COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72391 ERIC W. THEIS : ACCELERATED DOCKET : : JOURNAL ENTRY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT : : AND v. : : OPINION ADMINISTRATOR, OHIO BUREAU : OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES : PER CURIAM : DEFENDANT-APPELLEE : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: SEPTEMBER 11, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court, No. CV-317172. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: William H. Crosby, Esq. 2000 Illuminating Building 55 Public Square Cleveland, OH 44113 For Defendant-Appellee: Betsey Nims Friedman, Esq. Assistant Ohio Attorney General State Office Building, 12th Floor 615 W. Superior Avenue Cleveland, OH 44113-1899 2 PER CURIAM: This cause came on to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 25, the record from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, oral argument and the briefs of counsel. Eric Theis, plaintiff-appellant, appeals from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV- 317172, in which the trial court affirmed the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review's denial of plaintiff-appellant's application for unemployment benefits. Plaintiff-appellant assigns one error for this court's review. Plaintiff-appellant's appeal is not well taken. Eric Theis, plaintiff-appellant, was employed by Baxter Healthcare Corporation as a full-time picker and shipper of medical products from September, 1995 to January 26, 1996. Prior to accepting full-time employment, plaintiff-appellant completed a four-month probationary period as a temporary employee of Baxter Healthcare. On January 20, 1996, plaintiff-appellant and four other Baxter Healthcare employees were told to go to lunch one-half hour early due to an unidentified computer problem in the plant. All five employees took ninety minutes for lunch rather than the allotted one hour. Three of the five employees correctly marked on their respective time cards that they had taken ninety minutes for lunch. However, plaintiff-appellant and one other employee improperly marked their time cards indicating that they had taken only one hour four lunch. 3 David Will, the distribution supervisor for Baxter Healthcare, called an employee meeting after the time cards in question had been submitted and reminded each employee that they had a legal obligation to accurately complete their individual time cards. Mr. Will testified that he went to each individual employee and said: Do you understand when you turn this timecard in that if it's wrong I will force a suspension and then go for a three-day, I mean I will force a three-day suspension and then push for a termination. (T. 7.) Each individual employee was then given the opportunity to review their time card and make any necessary changes. Plaintiff- appellant did not make any changes to his time card. Consequently, plaintiff-appellant was given a three-day suspension and was then terminated for time-card fraud. Plaintiff- appellant maintained throughout that he inadvertently submitted the incorrect time card and offered to make up the disputed time to no avail. On January 26, 1996, plaintiff-appellant filed a timely application for unemployment compensation benefits with the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services arguing that his termination from Baxter Healthcare was without just cause. On February 26, 1996, the Bureau allowed plaintiff-appellant's claim for unemployment benefits, pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), on the grounds plaintiff-appellant was discharged without just cause. On March 18, 1996, Baxter Healthcare filed a request for reconsideration of 4 the allowance of the unemployment claim. Upon reconsideration, the Bureau affirmed its initial determination. Baxter Healthcare then filed an appeal to the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. On July 31, 1996, a hearing was conducted after which the hearing officer reversed the decision of the Bureau on reconsideration and held that plaintiff- appellant was, in fact, discharged for just cause from his employment with Baxter Healthcare and ordered reimbursement to the Bureau for unemployment compensation previously received by plaintiff-appellant. Plaintiff-appellant's application to institute further appeal with the Board of Review was disallowed on September 24, 1996. On October 17, 1996, plaintiff-appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the decision of the Board of Review to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 4141.28(O). On March 12, 1997, the trial court affirmed the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review finding that the underlying decision 5 was not unreasonable, unlawful or against the manifest weight of the evidence. On April 21, 1997, plaintiff-appellant filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. The instant appeal now follows. Although plaintiff-appellant failed to set forth a stated assignment of error as required by Loc.App.R. 6, the following statement is an accurate representation of plaintiff-appellant's sole assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WAS DISCHARGED FROM HIS EMPLOYMENT FOR JUST CAUSE AND THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION. Plaintiff-appellant argues, through his sole assignment of error, that the trial court erred in affirming the finding of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Specifically, plaintiff-appellant maintains that he was discharged from his employment with Baxter Healthcare without just cause for a thirty- minute error on his time card caused by an inadvertent omission which he offered to rectify by making up the disputed time. Plaintiff-appellant's sole assignment of error is not well taken. 6 A party dissatisfied with the ultimate decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review may appeal that decision to the appropriate court of common pleas which shall hear the appeal solely on the record certified by the board of review. R.C. 4141.28(O)(1). See Wigest Corp., dba. Cub Foods, Swan Creek v. Todd, et al. (April 4, 1997), Lucas App. No. L-96-327, unreported. Pursuant to the statute, the common pleas court may reverse the decision of the board only if the decision is unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Absent one of these findings, the trial court must affirm the board's decision. Tzangas, Plakas & Mannas v. Ohio Bur. Of Emp. Serv. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 653 N.E.2d 1207. The Tzangas court noted further that an appellate court may not make factual findings or determine the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 696-97. Rather, factual determinations are the exclusive province of the hearing officer and the board of review. Hall v. American Brake Shoe Co. (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 11, 14; Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Roach (1947), 148 Ohio St. 511. An appellate court may not weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the administrative hearing officer in factual determinations. Simon v. Lake Geauga Printing Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 41, 45. Determinations that are supported by some competent credible evidence will not be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence. C. E. Morris v. Foley Const. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, syllabus. In order to be eligible for unemployment compensation benefits 7 in Ohio, a claimant must satisfy the criteria set forth in R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) which provides in part: (D) *** [No] individual may *** be paid benefits ***: (2) For the duration of his unemployment if the administrator finds that: (a) He quit his work without just cause or has been discharged for just cause in connection with his work ***. The Ohio Supreme Court has defined just cause as that which, to an ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act. Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. Of Review (1985) 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17; Tzangas, Plakas & Namas, supra; see, also, Angelkavski v. Buckeye Potato Chips Co. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 159. Fault on the part of the employee is an essential factor of a just cause determination. If an employer has been reasonable in finding fault on behalf of an employee, then the employer may terminate the employee with just cause. Tzangas, Plakas & Mannas, supra, at 698. A deliberate violation of a reasonable work rule may provide just cause for an employee 8 discharge. Blitzer v. May Dept. Stores (Nov. 1, 1990), Belmont App. No. 90-B-15, unreported. In the case sub judice, a review of the record from the trial court demonstrates that sufficient evidence was adduced below to enable the trial court to determine that plaintiff-appellant's discharge was for just cause and affirm the decision of the Board of Review accordingly. It is undisputed that plaintiff-appellant improperly completed the time card in question. It is also undisputed that plaintiff-appellant was warned regarding the penalty for submitting an incorrect time card and then was given the opportunity to correct the erroneous time card. Given the fact that plaintiff-appellant did not take advantage of the opportunity provided by his supervisor at Baxter Healthcare to correct the time card, this court cannot now say that the trial court's affirmance of the decision of the Board of Review was in error since the decision of the Board was neither unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Clearly, there was competent credible evidence presented to support the Board of Review's finding that time card falsification did, in fact, occur. Therefore, this court has no alterative but to affirm the judgment of the trial court. Frato v. Ohio Bur. Of Emp. Serv. (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 193, 196; Thake v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. Of Rev. (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 503. Plaintiff-appellant relies exclusively upon Sindel v. EBCO Mfg. Co., Inc. (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 426, in support of his position that he was terminated without just cause. However, 9 Sindel is distinguishable from this case in one major respect; in Sindel, it was clearly established that the employee had not been informed by management of the new company policy he had been accused of violating. In the case at bar, the time card policy at issue was neither new or unknown to plaintiff-appellant. In fact, the testimony of plaintiff-appellant's supervisor clearly established that plaintiff-appellant was aware of the company policy and submitted the erroneous time card in spite of the policy. For the foregoing reasons, this court finds that plaintiff- appellant's sole assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 10 It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, PRESIDING JUDGE JOSEPH J. NAHRA, JUDGE TERRENCE O'DONNELL, JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's .