COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72432 CORRPRO COMPANIES, INC., : ACCELERATED : Plaintiff-Appellee : JOURNAL ENTRY : AND vs. : OPINION : JAMES B. BUSHMAN, ET AL., : PER CURIAM : Defendants-Appellants : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : SEPTEMBER 11, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: : Civil appeal from : Common Pleas Court : Case No. 327589 JUDGMENT : REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: Steven L. Gardner Douglas B. Schnee McDONALD, HOPKINS, BURKE & HABER 2100 Bank One Center 600 Superior Avenue, East Cleveland, Ohio 44114 For defendants-appellants: Susan V. Belanger Irene C. Keyse-Walker James A. Laurenson ARTER & HADDEN 1100 Huntington Building 925 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115-1475 PER CURIAM: Essentially, appellants' two assignments of error attack the trial court's refusal to compel arbitration of the instant lawsuit. 2 First, appellants challenge the trial court's conclusion that neither arbitration clause is enforceable. The trial court held that the arbitration clauses failed to articulate sufficient procedural guidelines and that this failure rendered the arbitration clauses invalid. However, we agree with the Tenth District Court of Appeals' statements in K.G. Quick & Assoc., Inc. v. Phil Ross Organizational Seminars, Inc., June 14, 1990), Franklin App. No.89AP-1213, unreported: [A]n enforceable arbitration provision need only show the parties' intent to submit disputes to arbitration. It does not require all the details of the arbitration process. * * * Arbitration clauses do not need to be long or complex; and they are not required to specify the arbitration methods to be employed. The touchstone of an enforceable arbitration agreement is a clear expression of intent to resolve a dispute through arbitration. The parties herein have expressed such intent and are bound accordingly. Once an arbitrator is chosen, an appropriate procedure will be established to resolve the claims. Appellee also contends that the arbitration clause contained in the 1996 agreement is unenforceable because assent to the second contract was fraudulently induced. This position is untenable given our holding in Krafcik v. USA Energy Consultants, Inc. (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 59. Therein, we stated at 63: A claim that the contract containing the arbitration clause was induced by fraud does not defeat a motion to compel arbitration unless the claimant can demonstrate specifically that the arbitration clause itself was fraudulently induced. [Internal quotation omitted.] Further, we do not find merit in appellee's attempt to distinguish Krafcik. Rather, we find that the issue of fraud, as alleged by 3 appellee, is a matter committed to arbitration because it requires appellee to demonstrate appellants' breach of the first agreement. See, infra. This determination is committed to arbitration. Additionally, appellee claims that because its complaint requested equitable relief, the case should not proceed to arbitration. However, arbitrators possess broad authority to fashion a remedy, Queen City Lodge No. 69, Fraternal Order of Police, Hamilton Cty., Ohio, Inc. v. Cincinnati (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 403, 407, and courts routinely affirm arbitration awards which provide equitable relief. See, e.g., Willharm v. M.J. Const. Co. (Feb. 20, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 70834, unreported; Ohio State Underwriters, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co. (January 23, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 70748, unreported. See, also, Engis Corp. v. Engis Ltd. (E.D.Ill.1992), 800 F.Supp. 627 (awarding non- traditional equitable relief in form of order to licensee to change its corporate name and assign patents). Accordingly, appellee's argument is unfounded. Having found that the arbitration clauses should have been enforced, we must examine whether either clause encompasses appellant's claims. It is well established that an arbitration clause should not be denied effect unless it may be said with positive assurance that the clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Neubrander v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 308, 311. We find that the case should have been stayed and arbitration compelled because the determination that Bushman had defaulted was integral to every claim appellee has made. Ultimately, appellee's 4 complaint avers facts which, if established, constitute breach of contract. The agreements provide that a determination regarding the existence of such facts must be made by an arbitrator. (1992 Agreement, P. 4 & 3.01(b); 1996 Agreement, P. 8.01). Thus, the claims fall squarely within the arbitration clauses. Judgment reversed and remanded. 5 This cause is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is, therefore, considered that said appellants recover of said appellee their costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, PRESIDING JUDGE JOSEPH J. NAHRA, JUDGE TERRENCE O'DONNELL, JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R.22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .