's Journal Entry, it gave substantial attention and detailed analysis to the evidence presented on the valuation of the business. See Journal Entry qq7-13, noting the respective positions of the parties, the disagreements among the experts on the contested work in progress and off-book inventory, and the significance the court attached to the evidence. The court finally valued the business at $240,000, finding as follows (Journal Entry q14): Based upon the hours of testimony, the volumes of documents presented to this Court, the Court finds that Fluid Systems has a value of $240,000, rather than the values set forth by either expert for the following reasons. In November 1994, Mr. Scalero valued his company for purposes of a financial disclosure statement at $270,000. In November of 1995 on his pretrial statement, he valued the company at $240,000 and in February of 1996 on another financial statement, he valued the company at $210,000.00, which valuations did not include the motor vehicles with values ranging anywhere between $20,000.00-$40,000.00, which both experts had included in the value of the company. While Mr. Scalero's own estimate of what his company is worth is not binding on this court, the court is concerned with the fact that both experts, created their own formula for valuating work in progress providing a swing in value of between $60,000.00 to $80,000.00. In addition, the -9- inventory off the books valuation is totally dependent on Mr. Scalero and while this Court finds Mr. Scalero to be a credible witness, the natural desire is to either underestimate when it benefits him or puff when it benefits him. The Court, therefore, feels that since these figures are so much in control of Mr. Scalero, the best way to value the company is to use his own estimates of the value of the company within the parameters set forth by the two appraisers. The court gave due consideration to the other assets of the parties and an itemized analysis of the factors required by R.C. 3105.171(F) in dividing the marital property. (Journal Entry qq15- 19). Based on the record, we can find no fault with the trial court's determination of the value of the business or the August 31, 1995 valuation date. The credibility of witnesses is primarily a matter for the trier of fact. McCoy v. McCoy (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 570, 575-76. Certainly we can not find that in reaching its conclusions on the division of marital property that the trial court abused its discretion. Nor do we find the court's determinationto be contrary to law or against the manifest weight of the evidence. We do find error, however, in the trial court's holding that defendant's $5,000 down payment on his new property was a separate marital asset. Defendant testified that he paid the down payment in August 1995. The $5,000 down payment was set forth in the August 1995 financial statement of the company as an asset (Deft's. Ex. A) and also appeared as an asset on the August 30, 1995 balance sheet submitted to Society Bank (Pltf's. Ex. 31). Both experts -10- could not recall if the down payment appeared on the financial statement for August 1995, but agreed that the deposit would be considered a corporate asset. (Tr. at 129; 857; 929). Therefore, the $5,000 is implicit in the trial court's valuation of the corporation and the trial court's awarding the defendant this $5,000 separate and apart from the value of the corporation was duplicative. We, therefore, reverse and remand the trial court's order regarding the disposition of the marital assets to remove the $5,000 duplication. However, given that the husband was awarded over $40,000 more in marital assets, we doubt that the impact of remedying the $5,000 duplication will require recalculation. We nonetheless remand the matter back to the trial court for correction. Assignments of Error I and II are overruled; Assignment of Error V respecting the $5,000 down payment is sustained with that issue remanded to the trial court. III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPLICIT DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CREDIT AGAINST TEMPORARY SUPPORT OBLIGATION WHICH RESULTED IN A FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOLLAR ($15,000.00) DISPARITY IN THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CONTRARY TO THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO CREDIT APPELLANT WITH THE TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS (12,500.00) DISSIPATED BY APPELLEE IN VIOLATION OF THE COURT'S TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CONTRARY TO THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. Defendant complains that the trial court failed to credit him in the property settlement with certain monies ($12,500) that Mrs. -11- Scalero is alleged to have obtained and applied in violation of temporary restraining orders. Defendant provided plaintiff with $7,500 a few days before he was served with the divorce complaint in order for plaintiff to pay the house mortgage. Instead, plaintiff kept the money to live off of. Defendant obtained a temporary restraining order to keep her from spending this money. Later, plaintiff, using a power of attorney document, withdrew $5,000 from the corporate account in order to pay car insurance premiums and bills. Defendant again obtained a temporary restraining order to keep her from spending this amount. Plaintiff, in spite of the restraining orders, used the funds to pay bills. The trial court refused to hear any evidence regarding the violation of the temporary restraining orders as the defendant failed to file a motion to show cause regarding the violation. (Tr. 706). Therefore, the trial court's failure to credit defendant's temporary spousal support arrearage based on plaintiff's violation of the temporary restraining orders was not in error. Furthermore, the evidence at trial indicated that plaintiff needed the money due to defendant's failure to pay the amount the trial court ordered in its temporary spousal support order. The money given to plaintiff was used to pay car insurance premiums for her and the sons, make mortgage payments and for food. Defendant's failure to pay her adequate support forced her to utilize the $12,500 for her monthly expenses. She was also forced to incur -12- debt on her credit cards in order to have the furnace replaced and the swimming pool closed for the season due to defendant's refusal to help her. Defendant's contention that the $5,000 withdrawn from the corporation results in the corporation being overvalued as the withdrawal is carried as a shareholder's loan is without merit. During this same period that plaintiff was not being adequately supported, Mr. Scalero purchased a new 1995 truck with corporate funds for the sum of $21,972.50, which he deemed his spite truck. He also bought an employee a car for $8,770. These assets were not included in the August 31, 1995 balance sheet and thus not included in the valuation of Fluid Systems, thereby offsetting plaintiff's withdrawals. Since plaintiff is not seeking credit for one half the value of these vehicles, that amount would more than offset the $5,000 credit which defendant is seeking. Assignments of Error III and IV are overruled. VI. WHETHER GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE COURT AWARDED APPELLEE ALL OF THE LIQUID ASSETS OF THE MARRIAGE AND THE FACTORS SET FORTH IN OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 3105.18, THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF TWENTY THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($23,000) IN ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS EXCESSIVE AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CONTRARY TO LAW. Defendant challenges an award of attorney fees in the sum of $23,000 to Mrs. Scalero. Plaintiff had requested approximately $32,000 in fees. We find no error in this award. This Court stated the applicable standards of review in McCoy v. McCoy (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 570, 583: An award of alimony may be made in the form of an allowance for reasonable attorney -13- fees. Swanson v. Swanson (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 85, 89, 2 O.O.3d 65, 68, 355 N.E.2d 894, 897. Consideration must be given to the reasonableness of the fee award and to the criteria used in the granting of an alimony award. Id. at 90, 2 O.O.3d at 68, 355 N.E.2d at 898. On appeal, the only questions for inquiry are whether the factual conclusions upon which the trial court based the exercise of its discretion were against the manifest weight of the evidence, or whether there was an abuse of discretion. Id.; Oatey v. Oatey (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 251, 263, 614 N.E.2d 1054, 1061; Birath v. Birath (1988), 53 Ohio App.3d 31, 39, 558, N.E.2d 63, 71. We find the trial court gave careful consideration to the evidence on attorney fees and found the fee statements were both reasonable and necessary; there were legitimate disagreements over the valuation of the business and disputable income issues; and it was not an easy case. The trial court quoted and followed Swanson. (Journal Entry qq28-30). The trial court concluded in making the award (Id. q31): The Court finds that unless Plaintiff is awarded a portion of her attorney fees, her ability to adequately protect her interests will be jeopardized. The Court is taking into account the income of the parties, their assets and liabilities. The Court finds that under S3105.18(C)(1)(a) through (n), Mr. Scalero has the ability to contribute to the fees and Mrs. Scalero has the need. The Court concludes that Defendant/Robert Scalero should pay to the Plaintiff/Andree Scalero the sum of $23,000.00 toward her attorney fees and expenses. We find that the award was not an abuse of discretion or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Assignment of Error VI is overruled. VII. WHETHER GIVEN THE FACT THAT APPELLEE HAS NO INSURABLE INTEREST ON APPELLANT'S LIFE AND -14- APPELLANT HAS NO OBLIGATIONS TO APPELLEE WHICH EXTEND BEYOND HIS DEATH, THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES ON APPELLANT'S LIFE WORTH FIFTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($55,000.00) TO APPELLEE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CONTRARY TO LAW. The trial court ordered that the Aid Association for Lutherans life insurance policy with a face value of $50,000 and a cash value of $5,775 and the Prudential Life Insurance policy with a face value of $5,000 and a cash value of $3,802 be awarded to plaintiff. Defendant correctly points out that under our authorities plaintiff has no interest in insurance benefits as security for spousal support after defendant's death. As stated in Robiner v. Robiner(Dec. 7, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67195, unreported at 10: In McCoy, we found security in the form of life insurance is inappropriate for spousal support payments. This is due to the language of R.C. 3105.18(B) which terminates spousal support upon the death of either party unless the award provides otherwise. McCoy, supra, at 582. Furthermore, by requiring plaintiff- appellant to maintain defendant-appellee as a beneficiary, the trial court is not necessarily securing payment of plaintiff- appellant's spousal support obligations and is, in effect providing defendant-appellee with a spousal support award after the death of plaintiff-appellant. See Addy v. Addy (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 204. This case is distinguishable from McCoy v. McCoy, 91 Ohio App.3d 570 and Robiner because Mr. Scalero was not required to pay the premiums for said life insurance and the life insurance was not determined to be security for spousal support, but was allocated to plaintiff to effect an equitable distribution of assets. We note that although the law presumes an equal distribution of marital property is an equitable distribution (R.C. 3105.171(C)(1)), the -15- husband here received more than $40,000 in net assets than the wife, although relatively unliquid property tied up in the business. Plaintiff was merely awarded the cash value of the policies. She could decide whether to cash in said life insurance policies or maintain said policy at her own cost. Whether or not plaintiff has an insurable interest is not before this Court. We find no abuse of discretion of an award of the cash value of the polices to Mrs. Scalero to effect an equitable distribution of property. Frost v. Frost (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 699, 713 (life insurance was marital asset properly distributed in dividing marital property); Babka v. Babka (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 428, 433 (life insurance bought with marital funds is marital asset to be considered in dividing marital property). Assignment of Error VI is overruled. VIII. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPUTATION OF INCOME TO APPELLANT OF SIXTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($60,000.00) PER YEAR WAS CONTRARY TO THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. IX. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD TO APPELLEE OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($1,500.00) PER MONTH SUBJECT TO FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT WAS EXCESSIVE AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Defendant challenges the imputation of $60,000 income to him and the award of spousal support based thereon. The court awarded spousal support of $1,500 per month to Mrs. Scalero until she dies, remarries or cohabits, subject to further order of the court. (Journal Entry at q25). -16- In McCoy, this Court referenced the authorities that must be applied in determining spousal support at pp. 579-80: In Ohio, alimony consists of two components: a division of marital assets and liabilities, and periodic payments of sustenance and support. Kaechele v. Kaechele (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 518 N.E.2d 1197, 1200. As part of a divorce proceeding, a trial court has equitable authority to divide and distribute the marital estate, and then consider whether an award of sustenance alimony would be appropriate. Holcomb v. Holcomb (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 128, 541 N.E.2d 597; R.C. 3105.18(A). Courts in this state derive their power to award sustenance alimony from the statutes. R.C. 3105.18(A) and (B) provide a trial court with guidelines for determining whether alimony is necessary and the nature, amount and manner of alimony payments. Wolfe v. Wolfe (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 399, 414, 75 O.O.2d 474, 482, 350 N.E.2d 413, 423. The trial court is provided with broad discretion in deciding what is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each case, but such discretion is not unlimited. Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 348, 355, 20 O.O.3d 318, 322, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1299. A reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion. Holcomb, supra [44 Ohio St.3d], at 131, 541 N.E.2d at 599. As we noted in Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 0BR 481, 482, 450 N.E.2d 1140, 1142, for an abuse of discretion to exist, the court's attitude must be unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Kunkle v. Kunkle (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 64, 67, 554 N.E.2d 83, 86-87. Accordingly, in this case we must examine the trial court's ruling under the totality of the circumstances and determine whether it acted unreasonable, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. -17- In determining spousal support, the court confronted the issues of what the parties' incomes would be, noting Mr. Scalero's rental income of $12,000 net per year, his salary as CEO at Fluid Systems for the last four years ($38,403; $47,003; $61,457; $43,880) and the perks and benefits of owning his own business and found a total income of $60,000 per year. (Journal Entry qq20-23). Both the plaintiff's and defendant's experts also estimated defendant's salary was $60,000, inclusive of all the perks and benefits he received from the company. The court then considered each of the factors required by R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a) through (n), noting that Mrs. Scalero has no real skills having been out of the job market for 25 years and is now 54 years old. She could earn maybe $12,000 per year at a minimum wage job. Finally, the court concluded as follows (Journal Entry qq25-27): 25. Pursuant to the factors set forth in S3105.18(C)(1)(a) through (n) and based upon the income and expenses of both the Plaintiff and Defendant, which the Court has reviewed very carefully, the Court finds that the Plaintiff/Andree Scalero has a need for spousal support and the Defendant/Robert Scalero has the ability to provide spousal support in the amount of $1,500.00 per month, plus 2% poundage, until the Plaintiff or Defendant die or the Plaintiff remarries or cohabits, but subject to further order of the Court. 26. The Court is anticipating that the Plaintiff will obtain employment making approximately $12,000.00 per year. The disparity in the parties' income is certainly a fact the Court must look at. See Moro v. Moro (May 14, 1992), Cuy. App. No. 60423, unreported. Further, as the Supreme Court stated in Kunkle v. Kunkle (1990), 51 Ohio St.3rd 64, 69; -18- The reason for awarding sustenance alimony payable only to a date certain is that the payee's need requiring support ceases, when, under reasonable circumstances, the payee can become self-supporting. Conversely, if under reasonable circumstances the divorced spouse does not have the resources, ability or potential to become self- supporting, then an award of sustenance alimony for life would be proper. As the Supreme Court stated in Kunkle, (p. 69), *** in cases involving marriages of long duration, parties of advanced age or a homemaker-spouse with little opportunity to develop meaningful employment outside the home *** indefinite alimony is appropriate. 27. The evidence demonstrates that the Plaintiff's needs will not terminate at any particular time and that spousal support should continue for an indefinite period of time, consistent with her needs and the husband's ability to pay, but of course, subject to further order of the Court. The Court is reserving jurisdiction to modify and review this spousal support order in the event of a significant change of circumstances that cannot be foreseen or anticipated. We have reviewed the court's findings against the record and believe they are fully supported by the evidence. A spousal award of $18,000 a year to the wife is hardly excessive when the court imputed $12,000 of earned income to her and she is obliged to maintain the home and sustenance out of such amounts. There has been no abuse of discretion in the award of spousal support or determination of income. The court has retained jurisdiction to adjust any inequities should changed circumstances warrant it. Assignments of Error VIII and IX are overruled. Judgment affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. -19- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas Division of Domestic Relations to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATTON, J., and ROCCO, J., CONCUR. JAMES M. PORTER PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .