COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71835 CALVIN L. SISSON : JOURNAL ENTRY : AND Plaintiff-appellant : OPINION : -vs- : : PIPELINE DEVELOPMENT : CORP. : : Defendant-appellee : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: OCTOBEDR 23, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Court of Common Pleas Case No. CP-CV-296772 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendant-Appellee: CALVIN L. SISSON AUDREY H. DAVIS, ESQ. Box 266 SALVATORE J. LOPRESTI, ESQ. Spencer, Ohio 44275 WILLACY, LOPRESTI & MARCOVY 700 Western Reserve Building 1468 W. 9th Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 2 DYKE, J.: Plaintiff Calvin Sisson appeals from the judgment of the trial court which dismissed his discrimination action against Pipe Line Development Company (hereafter referred to as Pipe Line ). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. On October 13, 1995, plaintiff filed this action against Pipe Line alleging that he suffered a work-related disability and that as a result of this disability and his age, has been denied work opportunities and has suffered retaliatory treatment. Plaintiff alleged violations of Section 7 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and also alleged numerous claims based in state law. Pipe Line denied liability and asserted various affirmative defenses. Thereafter, on June 6, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion to transfer the matter to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. On June 25, 1996, the trial court issued a journal entry in which it determined that the motion was unopposed and well-taken. Pipe Line moved for reconsideration and maintained that it was not served with plaintiff's motion to transfer and that the procedural requirements for removal were not met. In a related brief, Pipe Line asserted that 28 U.S.C. Sections 1441 and 1446 authorize the defendant in a civil action which is pending in state court, to obtain removal to the district court for the United States and make no provision for a plaintiff 3 to obtain removal. On July 30, 1996, the trial court vacated the transfer order and reinstated the matter. Plaintiff's attorneys were subsequently granted leave to withdraw from the action and plaintiff maintained the action pro se. On November 6, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion to move this case to the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Ohio. Within this document, plaintiff asserted that the state court lacked jurisdiction and that he did not give his trial attorney authority to file the action in state court. The trial court denied this motion on November 21, 1996. Thereafter, on December 4, 1996, the trial court journalized the following order: The court finds that all claims in the within case are currently being heard in the U.S. Dist. Court. As Plfs. have chosen the U.S. District Court as the proper forum and have twice sought to remove the within case to the U.S. District Court in the matter of judicial economy to prevent duplicative cases, this case is dismissed. Additional documents presented to this court by Pipe Line demonstrate that plaintiff filed a federal action against Pipe Line on August 19, 1996 which alleged violations of the Americans with disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Section 12101, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Section 621, et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000(e), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. Also included in the complaint are several pendent claims under Ohio law. See, Sisson v. Pipeline Development Co. (N.D. Ohio), Case No. 1:96 CV 1803. This action was dismissed with prejudice on 4 August 8, 1997. Within this appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court's dismissal of his action and assigns seven errors for our review. Plaintiff's assignments of error state: I. THE STATE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS LACKED JURISDICTION IN ALL MATTERS CONCERNING CASE NO. 296772. II. PLAINTIFF WAS INTENTIONALLY MISREPRESENTED BY PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY. III. THE HONORABLE JUDGE SAFERIN VIOLATED THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS. IV. DEFENDANT BENEFITTED BY PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S MISREPRESENTATION AND BY THE JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OF THE EX-JUDGE SAFERIN V. DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY AND WILFULLY MISLEAD THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. VI. PLAINTIFF'S FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. VII. PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT DID NOTHING TO PREJUDICE THE HONORABLE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AGAINST PLAINTIFF. With regard to assignment of error I, we note that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over actions brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Manning v. Ohio State Library Board (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 24, paragraph one of the syllabus. The court explained: In her first proposition of law, appellant claims, and appellee now concedes, that state courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over Title VII actions. The recent United States Supreme Court decision of Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly (1990), 494 U.S. 820, 110 St.Ct. 1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834, rendered three months prior to the decision of the court of appeals herein, is determinative of this issue. 5 * * * `* * * Unlike a number of statutes in which Congress unequivocally stated that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is exclusive, Title VII contains no language that expressly confines jurisdiction to federal courts or ousts state courts of their presumptive jurisdiction. The omission of any such provision is strong, and arguably sufficient, evidence that Congress had no such intent.' Yellow Freight, supra, 494 U.S. at 823, 110 St.Ct. at 1568-1569, 108 L.Ed.2d at 839-840. Thus, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to decide actions arising under Title VII. Accordingly, in applying Yellow Freight's presumption of concurrent jurisdiction in Title VII actions, we must overrule Fox v. Eaton Corp., supra, to the extent that it is inconsistent with Yellow Freight or this opinion. Id., at 28-29. Similarly, in Elek v. Huntington National Bank (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 135, 138-139, the court stated: Clearly, there is nothing in the language of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 794 et seq. Title 29 U.S. Code) which precludes state court jurisdiction over claims arising thereunder. Secondly, appellant points to no legislative history evidencing a Congressional intent to preclude state court jurisdiction. Finally, given state court familiarity with analogous state claims there exists no greater possibility of inconsistent interpretations arising from state court judgments than would be present because of the varied interpretations of the law posed by the decisions of numerous and diverse federal courts. Given the foregoing disposition by the Supreme Court of the gender discrimination claim, it would be clearly anomalous to suggest that such claims are cognizable in state court but a claim predicated upon handicap discrimination in employment brought pursuant to Section 794a, Title 29, U.S. Code (which affords remedies available under Title VI) is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. We therefore conclude that state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to entertain discrimination claims brought pursuant to Section 794a, Title 29, U.S. Code. 6 Thus, the first assignment of error is without merit. With regard to assignments of error II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII, we note that the allegations set forth within these assignments of error were not part of the trial court's proceedings. Accordingly, these assignments of error are hereby rejected. See, e.g., Sanders v. Webb (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 674, 679. Moreover, considering plaintiff's objection to the dismissal of this action, which is the essence of this appeal, we note: A party in litigation may not 'intentionally or unintentionally *** induce or mislead a court into the commission of an error,' then seek reversal on those very grounds. Lester v. Leuck (1943), 142 Ohio St.91; see, also Ctr. Ridge Ganley, Inc. v. Stinn (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 310, 313. Faber v. Queen City Terminals, Inc., (1994) 93 Ohio App.3d 197, 203. Similarly, a litigant may not induce a trial court to dismiss the action in a certain manner, then assign as error on appeal that very manner of dismissal. Id., at 203-204. The record in this matter indicates that plaintiff strenuously objected to the matter being heard in state court and that he asked the trial court to dismiss this action so that he could exclusively pursue the federal action. Thus, we are unable to credit plaintiff's essential claim in this appeal, i.e., that the trial court erred in dismissing this action so that the parties could litigate their dispute within the federal court. Judgment affirmed. 7 It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. BLACKMON, P.J., AND ROCCO, J., CONCUR. ANN DYKE JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App. R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App. R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .