COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72395 CITY OF CLEVELAND : : ACCELERATED DOCKET PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : : AND KENT MAPHIS : : OPINION DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : : PER CURIAM DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: NOVEMBER 6, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Cleveland Municipal Court, Case No. 97-TRD-18919. JUDGMENT: REVERSED. CONVICTION UNDER ORDINANCE 439.12 VACATED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: ________________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-appellee: Carolyn Watts Allen Chief Police Prosecutor Carol Skutnik, Assistant City Prosecutor 8th Floor, Courts Tower The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-appellant: David M. Cuppage, Esq. Climaco, Climaco, Lefkowitz, & Garofoli Co., L.P.A. 9th Floor, The Halle Building 1228 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115 PER CURIAM: An accelerated appeal is authorized pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 25. The purpose of an accelerated docket is to 2 allow an appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision. Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983) 11 Ohio App.3d 158. Defendant-appellant Kent Maphis was convicted of driving without a tailgate, driving with unsafe tires, and driving with an improper mud flap, in violation of Cleveland Codified Ordinances 439.12, 437.01, and 439.09, respectively. The appellant was fined $30.00 for the first offense, and $20.00 each on the second and third offenses. The appellant has appealed only from his conviction for driving without a tailgate. The appellant asserts the following assignment of error: DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF CLEVELAND CITY ORDINANCE SECTION 439.12(B) IS NOT SUPPORTED WITH SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. The appellant argues that the trial court erred when it found the requirement to have a tailgate on a truck an inherent element of Cleveland Codified Ordinance 439.12. The appellant asserts that the ordinance merely requires a tailgate, if present on the vehicle, to be properly fastened. When the sufficiency of the State's evidence is challenged, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 153 citing to Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307 and State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424. In Ohio, all crimes are statutory. State v. Winters (1970), 2 Ohio St.2d 325. No act is criminal in this state unless it is expressly made so by positive 3 legislative enactment. State v. Dickinson (1970), 23 Ohio App.2d 259. The elements of a crime are the constituent parts of an offense which must be proved by the prosecution to sustain a conviction. State v. Draggo (1981), 65 Ohio St.2d 88. Elements necessary to constitute a crime must be gathered wholly from statute and not aliunde. Draggo, supra, citing to Winters, supra and State v. Cimpritz (1953), 158 Ohio St. 490. Cleveland Codified Ordinance 439.12 provides in pertinent part: (b) No motor vehicle or trailer shall be driven unless the tailboard or tailgate, tarpaulins, chains (except ground or contact chains), ropes, stakes, poles, and the like, or any part of the load, are securely fastened to prevent dangling, flapping, swinging or falling from the side, end or top of the load or body. In the case sub judice, the trial court found that the requirement that each vehicle possess an attached tailgate was inherent in the ordinance. While the legislative body has required a tailgate to be securely fastened, there is no express requirement in the ordinance that a tailgate be present on a vehicle. If this court read such a requirement into the ordinance, it would have to be held that the ordinance required every motor vehicle or trailer have tarpaulins, chains, ropes, stakes, and poles. Such a requirement does not comport with the law of this State, or with basic common sense. Pursuant to the case law referenced above, the court may not read into an ordinance that which the legislative body has not expressly stated. The appellant's assignment of error is sustained. 4 Judgment reversed and vacated as to the appellant's conviction for the violation of Cleveland Codified Ordinance 439.12. 5 This cause is reversed. Conviction under Cleveland Codified Ordinance 439.12 vacated. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant(s) recover of said appellee(s) his costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. ______________________________ JAMES D. SWEENEY, C.J. ______________________________ DAVID T. MATIA, J. ______________________________ JAMES M. PORTER, J. N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .