COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72025 CAROL PISANI : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION JAMES SKIRBUNT : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT AUGUST 28, 1997 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. 261094 JUDGMENT: Reversed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCE: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendant-Appellee: CAROL PISANI, Pro Se TIMOTHY T. BRICK, ESQ. 30 Commons Court Gallagher, Sharp Fulton Chagrin Falls, Ohio 44022 & Norman 7th Floor Bulkley Building 1501 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115 PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.: The issue in this appeal is whether Carol Pisani, plaintiff- appellant, discharged James Skirbunt, defendant-appellee, as her 2 lawyer on November 9, 1992 or November 12, 1992 for purposes of her legal malpractice suit. Pisani argues her legal malpractice action was filed on November 12, 1993, one year after she severed her attorney-client relationship with Skirbunt. Thus, she says the trial court erred in dismissing her case and assigns the following error for our review: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY DISMISSING APPELLANT'S CASE BELOW AS A QUESTION OF FACT EXISTS PRECLUDING SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF MATTERS RELATING TO THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION DOCTRINE. Having reviewed the record and arguments of the parties, we reverse the trial court's decision and determine that a genuine issue of fact exists as to when the attorney-client relationship ended. The apposite facts follow. Pisani filed a legal malpractice and breach of contract action against Skirbunt on November 12, 1992. Skirbunt had been hired to represent Pisani in a divorce action. On November 12, 1992, Pisani's new lawyer, Joyce Barrett, sent Skirbunt the following letter with a check for $6,000: I am transmitting herewith check in the sum of $6,000 from Carol A. Pisani which it is my understanding you will accept in full payment of the outstanding balance due your office at this time. If this is the case, please feel free to negotiate this check. Skirbunt accepted the check and cashed it. However, Skirbunt challenges Pisani's claim that the relationship ended on November 12, 1992. He claims he was terminated on November 9, 1992, and the 3 November 12, 1992 letter and accompanying $6,000 check was designed to settle Pisani's outstanding bill for legal fees. Pisani on the other hand claims Skirbunt continued to do work on her file until November 12, 1992, which is evidenced by his fee bill. Before the trial court granted summary judgment, Pisani, through her lawyer, dismissed her legal malpractice claim. However, still pending was the claim for breach of contract. In that claim, she argued the following: (1) she and Skirbunt entered into a contract for legal services, (2) Skirbunt breached the normal duties an attorney has to a client, and (3) as a result, she was evicted from her marital home, lost custody of her children and expended an excess of $10,000 in legal fees. Her complaint also states that said result was due to Skirbunt's negligence *** with respect to his failure to practice law at an adequate standard of professional competence. The trial court dismissed Pisani's lawsuit pursuant to Skirbunt's summary judgment motion. In the motion, Skirbunt argued the breach of contract was a disguised legal malpractice action, which was barred by the one year statute of limitations. Additionally, he argued the $6,000 payment constituted an accord and satisfaction. After viewing the entire record, we conclude the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. There is at least a question of fact as to when the attorney-client relationship ended. 4 The standard of review in a summary judgment appeal is de novo. De novo review means that this court uses the same standard that the trial court should have used, and we examine the evidence to determine if as a matter of law no genuine issues exist for trial. Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., Inc. (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 116. De novo review requires that we review the trial court's decision independently and without deference to it. Brown v. Scioto Bd. Of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704. Consequently, the movant must inform the trial court of the basis for its motion by identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue for trial. Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280. A genuine issue exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986), 477 U.S. 242. The trial judge's function on summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence but to determine if a genuine issue exists for trial. Id. Skirbunt admits that Pisani's breach of contract is a legal malpractice claim. Thus, the only issue before us is whether it was time barred. Pisani says she terminated Skirbunt on November 12, 1992. She sued him on November 12, 1993. She also claims he continued to do work for her until the 12th of November as is evidenced by his fee bill to her. Skirbunt on the other hand says Pisani terminated their relationship on November 9, 1992 and her action is time barred. Based on the conflict in the parties' 5 representations of the facts, we conclude that a fact question exists as to when the relationship ended. Likewise, there is a question of fact as to whether the $6,000 settled all claims between the parties. Skirbunt says it was an accord and satisfaction. Pisani says it was payment for release of her file. It is undisputed that the $6,000 was given to Skirbunt; however, the question for trial is whether it settled any and all claims as between the parties including the legal malpractice. This is a fact question to be resolved at trial. Pisani's assigned error is sustained. Judgment reversed. It is, therefore, considered that said Appellant recover of said appellee her costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. SPELLACY, J., and ROCCO, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the .