COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72426 STATE OF OHIO : ACCELERATED DOCKET : : JOURNAL ENTRY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : : AND v. : : OPINION BEATRICE DAVIS : : PER CURIAM : DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: OCTOBER 30, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court, No. CR-346521. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Esq. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor William B. Vodrey, Esq. Assistant County Prosecutor Justice Center - 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: Timothy A. Taylor, Esq. 220 Suburban West Building 20800 Center Ridge Road Rocky River, OH 44116 PER CURIAM: This cause came on to be heard upon the accelerated calender pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 25, the record from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, and the briefs of the parties. 2 Beatrice Davis, defendant-appellant, states as her sole assignment error: THE TRIAL COURT FAILED AT THE TIME OF THE SENTENCING OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO COMPLY WITH THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF OHIO REVISED CODE 2929.11, ET SEQ. On January 16, 1997, defendant-appellant was indicted on one count of possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a fifth degree felony. Defendant-appellant pled not guilty. On February 21, 1997, defendant-appellant retracted her former plea and pled guilty to the offense. A sentencing hearing was set for April 9, 1997 at which time defendant-appellant was sentenced to a term of six months with credit for time served. Defendant-appellant argues that the trial court failed to make any of the eight findings set forth in R.C. 2929.13(B)(1). As such, defendant-appellant argues the trial court was required to impose a community control sanction as opposed to a prison term. Since defendant-appellant had no prior record, defendant-appellant argues the only apparent reason she was excluded from operation of R.C. 2929.11 is that she is an African-American woman on welfare, precisely contrary to the guiding principles of R.C. 2929.11(C). For these reasons, defendant-appellant requests that her sentence be vacated and a sentence of community control sanction be imposed. R.C. 2929.11 states: (A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender. To achieve those purposes, the court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, 3 deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both. (B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders. (C) A court that imposes a sentence upon an offender for a felony shall not base the sentence upon the race, ethnic background, gender, or religion of the offender. The severity of a sentence imposed in conformity to the law by the trial court rests in the discretion of the court and is not a matter with which the reviewing court can interfere, except for an abuse of that discretion. State v. Lazada (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 189; State v. Williams (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 160. Abuse of discretion connotes more than a mere error, it indicates that the trial court's attitude was arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219. In this case, defendant-appellant argues that the trial court did not consider a community sanction even though the circumstances surrounding the case would warrant such sentence. While defendant- appellant acknowledges the trial court stated placing you on a term of community service would demean the seriousness of the offense, defendant-appellant argues the record is silent to the court's conclusion and subsequent rationale for its sentence. We disagree. 4 Initially, we find that the trial court ruling that placing the defendant-appellant on a term of community service would demean the serious nature of the offense needs no further rationalization as it demonstrates the trial court did in fact consider a community sanction. With regards to the trial court's compliance with R.C. 2929.13, we note that a judge is presumed, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, to have considered in the sentencing process the standards mandated by the Revised Code. Columbus v. Jones (1987), 39 Ohio App.3d 87, 89. Moreover, as stated in State v. Baker (1995), 99 Ohio App.3d 718: Although the criteria listed in R.C. 2929.13 must be considered by a trial court when imposing a sentence for a third or forth degree felony, the trial court need not state in the record that it considered the criteria. The requirement of R.C. 2929.13 that a trial court must review the criteria is satisfied if the record reflects that the trial court reviewed a presentence report prior to imposing sentence. (Citations omitted.) See, also, State v. Kroons (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 289; State v. Turner (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 38. Here, from a review of the record, it is clear the trial court did review the presentence report prior to imposing defendant- appellant's sentence. Without presenting any evidence to the contrary, defendant-appellant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, defendant- appellant's sole assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed. 5 6 It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, PRESIDING JUDGE DAVID T. MATIA, JUDGE JAMES M. PORTER, JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's .