COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72152 : ROSWITHA ( ROSE ) WYRWAS : : Plaintiff-Appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION CITY OF PARMA HEIGHTS : : Defendant-Appellee : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION ------------------------- CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: APPEAL FROM THE CUYAHOGA COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE CV-314911 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: ------------------------ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: AUBREY B. WILLACY (#0006541) M. SCOTT YOUNG (#0062400) WILLACY, LoPRESTI & MARCOVY 700 Western Reserve Building 1468 West Ninth Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-Appellee: C. ANTHONY STAVOLE (#0003086) DWIGHT A. MILLER (#0005982) STAVOLE & MILLER 55 Public Square, Suite 1604 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 SPELLACY, J.: Plaintiff-appellant, Roswitha Wyrwas ( appellant ), appeals the judgment of the trial court dismissing her administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant assigns the following -2- errors for our review: I. THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT IT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER APPELLANT-WYRWAS' APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE CITY OF PARMA HEIGHTS' CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. II. THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE PARMA HEIGHTS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, AND GRANTING FINAL JUDGMENT UPON THE MERITS IN APPELLANT'S FAVOR. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. In 1995, appellant took an approved leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Policy and Procedures from her position as a secretary in the Parma Heights Police Department. On November 20, 1995, appellant returned to work. However, upon her return, appellant's responsibilities were increased without a comparable increase in her rate of pay. On January 17, 1996, appellant was issued a formal letter of reprimand by the Parma Heights Chief of Police, Mike Mlecik, for violating specific rules of the Parma Heights Police Department. On January 24, 1996, Chief of Police, Mike Mlecik, instituted several disciplinary actions against appellant resulting in suspension of appellant's duties and loss of pay for a four hour period of time. On July 10, 1996, appellant was issued a formal warning that if she did not bring her performance up to standard she would face disciplinary action up to an including termination of her employment. -3- On February 1, 1996, appellant sent Parma Heights Civil Service Commission a Notice of Appeal claiming the City's Chief of Police had taken adverse personnel action against appellant on November 20, 1995, December 12, 1995 and January 24, 1995. Appellant submitted a second Notice of Appeal to the Parma Heights Civil Service Commission on July 16, 1996, for adverse personnel actions taken by the City's Chief of Police on July 10, 1996. In response to both notices of appeal, appellee, on July 1, 1996, filed a motion to dismiss with the Civil Service Commission for lack of jurisdiction. On August 13, 1996, the Civil Service Commission consolidated both of the appellant's appeals and granted appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On September 9, 1996, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas appealing the decision of the Civil Service Commission that it lacked jurisdiction to hear appellant's complaints. On September 26, 1996, appellant filed notice of service of praecipe which was served upon Ms. Joanne Calamia, Secretary of the Civil Service Commission via certified U.S. mail. Appellant also sent a copy of the Notice of Appeal to the City of Parma Heights Clerk of Courts in a letter dated September 9, 1996. On October 7, 1996, appellee filed a motion to dismiss appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court granted appellee's motion on February 2, 1997. II. In her first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction over -4- appellant's appeal from the decision of the City of Parma Height's Civil Service Commission. Initially, we note appellant never filed a document captioned notice of appeal with the Civil Service Commission. Instead, appellant filed her appeal in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant delivered a time-stamped notice of service of praecipe and a copy of the notice of appeal to the Civil Service Commission and to the Parma Heights Clerk of Courts. In the absence of any authority to the contrary, appeals from orders of administrative officers and agencies are governed by R.C. Chapter 2506. Specifically, R.C. 2506.01, which governs appeals from decisions of agencies of political subdivisions, provides, in relevant part, that: Every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or other division of any political subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the court of common pleas of the county in which the principal office of the political subdivision is located as provided in Chapter 2505 of the Revised Code, except as modified by this chapter. Pursuant to R.C. 2505.04, an appeal is perfected as follows: An appeal is perfected when a written notice of appeal is filed, in the case of an appeal of a final order, judgment, or decree of a court, in accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure or the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court, or, in the case of an administrative-related appeal, with the administrative officer, agency, board, department, tribunal, commission, or other instrumentality involved. * * *. The filing of a notice of appeal under R.C. 2505.04 is a jurisdictional requirement. Poole v. City of Euclid, et al. -5- (August 6, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 62988, unreported, citing Moore v. Civil Service Comm. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 273. Any other deficiency in the notice of appeal or in any subsequent procedural step, although not favored or condoned, may be amended upon approval of the appellate court. R.C. 2505.04-05; Kertes Enterprises, Inc. (1990), 71 Ohio App.3d 151; Hirt's Greenhouse, Inc. v. City of Strongsville (September 7, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 68374, unreported. Appellant filed her notice of appeal in the common pleas court and served a copy on the clerk of Parma Heights. Service of a notice of appeal is not tantamount to filing a notice of appeal. Hirk's, supra. Therefore, appellant failed to perfect her appeal according to R.C. 2505.04. Consequently, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. III. In her second assignment of error, appellant maintains that the trial court erred by not reversing the decision of the Parma Heights Civil Service Commission, and granting final judgment on the merits in appellee's favor. As stated supra, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear appellant's appeal. Any judgment rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction would be a nullity and void ab initio. Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68. However, in the present -6- case, the trial court, after determining it lacked jurisdiction to hear appellant's appeal, dismissed the case in its entirety. Because the trial court acted properly and did not proceed on the merits of appellant's case, we have no judgment to review on appeal. Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. ANN DYKE, P.J. and DIANE KARPINSKI, J. CONCUR LEO M. SPELLACY Judge N.B. This is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(B) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days -8- of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .