COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA No. 72378 MARK P. CAVANAUGH : ACCELERATED DOCKET : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-appellee : : AND vs. : : OPINION KAREN M. MCCARTHY, FNA : CAVANAUGH : PER CURIAM : Defendant-appellant : : : December 18, 1997 DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. D-176079 : JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: RAE E. GRIFFIN, ESQ. 7379 Pearl Road, #4 Middleburg Heights, OH 44130 Guardian ad Litem: BEVERLY A. ADAMCZYK, ESQ. Southland Plaza, #660 6929 West 130th Street Parma Heights, OH 44130 For defendant-appellant: OTHA M. JACKSON, ESQ. 1422 Euclid Avenue 1660 Hanna Bldg. Cleveland, OH 44115-2001 -2- PER CURIAM: This cause came on to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to App. R. 11.1 and Loc. R. 25, the records from the court of common pleas and the briefs. The domestic relations court approved a magistrate's decision recommending adoption of plaintiff-father Mark Cavanaugh's proposed shared parenting plan. Defendant-mother Karen McCarthy appeals from that judgment, arguing (1) the plan fails to conform to guidelines set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F), (2) no change of circumstance sufficient to warrant modification of custody exists, (3) the court erred by terminating child support, and (4) the court erred by failing to remove the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the interests of the two minor children involved. The order appealed from implements a shared parenting plan proposed by father. The two minor children make their residence with each parent on an alternating two week schedule during the course of the year. Neither party is obligated to pay child support. Father's residence is considered primary for purposes of school attendance. The need to adopt this shared parenting plan arose after the parties began experiencing difficulties with a shared parenting plan adopted in 1993. That plan placed the children in mother's house, although the children continued to attend school in father's school district. The court ordered father to pay child support of $30 per week, per child. However, the children began spending some nights with father, often through the school week. When father -3- asked mother to consider amending the custody and support arrange- ments, mother stopped delivering the children to father's house, instead hiring a babysitter to transport and watch the children. I Mother first claims the court abused its discretion in approving the magistrate's decision to implement a shared parenting plan because the parents failed to demonstrate an ability to cooperate and make decisions jointly with respect to the children. Parents' ability to cooperate and make decisions jointly is simply one factor the court shall consider when deciding whether it is in a child's best interest to adopt a shared parenting plan. See R.C. 3109.04(F)(2). We review the court's decision to modify a shared parenting plan for an abuse of discretion. deLevie v. deLevie (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 531, 539. We find no abuse of discretion. The magistrate understood the parties past conduct may not have shown the greatest cooperation, but nonetheless found the parties have cooperated in past and are capable of doing so in the future. Importantly, the magistrate found the shared parenting plan would require no more interaction between the parties than a traditional single parent residential custody. In any event, the magistrate found the parties' lack of communication with each other had not prevented them from making "appropriate mutual decisions with respect to the children" and the children's affection towards both parents suggested the parents fostered mutual respect with one another. II -4- The second assignment of error complains the court erred by refusing to remove the guardian ad litem because the guardian initially recommended the two children be separated and placed in the custody of different parents. Mother argues this demonstrates the guardian's inability to represent both children. As the appointment of a guardian ad litem is committed to the sound discretion of the court, see Stone v. Stone (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 6, the removal of a guardian ad litem is likewise discre- tionary with the court. We find the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to remove the guardian ad litem because mother's motion, filed after the hearing before the magistrate, had been rendered moot by the guardian's recommendation that the court keep the children together. The guardian ad litem no longer advocated separating the children, instead voicing agreement with the shared parenting plan advocated by the court's expert. The second assignment of error is overruled. -5- III The third and fourth assignments of error, argued collectively by mother, complain the court erred by (1) finding a change of circumstance sufficient to warrant modification of the 1993 shared parenting plan and (2) terminating father's support obligation. The fourth assignment of error, raising the termination of father's support obligation, is not separately argued as required by App.R. 16; therefore, we disregard that assignment of error. See App.R. 12(A)(2). R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(b) permits the court to modify the terms of a shared parenting plan if the court determines a modification would be in the best interests of the children. In determining whether a shared parenting plan would be in the children's best interests, the court must consider, among other things, the factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F)(2). We review modifications to shared parenting plans for an abuse of discretion. Pater v. Pater (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 393. All parties expressed dissatisfaction with the then-existing shared parenting plan. Father and the guardian ad litem agreed with the recommendations of the court's witness, the director of Family Conciliation Services, that custody should alternate on a two-week basis. Mother rejected any notion that a shared parenting plan be implemented and asked that she be named custodial parent. The magistrate's decision referenced the factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) and concluded that "[t]he children have already -6- been integrated into the households of both parents and the advantages of the modified possession schedule strongly outweigh the disadvantages of the available alternatives." The magistrate's decision fully supports this finding and, under the circumstances, we cannot say the court abused its discretion by adopting that decision. The third assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant his costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOHN T. PATTON, JUDGE JAMES M. PORTER,PRESIDING JUDGE LEO M. SPELLACY, JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsidera- ation with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by .