COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71757 C&K INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC. : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION JULIE SMITH, GUARDIAN : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT NOVEMBER 20, 1997 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-309299 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCE: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendant-Appellee: ROBERT W. MCINTYRE, ESQ. GUY V. NERREN, ESQ. McIntyre, Kahn, Kruse & 75 Public Square Galleria & Towers At Erieview Suite 1320 1301 E. 9th Street, #1200 Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2096 Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1824 and MARK F. KRUSE, ESQ. McInTyre, Kahn, Kruse & Gillombardo Co. 1301 E. 9th Street, #1200 Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1824 2 PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.: C&K Industrial Services, plaintiff-appellant, appeals a decision by the trial court in favor of Julie Smith, defendant- appellee, in a declaratory judgment action. Julie Smith filed the action as guardian of her minor son, David Smith, to recover money she claims C&K agreed to pay in settlement of a wrongful death suit brought against C&K in connection with the death of David Smith's father, Stephen Polivka, in an industrial accident. C&K assigns the following error for our review: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT- APPELLEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS, AND THEREBY HOLDING THAT IT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO DECIDE A COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT WHICH SEEKS A FINDING THAT A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN REACHED IN A MATTER BETWEEN THE PARTIES PENDING IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION (REGARDING A CLAIM FOR A VIOLATION OF A SAFETY REQUIREMENT [ VSSR ]). Having reviewed the record and the legal arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. On July 9, 1994, C&K employee Stephen Polivka was killed in an industrial accident. Julie Smith, Guardian of David Smith, retained the law firm of Jones & McArtor and filed a claim for benefits with the Industrial Commission for the State of Ohio alleging C&K had violated specific safety requirements. A pre-trial hearing was scheduled for April 10, 1996 before the Industrial Commission. A notice of hearing was sent to the parties advising them that attendance at the hearing was mandatory. Attached to the notice was a list of the matters to be discussed at 3 the hearing. The list of issues to be discussed included Are the parties considering/engaged in settlement negotiations? and If so, how much additional time (i.e. 30 to 60 days) is needed to CONCLUDE the negotiations? The hearing was held as scheduled but neither Smith nor her attorneys appeared. Anita Looser, an employee at Jones & McArtor attended the hearing via telephone and explained that Smith's attorneys were unable to attend because they were out of town. When the hearing officer asked Looser if she wished to present a settlement offer on behalf of Smith, Looser replied that the firm`s demand was $4,500. C&K accepted the demand. A settlement entry was prepared by the hearing officer and signed by C&K. C&K sent Smith a check for $4500. However, Smith returned the check and refused to sign the settlement entry. C&K filed a declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to find that the case had been settled for $4500. Smith moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Looser did not have authority to settle the case and that her statement demanding $4500 was an unintentional misstatement of Smith's prior demand for $45,000 which had previously been communicated to C&K. Smith also alleged the settlement had not been approved by the Industrial Commission and that Smith never signed the settlement agreement. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, noting that the matter was currently pending before the Industrial Commission. This appeal followed. 4 C&K argues the trial court erroneously dismissed its declaratory judgment complaint. C&K argues the question of whether the case had been properly settled was an issue that could appropriatelybe determined through a declaratory judgment despite the fact that the Industrial Commission did not reach a final decision in the parties' dispute. Smith argues that, because the case was still pending before the Industrial Commission, declaratory judgment relief was unavailable. In Jones v. Chagrin Falls (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 456, 462, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to a declaratory judgment action. It is the long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. Id. [citing Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. (1938), 303 U.S. 41, 50-51.] In this case, the Industrial Commission Hearing Officer did not issue a finding with respect to the case. In an April 24, 1996 letter to the parties, the Hearing Officer acknowledged there was a misunderstanding concerning settlement and that the claim would be rescheduled for hearing. C&K cites to several cases in support of its argument that declaratory relief should have been allowed. Citing to Felty v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 234, 237, C&K writes litigants may seek judicial review of commission rulings *** by an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to R.C. 2721. (Emphasis 5 added.) In this case, there was no ruling by the Industrial Commission. Accordingly, this case is distinguishable from two other cases cited by C&K -- State ex rel Marks v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 184 and State ex rel Longacre v. Penton Publishing Co. (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 266, both of which involved complaints for declaratory relief brought after an administrative determination had been made. In Gray v. Willey Freightways, Inc. (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 355, 359, the court held that a court of common pleas is obligated to review only final administrative orders from the Industrial Commission. The Gray court opined that allowing declaratory judgment actions absent final determinations would allow claimants to circumvent an adverse decision of the commission and to bypass the General Assembly's desires for an independent workers' compensation system. Id. at 362. C&K's reliance on Schaefer v. First National Bank of Findlay (1938), 134 Ohio St. 511 and Swander Ditch v. Bd. Of Cty. Commrs. (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 131 is also misplaced. While stating that plaintiffs need not always exhaust administrative remedies before seeking a declaratory judgment action, the court added that, generally, declaratory judgment proceedings will not be allowed where the parties' rights can be fully protected through other available remedies. Schaefer at 518, Swander Ditch at 135. In this case, administrative regulations provided for an evaluation of all proposed settlements. OAC 4121-3-20(H)(1)(b) provides: When an application by the employer to settle its liability for the violation is made, the 6 matter will be set for hearing before a staff hearing officer with notice to the claimant, the employer, their respective representatives and to the administrator of the bureau of workers' compensation. Following the hearing, the staff hearing officer shall recommend to the commission action to be taken with regard to the settlement, and the commission shall issue its order approving or disapproving the settlement. Where a special statutory mandate for determination of a particular type of case has been provided, it is not proper to bypass this statutory procedure by means of a declaratory judgment action. State ex rel Iris Sales Co. v. Voinovich (1975), 43 Ohio App.2d 18, 19. See also State ex rel. Albright v. Delaware Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 40, 42; Mayfield Hts. Fire Fighters v. DeJohn (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 358, 367. Because the administrative code provides a forum for determining the validity of the alleged settlement, the trial court properly dismissed the declaratory judgment complaint. Judgment affirmed. herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. DYKE, J., and PATTON, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON PRESIDING Judge N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the .