COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72431 LORETTA KRUMHEUER : : ACCELERATED DOCKET PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : : AND FLOWERS & VERSAGI COURT : REPORTERS : : OPINION DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : : PER CURIAM DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: NOVEMBER 6, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Cleveland Municipal Court, Case No. 95-CVI-3624. JUDGMENT: REVERSED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: ________________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-appellee: Mary A. Lentz, Esq. Walter & Haverfield 1300 Terminal Tower Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2253 For Defendant-appellant: Christopher M. DeVito, Esq. Morganstern, MacAdams & DeVito Co., L.P.A. Burgess Building - Suite 400 1406 West Sixth Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 PER CURIAM: An accelerated appeal is authorized pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 25. The purpose of an accelerated docket is to allow an appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision. 2 Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 158; App.R. 11.1(E). In the appeal sub judice, defendant-appellant Flowers & Versagi Court Reporters appeal from the March 19, 1997 order of the trial court. For the reasons adduced below, we reverse and reinstate the final order of January 9, 1996. A review of the record on appeal indicates that on February 24, 1995, plaintiff-appellee filed a complaint for money only in the small claims division of the trial court alleging that she was an independent contractor court reporter who left the defendant's firm, and that following her departure the firm owed her $2,000 (plus interest at the rate of 5%) for work that she had performed, but for which she had not been paid. This complaint was amended on April 20, 1995, with leave of court, adding the allegation that her term of employment was from March 5, 1990 to November 20, 1991. The matter was heard before Magistrate Gayle Belcher on May 26, 1995. On January 9, 1996, the Magistrate Belcher recommended that judgment be awarded in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $266.36, plus interest at the rate of 5% from November 20, 1991, plus court costs1. The trial court approved and confirmed this recommendation by Magistrate Belcher on January 9, 1996. No direct appeal from this final order was filed by either party. 1This original report by Magistrate Belcher was dated December 29, 1995, and journalized on January 9, 1996. 3 On September 23, 1996, after further review of the evidence upon the urging of plaintiff and without notice to the defendant, Magistrate Belcher made the following recommendation in an amended report: * * * The new review, however, reveals conclusions which differ from those in the Magistrate's report dated 12/29/95. In the interest of justice and in fairness to both parties the Magistrate's Report which was filed on 1/9/96 is hereby withdrawn. The journal entry of 1/9/96 is vacated and is set aside. * * * ... Parties are ordered to Mediation set for 8/26/96 at 9:00 a.m., courtroom 12D. This set aside recommendation was approved and confirmed by the trial court on September 23, 1996. The mediation, which was originally ordered to be held in August of 1996, was rescheduled to be conducted by Magistrate Gus Frangos on September 23, 1996. See Magistrate Frangos' decision dated August 21, 1996. Defendant-appellant did not participate in the mediation before Magistrate Frangos. Thereafter, Magistrate Belcher, noting that the mediation department informed her that the defendant declined to participate in mediation and without notice to the defendant, recalculated the damages based on a review of the evidence and recommended that the plaintiff should recover $1,390.85, plus interest at the rate of 5% from November 20, 1991, plus court costs. See Magistrate's decision dated December 18, 1996, and journalized on January 8, 4 1997. This recommendation was approved and confirmed by the trial court on January 8, 1997. On January 21, 1997, the defendant filed objections to the Magistrate's January 8, 1997 recommendation pursuant to Civ.R. 53(E)(3). By order journalized on March 19, 1997, the trial court overruled the objections of defendant, as follows: Pursuant to Civ.R. 53, Defendant's Objections to the Magistrate's Decision are hereby overruled. Although neither Plaintiff nor Defendant requested relief from the January 9, 1996 judgment pursuant to the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court is endowed with the inherent power to vacate judgments rendered thereby. See First Nat'l Bank of Dunkirk v. Smith (1921), 102 Ohio St. 120. The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure do not abrogate a court's inherent power to vacate or modify its own judgments, they simply provide a procedure to be followed when a party makes a motion invoking the inherent power of the court over its orders and judgments. Judgment Entry of January 9, 1996 shall not be reinstated and has no force and effect. Judgment Entries of January 23, 1996 and January 8, 1997 shall remain in full force and effect. Stay terminated. A copy of this entry shall be mailed to Plaintiff Loretta Krumheuer and Defendant's attorney, Christopher M. DeVito. Ss. G. Sweeney Judge This timely appeal from the March 19, 1997, order presents the following lone assignment of error: THE CLEVELAND MUNICIPAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY SUA SPONTE VACATING A VALID JOURNALIZED JUDGMENT ENTRY WITHOUT USING THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Once an order has been journalized by a trial court as a final appealable order, that order cannot be modified or vacated except 5 as provided under Civ.R. 50(B) (motion notwithstanding the verdict), Civ.R. 59 (motion for a new trial), or Civ.R. 60(B) (motion for relief from judgment). In re Guardianship of Maurer (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 354, 357, discretionary appeal overruled in (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 1405, certified conflict found not to exist in (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1461, citing Pitts v. Dept. of Transp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 380, and Civ.R. 54(A); also see Kemper Securities, Inc. v. Schultz (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 621, 625 (trial court without authority to sua sponte reopen or modify a final order), citing Levin v. George Fraam & Sons, Inc. (1990), 65 Ohio App.3d 481, Corradi v. Gene Norris Honda, Inc. (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 788, and Pitts, supra; Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Forest Cartage Co. (Cuyahoga, 1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 333, 337, motion to certify overruled in (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 720, citing McCue v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. (1979), 61 Ohio App.2d 101, syllabus ( Civ.R. 60[B] provides the exclusive grounds which must be present and the procedure which must be followed in order for a court to vacate its own judgment. ). In the case sub judice, the trial court vacated its final order of January 9, 1996, without any reliance on, or demonstration of, the Civil Rules of Procedure. The trial court's reliance on First Nat'l Bank of Dunkirk, Ohio v. Smith (1921), 102 Ohio St. 120, is misplaced. In Smith, a court could inherently control its own orders during the same term at which they are rendered. In light of the extensive modern case law cited in the preceding paragraph, we conclude that a court's control over its judgments is subject to the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which 6 became effective as of July 1, 1970. All orders subsequent to that January 9, 1996 order were rendered without the trial court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and are therefore void and of no effect. The assignment of error is affirmed. Judgment reversed and the order of January 9, 1996, is reinstated. This cause is reversed. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant(s) recover of said appellee(s) its costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. ______________________________ JAMES D. SWEENEY, C.J. ______________________________ DAVID T. MATIA, J. ______________________________ JAMES M. PORTER, J. N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will 7 be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .