COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72423 DONNIE G. GOODALL : : ACCELERATED DOCKET PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : : AND SYSCO FOOD SERVICES OF : CLEVELAND, ET AL. : OPINION : DEFENDANTS-APPELLEE : : PER CURIAM DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: SEPTEMBER 18, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV-308769. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: ________________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-appellant: Mitchell A. Stern, Esq., 1015 Euclid Avenue, 3rd Floor, Cleveland, Ohio, 44113. For Defendant-appellee Sysco Food Services of Cleveland: Timothy A. Marcovy, Esq., M. Scott Young, Esq., Willacy, LoPresti & Marcovy, 700 Western Reserve Building, 1468 West Ninth Street, Cleveland, Ohio, 44113. For Defendant-appellee Bureau of Workers' Compensation and Industrial Commission of Ohio: James P. Mancino, Assistant Attorney General, 615 West Superior Avenue, 12th Floor, State Office Building, Cleveland, Ohio, 44113. An accelerated appeal is authorized pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 25. The purpose of an accelerated docket is to allow an appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision. 2 Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 158. Plaintiff-appellant Donnie Goodall appeals from the decision of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment of defendant-appellee Sysco Food Services of Ohio, Inc. (Sysco). The original action was filed as an appeal by the appellee pursuant to R.C. 4123.512. The appellant filed the complaint which the appellee timely answered. The case proceeded to case management and a trial date was set for June 10, 1997. On February 18, 1997, the appellee filed its motion for summary judgment. No brief in opposition was filed and on March 27, 1997, the court granted the motion. On April 1, 1997, the appellant filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a). Subsequently, the court issued an order stating that the voluntary dismissal was denied as moot. On appeal, the appellant asserts that the motion for summary judgment was in essence a request for dismissal for the failure to comply with discovery requests. The appellant maintains that in order to grant a dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B), the court was required to give the appellant prior notice. While this argument is certainly creative, the appellant has failed to cite any cases, and this court can find no basis for, deeming an unopposed motion for summary judgment to be a request for dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B). Next, the appropriateness of the court's granting of the motion for summary judgment must be considered. A court is 3 permitted to grant a motion for summary judgment where all of the tests provided in Civ.R. 56 are met. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, at 323. The court found that in a case where, as here, the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial on dispositive issues, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. The non-moving party is required to go beyond the pleadings by way of affidavit, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. In the case sub judice, the appellee filed its motion for summary judgment indicating that the appellant would be unable to meet its burden under Celotex, supra, as he had completely failed, even after being subject to court order, to comply with discovery. This failure to supply discovery included the failure to disclose the name of his expert witness, without which the appellant would be unable to establish his right to participate in the workman's compensation fund. Absent this crucial evidence, the appellee argued, the motion for summary judgment should be granted. We see no error in the logic used by the appellee, and find the appellant's assertions not well taken. The appellant next contends that: 1) litigants are not deemed to be on notice of a decision until a court's order is docketed; 2) pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B) that notice is not effective until mailed; and, 3) the voluntary dismissal was journalized prior to the 4 journalization of the court's order granting of the motion for summary judgment and prior to the receipt of notice of the court's order. It has been held that a court speaks only through its journal. Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1996) 76 Ohio St.3d 380. Constructive notice of a decision is given upon entry on the court's journal. Zashin, Rich, Sutula & Monastra Co., L.P.A. v. Offenberg (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 436,445. To journalize an order it must be reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk to become part of the permanent record of the court. The time stamped date offers some evidence of its filing. State v. Ellington (1987), 36 Ohio App. 76. In the present case, the record reveals that the court's order was written on a half-sheet, signed by the judge, and a date stamp and signature by an employee of the clerk's office indicates that it was received for filing on March 27, 1997. Thus, the court's order was effective on March 27, 1997, four days prior to the filing of the voluntary notice of dismissal. The appellant's notice of dismissal was indeed moot. The appellant's contentions are without merit. Judgment affirmed. 5 It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. ______________________________ JAMES D. SWEENEY, C.J. ______________________________ PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J. ______________________________ LEO M. SPELLACY, J. N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 25(A); Loc. App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E), unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .