COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71899 MARIE SPECHT, : : Plaintiff-Appellant : JOURNAL ENTRY : and vs. : OPINION : BP AMERICA INC., ET Al., : : Defendants-Appellees : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : NOVEMBER 20, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: : Civil appeal from : Common Pleas Court : Case No. 263029 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: Alan J. Shapiro Geoffrey J. Shapiro SHAPIRO, KENDIS & ASSOCIATES 15th Floor Rockefeller Building 614 W. Superior Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendants-appellees: Edward D. Murray Michael A. Thompson KRUGLIAK, WILKINS, GRIFFITHS & DOUGHERTY CO., L.P.A. 4775 Munson Street, N.W. P.O.Box 36963 Canton, Ohio 44735-6963 For Ohio Bureau of Workers' Steven L. Sterner Compensation: Assistant Attorney General State Office Building, 12th Floor 615 W. Superior Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1899 3 NAHRA, J.: Marie Specht appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of BP America, Inc., thereby denying her participation in the Workers' Compensation fund for an alleged flow-through psychiatric condition. We hold that appellant did not give timely notice of this claim as dictated by R.C. 4123.84; thus summary judgment is affirmed. The parties do not generally dispute that appellant injured her back on March 19, 1985, while assisting with the move into the new British Petroleum America, Inc. world headquarters. Her initial workers compensation claim was allowed for, low back, acute allergic reaction to lumbar radiculopathy medication, and lumbar radiculopathy L4-5. On January 23, 1986, Marie Specht went to the W.G. Nord Community Health Center and was diagnosed by Thomas J Haglund Ph.D. as having a moderate psychological condition known as adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features. Subsequently, on October 7, 1986, Dr. Haglund, by letter, informed appellant's attorney of this condition. As a result, on December 12, 1986, prior to filing a motion with the Industrial Commission, Specht's attorney mailed a copy of the C-86 motion, which is particularized below, to BP America. Specht also claims that her attorney mailed a copy of Dr. Haglund's medical report and diagnosis to BP America, however, there is no evidence of this in the record. Approximately one year after the initial diagnosis, on January 29, 1987, Specht filed a C-86 motion seeking all of the following: 4 1. Order employer to pay for consultation with physicians at Cleveland Clinic. . Order employer to approve referral to pain center at Cleveland Clinic. . Further allow claim for protrusion [sic] of disc between 4th and 5th lumbar vertebrae. . Approve and pay for treatment W.G. Nord Community Mental Health Center. . Set average weekly wage pursuant to Sections 4123.61 & 62. At the C-86 hearing, which was held before the Industrial Commission December 2, 1988, the hearing officer entertained an oral motion for allowance of Specht's psychiatric condition and issued the following order inter alia: ***THE DISTRICT HEARING OFFICER FINDS, PER ORAL REQUEST AT HEARING, THAT THE CLAIM BE ADDITIONALLY ALLOWED FOR A PSYCH CONDITION BY CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL. THE DISTRICT HEARING OFFICER ORDERS CLAIMANT EXAMINED BY A QUALIFIED PSYCHIATRIST (CLESP). THEREFORE, THE DISTRICT HEARING OFFICER HOLDS NUMBER FOUR, PER C-86, IN ABEYANCE PENDING AN EXAM AND ORAL HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCE (PSYCH). (SEE W-6 NORD RECORDS AND NARRATIVE FROM THOMAS HAGLUND, PHD., AND COMPLETE FILE ON ISSUE OF SAME). THE DISTRICT HEARING OFFICER GRANTS CLAIMANT'S REQUEST TO NUMBER FOUR PER C-86. On appeal by BP America, the Regional Board deleted in its entirety only the first sentence relating to the additional allowance per oral request, and affirmed in all other respects. Neither party appealed that order of the Regional Board, but on October 23, 1989, Specht filed a new request with the Industrial Commission seeking an additional allowance of her psychiatric condition, listed as, adjustment disorder with mixed emotional 5 features including depression. At the hearing held on this second C-86 motion, the district hearing officer denied additional psychiatric allowance because the claim was not made within two years of diagnosis of the condition. On appeal, the Regional Board vacated the order of the hearing officer, found the employer had notice of the psychiatric condition per the 1987 C-86 motion, and allowed the claim. On further appeal, the industrial commission vacated this order of the Regional Board and reinstated the finding of the district hearing officer. On January 3, 1994, when Specht appealed to the Common Pleas Court, BP America filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. Appellant then filed a motion in this court appealing the grant of summary judgment. On May 23, 1996, this appeal was vacated and remanded to the trial court for a limited hearing to determine whether the claimant filed attachments to her original January 29, 1987 C-86 form adequately describing treatment at the W.G. Nord Community Mental Health Center which would have timely notified the bureau of this claim. This court further stated that (a) later presentment of those records would not constitute timely notice. On December 16, 1996, the trial court determined that appellant had not filed the necessary attachments to her 1987 C-86 form, and the summary judgment verdict was reinstated. Appellant timely filed a motion appealing this summary judgment. However, this appeal was stayed pending a ruling at the trial court level on appellant's 60(B) motion for relief due to fraud. This motion was 6 denied. Appellant never appealed this ruling, leaving the Dec. 16, 1996 entry of summary judgment the issue properly before this court. Appellant assigns one error for our review. Assignment of error number one states: . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF BECAUSE THE SELF INSURING EMPLOYER MADE MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS OF FACT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONVINCING THE TRIAL COURT TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ITS FAVOR. The main issue on appeal is not the denial of appellant's 60(B) motion, but the timeliness of Ms. Specht's filing of her flow-through condition. This case is here on appeal of the December 16, 1996 motion granting summary judgment to appellee, BP America, and not on the denial of the 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. We review the instant assignment of error de novo. Soltis v. Wegman, Hessler, Vanderburg & O'Toole (Feb. 13, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 69602, unreported. Essentially appellant argues she filed her claim for additional allowance of her psychiatric condition in a timely manner and that the first order of the Regional Board clarified an inconsistent order of the hearing officer and permitted her to go ahead with a CLESP examination. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for appellee on her additional claim for her psychiatric condition. It is BP America's contention that the summary judgment was properly granted because appellant failed to give timely written 7 notice of the flow-through injury to either the Bureau of Worker's Compensation or the Industrial Commission, as required by R.C. 4123.84. The issue then presented is whether Marie Specht filed her claim for additional allowance of her psychological condition in conformity with R.C. 4123.84, which sets forth the period of limitations on giving notice of claims. In relevant part, 4123.84 states: (A) In all cases of injury or death, claims for compensation or benefits for the specific part or parts of the body injured shall be forever barred unless, within two years after injury or death: (3) In the event the employer is a self insuring employer, one of the following has occurred: (a) Written notice of the specific parts of the body claimed to have been injured has been given to the commission or bureau or the employer has furnished treatment by a licensed physician in the employ of an employer,.... This statute has been interpreted by the courts to allow an extended period of time for flow-through injuries provided that the claimant file a motion for an additional allowance within two years of the time the claimant knew or should have known of the additional condition. Clementi v. Wean United, Inc. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 342, 347. However, the limitations period will not be tolled if the claimant was merely aware that a condition existed, the claimant must also be aware of the nexus between the original injury and the flow-through or residual injury. McKenney v. Hillside Dairy Co. (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 164, 173, see, also, Dietrick v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp. (1991), 72 Ohio App.3d 8 567, 571, 595 N.E.2d 513, 516. Further, a bare reference to medical conditions such as a physician's correspondence or medical test summary does not constitute a request for recognition of that condition by a claimant. McKenney at 174, see, also, State ex rel. Morrow v. Indust. Comm. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 236, 643 N.E.2d 118. It must also be noted, that R.C. 4123.84(A)(3)(a), relating to self insuring employers, only requires that notice be sent by the employee `to the commission or bureau' and not the employer. Thomas v. Emery Industries, Inc. (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 563, 568. In the instant case, appellant and appellee have been disputing the validity of this claim since 1987. It is undisputed that appellant knew of her psychiatric condition and its relation to her lower back problems at the time of Dr. Haglund's diagnosis, January 23, 1986. As a result, January 23, 1988 was the time by which she should have filed any residual claim. It is also clear, from the record, that BP America and the Industrial Commission have been on formal notice of the psychiatric condition since appellant's claim filed on October 23, 1989, thirteen months after the period of limitation had run. As a result, the January 29, 1987, C-86 motion filed by appellant with the Industrial Commission becomes the dispositive motion. The trial court, on limited remand from this court, determined that this motion was not specific enough in its nature to place either the commission or BP America on notice because it did not contain the necessary attachments (a medical report and 9 bill from Dr. Haglund). Had these attachments been filed, notice would have been effected. Therefore, the issue which must now be addressed is, was the notice given by appellant to BP America on December 12, 1986, or in the alternative, to the commission in line 4 of the 1987 C-86 form, alone, sufficient to alert the employer that Specht was filing for a flow-through psychiatric condition. The totality of the circumstances indicates that the mere mention of a psychological condition in a letter to an employer is insufficient to put the employer `on notice' of a claim for such an injury so as to toll the statute of limitations." McKenney, at 174. Further, the request made by the appellant to the commission in line 4 of their C-86 motion is too vague and spurious to allow the appellant the protection of an extended statute of limitations. Specht's reference to W.G. Nord Community Mental Health Center makes no mention of the treatment received or the body part or injury that was treated. Since appellant did not conform with the parameters of R.C. 4123.84(A)(3)(a), summary judgment was proper. As a result of this court's decision, the appellant's assignment of error regarding Civ.R. 60(B) is moot. See Civ.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Judgment affirmed. 10 It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. MATIA, DAVID T., P.J., and JOSEPH J. NAHRA McMONAGLE, TIMOTHY E., J., CONCUR. JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R.22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .