COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71885 DAVID B. NEILSEN : ACCELERATED CASE : Plaintiff-Appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION MARSHA MEEKER : : PER CURIAM Defendant-Appellee : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: JUNE 19, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE JUVENILE COURT CASE NO. 9172818 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: JOSEPH G. STAFFORD (#0023863) JAMES E. POWELL (#OOO8494) JOSEPH G. STAFFORD & ASSOCIATES CO. L.P.A. 380 Lakeside Place 323 West Lakeside Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-Appellee: JOHN D. SUTULA (#0031845) 920 Terminal Tower Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 2 - PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-appellant, David B. Neilsen ("appellant"), appeals the judgment of the trial court awarding defendant-appellee, Marsha Meeker ("appellee"), interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum from April 1, 1993, on an unpaid portion of a past support obligation in the amount of eleven thousand five hundred dollars ($11,500.00). Appellant assigns the following error for our review: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO HOLD A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF INTEREST DUE UPON THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT'S OBLIGATION. Finding appellant's appeal lacks merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. I. On August 14, 1991, appellant filed a complaint in Juvenile Court to establish his paternity of Taylor Neilsen, born February 18, 1989. On February 23, 1993, the trial court adopted a negotiated support agreement which delineated the rights and obligations of the parties and specifically provided for appellant to pay past support of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00) to appellee on or before April 1, 1993. On August 3, 1993, appellee filed a motion to show cause alleging an eleven thousand five hundred dollar ($11,500.00) deficiency on the past support obligation and seeking interest and a current support arrearage of one thousand seven hundred dollars ($1,700.00). On March 15, 1995, the trial court held a hearing on - 3 - appellee's motion to show cause. On April 6, 1995, the trial court held, in part, that: With respect to the fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00), the court finds that the Complainant [appellant] has paid three thousand five hundred on that amount. * * * Therefore, this court finds that the amounts represented by the checks can not be considered as payments on the obligation of fifteen thousand ($15,000.00). The complain- ant will make arrangements to make full pay- ment upon this obligation forthwith. (Journal Entry, April 6, 1995). On May 8, 1995, appellee filed a notice of appeal with this court. Among other things, appellee alleged that the juvenile court abused its discretion in not awarding interest on the unpaid portion of appellant's obligation in the amount of eleven thousand five hundred dollars ($11,500.00) due April 1, 1993. This court, in Neilsen v. Meeker (January 27, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 69001, unreported, ("Meeker I"), affirmed the decision of the trial court in part, reversed the decision of the trial court in part and remanded the case for further proceedings on the issue of interest to be added to the unpaid portion of appellant's fifteen thousand dollar ($15,000.00) support obligation. On December 11, 1996, the trial court journalized the following order: Pursuant to the mandate of the District Court of Appeals, Eighth District, entered on August 14, 1996, interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum from April 1, 1993, until paid, is awarded the defendant on the unpaid portion of - 4 - the judgment for fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00). (Journal Entry, December 11, 1996). It is from this order that appellant now appeals. II. In his sole assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court, on remand, did not follow the directive of this court in Meeker I. In particular, appellant asserts the trial court failed to make a determination of the amount of interest due on his obligation to appellee. Further, appellant contends the trial court erred in not holding a hearing on the total amount of interest due. In Meeker I, this court addressed the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred by not awarding interest on the balance due on the fifteen thousand dollar ($15,000.00) support obligation. We held the following: R.C. 1343.03(A) provides in part: * * * when money becomes due and payable * * * upon all judgments, decrees, and orders of any judicial tribunal for the payment of money arising out of tortious conduct or a contract or other transaction, the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum * * * . The record in this case reflects that on February 23, 1993, the trial court adopted a negotiated support agreement wherein Nielsen [sic] was ordered to pay $15,000.00 to Meeker on or before April 1, 1993. Since this obligation became part of the court's order, by statute, interest accrues on that sum at the rate of ten percent per annum from April 1, 1993. This is not a matter within the - 5 - discretion of the trial court and the failure to impose the statutory interest on this sum is error. Accordingly, we reverse the determination of the trial court in this regard. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The doctrine of "law of the case" provides that the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels. Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3. The doctrine is considered to be a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied so as to achieve unjust results. Id. However, the rule is necessary to ensure consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution. Id. In pursuit of these goals, the doctrine functions to compel trial courts to follow the mandates of reviewing courts. Id., See e.g., State, ex rel. Special Prosecutors, v. Judges (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 94. Thus, where at a rehearing following remand a trial court is confronted with substantially the same facts and issues as were involved in the prior appeal, the court is bound to adhere to the appellate court's determination of the applicable law. Nolan, supra. Moreover, the trial court is without authority to extend or - 6 - vary the mandate given. Briggs v. Pennsylvania RR. Co. (1948), 334 U.S. 304, 306. Appellee maintains that the trial court did conform itself to our mandate in Meeker I. Based on the record before us, we agree. On initial review of the instant matter, this court was faced with five claimed errors. However, in Meeker I, we reversed the trial court's decision only on the issue of interest as it pertains to appellant's unpaid support obligation of eleven thousand five hundred dollars ($11,500.00) as determined by the trial court. Thus, this court remanded solely on the issue of interest to be applied to the unpaid obligation owed to appellee and issued a directive that the trial court calculate the interest on the unpaid obligation at a rate of 10% per annum from April, 1, 1993. Subse- quently, the trial court, in accordance with the directive of this court in Meeker I, did issue an order that interest on the unpaid sum of eleven thousand five hundred dollars ($11,500.00) should be calculated at a rate of 10% per annum from April 1, 1993. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court was in compliance with the order the order of this court in Meeker I. Accordingly, we find appellant's sole assignment of error not well-taken. Judgment affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Juvenile Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATRICIA BLACKMON, P.J. DAVID T. MATIA, JUDGE LEO M. SPELLACY, JUDGE N.B. This is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(B) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .