COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71844 THOMAS DANIEL RUBLE, ADM'R ET AL. : : Plaintiffs-Appellants : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION THE CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION : : Defendant-Appellee : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: OCTOBER 16, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. CV-282750 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs-Appellants: DONALD A. MODICA (#0016017) 105 JEFFERSON CENTRE 5001 MAYFIELD ROAD LYNDHURST, OHIO 44124 For Defendant-Appellee: CLIFFORD C. MASCH (#0015737) JAMES L. MALONE (#0019178) JAMES S. CASEY (#0062552) REMINGER & REMINGER CO., LPA THE 113 ST. CLAIR BUILDING CLEVELAND, OHIO 44114 SPELLACY, J.: Plaintiffs-appellants Thomas Daniel Ruble, Administrator, and Suzanne, Alison, and Jennifer Ruble ( appellants ) appeal from the 2 denial of their motion for a continuance. Appellants assign the following error for review: . THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANT A CONTINUANCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING NEW COUNSEL AFTER ALLOWING APPELLANT'S PRIOR COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS PRIOR TO TRIAL AND THEN REQUIRING APPELLANT TO PROCEED PRO SE TO JURY TRIAL THE NEXT DAY IN A COMPLEX MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASE AGAINST EXPERIENCED DEFENSE COUNSEL. Finding the appeal to lack merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. I. On December 30, 1994, appellants filed a complaint pro se against the Cleveland Clinic Foundation and various defendants ( Clinic ) for the wrongful death of Ruth Jane Ruble. The action had been filed earlier but voluntarily dismissed without prejudice by appellants. Trial was set for January 29, 1996. On August 18, 1995, appellants filed a motion for extension of time for filing their expert report. In their motion, appellants argued that lab slips necessary for their case were not being given to appellants by the Clinic. Appellants averred they had contacted the Clinic numerous times in regard to the matter. The trial court granted an extension for filing the report until September 22, 1995. On November 29, 1995, appellants filed a motion for an extension of the discovery cutoff date and a trial continuance. Appellants sought the continuance in order to obtain counsel and because they had not yet received many necessary medical files from the Clinic. A new trial date of August 12, 1996, was set. 3 Appellants succeeded in obtaining counsel. On July 16, 1996, the parties filed a joint motion for continuance in order to allow for completion of discovery. The Clinic had just located the complete medical file of the decedent. The newly discovered portion of the file contained several hundred pages of records. Also, the Clinic's attorney had been hospitalized.The trial court set trial for December 4, 1996, and stated there would be no further continuances. On November 13, 1996, appellants' counsel withdrew from the case with approval of the trial court and of appellants. On November 27, 1996, appellants filed a motion for continuance until June 30, 1997, in order to allow their new counsel time to prepare for the trial. If the continuance would not be granted, appellants' new counsel would not try the case. The trial court denied appellants' motion for continuance. Before trial began, the trial court reiterated its reasons for not granting the motion for continuance including the several motions for extension of time which had been granted and that the case had been dismissed earlier. The trial court stated it had informed appellants that they should have counsel ready to proceed on the trial date and that the case would proceed as scheduled. Thomas Ruble informed the trial court that he would not attempt to try the case and that he would remain mute throughout the proceedings. The case proceeded to trial. Appellant Thomas Ruble asked no questions of prospective jurors or challenged any jurors for cause 4 or exercised any peremptory challenges. Ruble gave no opening statement and did not present any evidence or witnesses on appellants' behalf. Ruble stated they were just going through an exercise and that he was not prepared. The trial court then granted the Clinic's motion for directed verdict. II. In their assignment of error, appellants contend the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant their motion for a continuance. Appellants argue the trial court allowed appellants' counsel to withdraw close to the trial date and that it was impossible to find competent counsel willing to try a complicated case without a continuance being granted. Appellants point out that the two previous continuances were necessitated in part by the Clinic's failure to produce discoverable records in a timely manner. The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance is a matter which is within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed on appeal only if the trial court abused that discretion. State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 65. When determining whether that discretion has been abused, a reviewing court must balance the interests of judicial economy and justice against any potential prejudice to the moving party. Griffin v. Lamberjack (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 257. There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is 5 denied. Ungar v. Sarafite (1964), 376 U.S. 575, 589. Objective factors that may be considered by the trial court in assessing the propriety of a motion for continuance include the length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have been requested and received; the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the [moving party] contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; and other relevant factors, depending on the unique facts of each case. Unger, supra, at 67-68. In assessing these factors relative to the instant case, appellants requested a continuance for six months or for a lengthy period of time. The case already had been dismissed once by the appellants and two other continuances had been granted by the trial court. The trial court made it clear to the appellants at the time their attorney withdrew from the representation of the appellants that no further continuances would be granted. Trial would go forward on December 4, 1996, as scheduled. The trial court journalized its order that there would be no further continuances. Appellants contributed to the circumstance which led to the request for the continuance as appellant Thomas Ruble agreed to their counsel's withdrawal three weeks prior to the trial date. It also is noted that appellants' counsel withdrew because of differences of opinion with appellants regarding the case. 6 Appellants requested the continuance on November 27, 1996, or only a short time before trial was to commence. Appellants' motion for a continuance was filed one day after the Clinic filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of two of appellants' expert witnesses because appellants had not made the witnesses available to be deposed by the Clinic. Both the Clinic and the trial court were ready to proceed on the trial date. After considering the following factors, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellants' motion for continuance. Appellants' assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. 7 It is, therefore, ordered that said appellee recover of said appellant its costs herein. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOHN T. PATTON, P.J. and ROBERT E. HOLMES, J.* CONCUR (Robert E. Holmes, J., Retired Justice of The Ohio Supreme Court, Sitting by Assignment) LEO M. SPELLACY JUDGE N.B. This is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R.22(B), 22(D), and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(B) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .