COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71810 ROBERTA VALENTINE, et al. : : Plaintiff-appellants: : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION DAVIS WELDING SUPPLY CO., INC.,: et al. : : Defendant-appellees : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : NOVEMBER 20, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 297,154 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellants: JAMES A. JENKINS Attorney at Law 2000 Standard Building 1370 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendant-appellees: MICHAEL P. GILBRIDE MARTIN T. FRANEY Attorneys at Law 1240 Standard Building 1370 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J.: 2 Plaintiffs-appellants, Roberta and Fred Valentine (collectively appellants ), appeal the decision of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, which denied their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The record reflects that Roberta Valentine ( Valentine ) instituted suit against Davis Welding Supply ( Davis Welding ) and its employee, Scott Marx ( Marx ), for injuries sustained when a vehicle driven by Valentine collided with a truck owned by Davis Welding and operated by Marx. Valentine's complaint included a claim by her husband, Fred Valentine, for loss of services.1 The testimony adduced at trial reveals that Valentine was traveling westbound on Franklin Boulevard, near the West 48th Street intersection, as Marx was traveling northbound on West 48th Street near the same intersection. Both Valentine and Marx testified that the light at the intersection was green in their favor as each entered the intersection. Jerry Milam, who lives on West 48thStreet, was walking westbound on Franklin Boulevard near West 50thwhen he heard the accident. This witness testified that he turned around at the moment he heard the collision and observed the traffic light as being green for Valentine, but he further testified that he did not see the accident as it happened nor could 1Marx filed a counterclaim against Valentine, joining with his counterclaim a third-party complaint by Marx' wife, Doris Renee Marx. Both the counterclaim and third-party complaint were voluntarily dismissed before trial. 3 he accurately state what color the traffic light was at the time of impact. Chris Lesko, who resides on West 48th Street south of Franklin Boulevard, testified that he was returning from work that day and had parked his vehicle in front of his home, facing south. As he exited his vehicle, Mr. Lesko observed Marx's truck pass him as it traveled northbound. Mr. Lesko further testified that when Marx's truck was some undetermined distance from the intersection, he happened to see that the traffic light was red for northbound traffic. While walking to his home, Lesko heard the collision and ran toward Franklin Boulevard. According to his testimony, he looked up and again observed that the traffic light was red. Nonetheless, he testified that he did not witness the collision nor did he continuously observe the traffic light and he could not, therefore, testify as to what color the light was at impact. The jury returned a verdict in favor of both Davis Welding and Marx and against appellants. Appellants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a motion for new trial, which was denied by the trial court. Appellants timely appeal, assigning the following errors for our review: . THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WHERE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. . THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AS IT FAILED TO INDEPENDENTLY WEIGH THE EVIDENCE AND ASSESS CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 4 I. In their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Specifically, they argue that appellees presented no credible evidence justifying a defense verdict. In reviewing a trial court's disposition of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, this court applies a de novo standard of review. See Norris v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Dec. 19, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 70591, unreported. The test to be applied by a trial court in ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same test to be applied on a motion for a directed verdict. The evidence adduced at trial and the facts established by admissions in the pleadings and in the record must be construed most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is made, and, where there is substantial evidence to support his side of the case, upon which reasonable minds may reach different conclusions, the motion must be denied. Neither the weight of the evidence nor the credibility of the witnesses is for the court's determination in ruling upon either of the above motions. Posin v. A.B.C. Motor Court Hotel (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 271, 275. Accord Pariseau v. Wedge Products, Inc. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 124, 127; Osler v. Lorain (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 345, 347. Thus, if the evidence supporting the nonmovant's case is such that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions, the trial court cannot usurp the role of the jury and the motion must be denied. Osler, supra. 5 The parties disputed whether the traffic light was in the other's favor prior to the collision. While appellants rely heavily upon the testimony of witnesses Jerry Milam and Chris Lesko to support their version of events, the testimony adduced at trial supported that neither witness actually saw the accident or the color of the traffic light at the time of impact. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to Davis Welding and Marx, this court finds that there existed substantial evidence from which reasonable minds could reach different conclusions. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Accordingly, appellants' first assignment of error is overruled. II. In their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred in failing to alternatively grant their motion for a new trial where the jury's verdict was not sustained by the weight of the evidence. Specifically, appellants argue that the trial court rather summarily denied their motion without properly weighing the evidence. Civ.R. 59(A)(6) allows the trial court to grant a party's motion for a new trial where the judgment is not sustained by the weight of the evidence. A reviewing court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on such a motion absent an abuse of discretion. Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82; Jones v. Olcese (1991), 6 75 Ohio App.3d 34, 37. An abuse of discretion connotes mores than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219. In deciding a motion for a new trial on the basis that the judgment is not sustained by the weight of the evidence, a trial court must pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence. If it finds that the verdict is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, it must set the verdict aside. Rohde, 23 Ohio St.2d at 92. A judgment supported by some competent, credible evidence going to the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, syllabus; see, also, State ex rel. Pizza v. Strope(1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 41, 46. Since the trial court is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor when weighing the credibility of the offered testimony, there is a presumption that the findings of the trier-of-fact are correct. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80. In this case, competent, credible evidence was before the trial court which supported the jury's verdict. Despite appellants' heavy reliance on the testimony of witnesses Chris Lesko and Jerry Milam in support of Valentine's version of events, both witnesses testified that they did not actually see the accident or the color of the light at the time of the collision. The parties involved in the collision disputed the color of the 7 traffic light as each entered the intersection. It was, therefore, within the purview of the jury, and the trial court in deciding the motion for new trial, to judge the credibility of the witnesses and assign the appropriate weight to their testimony. Because there existed competent, credible evidence supporting the jury's verdict, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion for a new trial. Accordingly, appellants' second assignment of error is overruled. 8 It is ordered that appellees recover of appellants their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, P.J. and JOSEPH J. NAHRA, J. CONCUR JUDGE TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .