COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 72024 TRUDY JACOBS, et al. : : Plaintiff-appellants: : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION CITY OF CLEVELAND, et al. : : Defendant-appellees : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : DECEMBER 11, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 305,477 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellants: SCOTT A. RUMIZEN Attorney at Law 614 Superior Avenue, N.W. 911 Rockefeller Building Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendant-appellees: SHARON SOBOL JORDAN Director of Law TRACI M. HIXSON, Assistant Room 106 - City Hall 601 Lakeside Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 -2- TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J.: This court is asked to decide whether the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas appropriately granted summary judgment to defendants-appellees, the City of Cleveland ( City ) and its employee, Patrol Officer Franklyn Lake (collectively referred to as appellees ), on the basis that appellees are immune from liability under R.C. Chapter 2744. Specifically at issue is whether the determination that Ofc. Lake was responding to an emergency call as defined by R.C. 2744.01(A) is properly resolved by summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we find summary judgment to be appropriate and affirm. The record reflects that in the early morning hours of February 23, 1993, plaintiffs-appellants, Trudy Jacobs, Robin Major and James Jones (collectively referred to as appellants ), were traveling east on Superior Road in the City of Cleveland in a vehicle driven by Ms. Jacobs when Ofc. Lake observed Ms. Jacobs' car drive at an excessive rate of speed through two red traffic lights. According to the officer's testimony, the road was icy and parts were snow-covered. After observing these traffic violations, Ofc. Lake activated his overhead emergency lights and siren and proceeded to stop Ms. Jacobs' vehicle. As he pulled his vehicle behind Ms. Jacobs' stopped vehicle, the officer slid on a patch of ice and collided with Ms. Jacobs' vehicle, allegedly causing injury to the occupants, appellants herein. Appellants instituted suit against appellees, alleging that the officer's negligence proximately caused appellants' injuries. Appellees moved for summary judgment on the basis that the City and -3- its employee are immune from liability under R.C. Chapter 2744 when the officer is responding to an emergency call. Attached to its motion were excerpts of Ofc. Lake's deposition testimony detailing the circumstances surrounding his decision to stop the vehicle in which appellants were traveling. Appellants opposed the motion, arguing that whether the officer was responding to an emergency call is an issue of material fact to be decided by a jury. The trial court ultimately granted appellees' motion. Appellants timely appeal and assign the following error for our review: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING APPELLEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE WHETHER CLEVELAND POLICE OFFICER FRANKLYN LAKE WAS RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY CALL PURSUANT TO OHIO REVISED CODE S2744.02 IS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR JURY DETERMINATION. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court conducts a denovo review of the trial court's decision. A court reviewing the granting of a summary judgment must follow the standards set forth in Civ.R. 56(C) *** . Aglinsky v. Cleveland Builders Supply Co. (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 810, 814. Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from such evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and, reviewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to -4- the party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327. With this standard in mind, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) provides political subdivisions immunity from civil liability for injury, death, or loss to persons or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function. R.C. 2744.02(B)(1), however, excepts from immunity an injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their employees upon the public roads, highways, or streets when the employees are engaged within the scope of their employment and authority. Nonetheless, R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) provides an exception to the exception when the driver is a police officer operating a motor vehicle while responding to an emergency call and the operation of the vehicle [does] not constitute willful or wanton misconduct. In this case, appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue of fact remains as to whether Ofc. Lake was responding to an emergency call as that term is defined by R.C. 2744.02(A). Appellants rely on the officer's own testimony wherein he testified that he did not consider the events preceding the stop of Ms. Jacobs' vehicle as an emergency and further that the stop was a lower level priority stop. Ofc. Lake's characterization of this situation, however, is not dispositive of this issue because it is under the statute's -5- definition of emergency call that the officer's actions are to be analyzed. See Horton v. Dayton (1988), 53 Ohio App.3d 68, 69. In this regard, R.C. 2744.01(A) defines emergency call as: *** a call to duty including, but not limited to, communications from citizens, police dispatches, and personal observations by peace officers of inherently dangerous situations that demand an immediate response on the part of a peace officer. Appellants appear to argue that the situation must be one that is inherently dangerous in order to constitute an emergency call. The statute, however, is not so restrictive. Read in its entirety, the definition begins broadly by defining emergency call as a call to duty. This duty includes, but is not limited to, responding to inherently dangerous situations. Thus, appel- lants' position that an emergency call must be in response to an inherently dangerous situation is insupportable. Accord Moore v. Columbus (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 701, 706-707. Notwithstanding, we need not expand upon the meaning of a call to duty because reasonable minds could only conclude that Ofc. Lake was responding to a dangerous situation. The officer testified that he observed Ms. Jacobs driving fast on a icy roadway through two red traffic lights. Not only did the potential exist for causing harm to herself and her passengers, the same potential existed for causing serious harm to others traveling on the roadway. See Rodgers v. DeRue (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 200, 203; see, also, Griffin v. Wells (July 10, 1986), Cuyahoga App. No. 50670, unreported, at 5-6. Construing this evidence most strongly in favor of appellants, Ofc. Lake's response to the traffic -6- violations he observed constituted an emergency call as defined by R.C. 2744.01(A). Thus, no genuine issues of material fact remained to be litigated and summary judgment was appropriately granted to the City and its officer. Accordingly, appellants' sole assignment of error is not well taken and is hereby overruled. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellees recover of appellants their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, C.J. and ANN DYKE, J. CONCUR JUDGE TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .