COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71740 : CITY OF BEDFORD HEIGHTS : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION : TANA J. SINGER : : Defendant-Appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION October 9, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM THE BEDFORD MUNICIPAL COURT CASE NO. 96-TRC-00119 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: JAMES L. OAKAR (#0006972) PROSECUTOR FOR CITY OF BEDFORD HEIGHTS 700 West St. Clair Avenue Suite 210 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: CHRISTOPHER J. MALLIN (#0020153) P.O. Box 46565 Bedford, Ohio 44146 SPELLACY, J.: Defendant-appellant, Tana J. Singer ( appellant ), appeals her convictions for driving while under the influence of alcohol in 2 violation of R.C. S4511.19 and driving with a prohibitive blood alcohol level in violation of R.C. S4511.191. Appellant assigns the following errors for our review: . THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, ENTERED OCTOBER 10, 1994, AT Jr. 208, PAGE 269. . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONDUCTING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING PRIOR TO DENYING DEFENDANT'S SAID MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO OFFICER NEMECEK'S TESTIMONY AS TO WHAT HE CLAIMED THE DEFENDANT TOLD HIM WHEN HE STOPPED THE DEFENDANT WALKING DOWN ROCKSIDE ROAD. . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL RULE 29 AT THE CLOSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE. . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. Finding appellant's appeal lacks merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. I. On January 6, 1996, appellant was arrested by the Bedford Heights Police Department and charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. S4511.19. Appellant was also charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol level above .10% in violation of R.C. S 4511.191 3 and failure to control her vehicle in violation of the Cod. Ord. Of Bedford Heights S331.34(A). On January 29, 1996, appellant filed a motion to dismiss for double jeopardy. A hearing on appellant's motion to dismiss was held on August 7, 1996, and on August 15, 1996, the trial court denied appellant's motion. On September 19, 1996, appellant filed a second motion to dismiss or in the alternative to suppress evidence. A hearing was held on appellant's motion on October 9, 1996, and on October 15, 1996, appellant's motion was denied. On November 7, 1996, the case proceeded to trial. On November 15, 1996, the trial court found appellant guilty of having a blood alcohol level of over .10% in violation of R.C. S4511.191, fined appellant $500.00, sentenced appellant to 30 days in jail with twenty-seven days suspended, and suspended appellant's Operators License for 180 days with credit given for pre-trial suspension. The trial court also found appellant guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. S4511.19, fined appellant $500.00, sentenced appellant to 30 days in jail, but suspended twenty-seven days and suspended appellant's Operators License for 180 days. Appellant's sentence was to be served concurrently with appellant's sentence for her conviction in violation of R.C. S4511.191. Appellant was found guilty of failure to control in violation of Bedford Municipal Ordinance S331.34(A) and fined $150.00. II. 4 On January 6, 1996, Officer Nemecek of the Bedford Heights Police Department was on patrol in the vicinity of Rockside Road when he observed, at approximately 2:30 a.m., a green, four door Ford Escort sitting on top of a snowbank in front of 25081 Rockside Road. According to Officer Nemecek, it appeared as if someone had lost control of the vehicle, went up a snowbank, and as a result got stuck. The hazard lights were on and no one was in or around the vehicle. Officer Nemecek proceeded westbound on Rockside Road in an attempt to find the driver, at which time Officer Nemecek located a white female walking westbound across the Rockside Road bridge. Officer Nemecek pulled up behind the female and activated his emergency lights. The female, however, kept walking. Officer Nemecek then proceeded to activate his siren. Officer Nemecek observed appellant reach her right hand out, take a handful of dirty snow and put it into her mouth. Appellant subsequently stopped. Officer Nemecek exited his vehicle and approached appellant. Officer Nemecek immediately noticed appellant's groggy appearance and a moderate odor of an alcoholic beverage on or about her person. Subsequently, Officer Nemecek asked appellant if her vehicle was on the snowbank. Appellant responded affirmatively. Appellant told Officer Nemecek that she had been coming out of Burger King and lost control of her vehicle. Officer Nemecek observed that appellant's speech was slurred and appellant was difficult to understand. Officer Nemecek asked appellant to recite her ABC's and he also performed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test 5 on appellant. Appellant performed poorly on both tests. Officer Nemecek placed appellant under arrest and returned to the Bedford Heights police station where appellant was advised of her constitutional rights. Field sobriety tests were done at the police station. Again, appellant's performance on the tests was poor. Appellant submitted to a Breathalyzer test which revealed that appellant's blood alcohol level was .14%. III. Before we can address appellant's first assignment of error, we must decide whether Officer Nemecek's initial stop and subsequent arrest of appellant were valid. These issues are raised for our consideration in appellant's second and third assignments of error. In her second and third assignments of error, appellant contends the trial court failed to dismiss all charges against her and/or suppress all evidence as her arrest was illegal and in violation of both the Ohio and United States Constitution. Appellant further contends the trial court erred in dismissing her motion to dismiss or in the alternative to suppress without first conducting a hearing. In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness credibility. State v. Smith (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 284; City of Westlake v. Sloan (October 31, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 68706, unreported. Accordingly, we are bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by 6 competent, credible evidence. Sloan, supra citing State v. Klein (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 488. Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine, as a matter of law and without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal standard. Id. This court must first determine whether Officer Nemecek's initial stop of appellant was reasonable. As the Supreme Court of Ohio held in State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177, `[i]n determining whether the seizure and search were unreasonable our inquiry is a dual one--whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' Id. at 178. Initially, we must note that the judgment entry denying appellant's motion to dismiss or in the alternative to suppress states that a hearing was conducted. Appellant has failed to provide this court with evidence to the contrary. Therefore, we must accept the trial court's journalized entry as verification that a hearing was, in fact, conducted. In the present case, the record reveals that Officer Nemecek, while on patrol during the early morning hours of January 6, 1996, observed a vehicle stuck in a snowbank on Rockside Road with its hazard lights on. After determining that no one was inside of the vehicle, Officer Nemecek, in order to see if he could find the owner of the vehicle, and if necessary, render assistance, obtained the name and residence of the vehicle's owner. Subsequently, 7 Officer Nemecek proceeded to drive westbound on Rockside Road, the direction in which the vehicle owner's residence was located. As Officer Nemecek proceeded westbound on Rockside Road, he observed a woman (appellant) walking in the street. Officer Nemecek proceeded to approach appellant and put on his overhead lights. Appellant continued walking and Officer Nemecek activated his siren. Appellant stopped and Officer Nemecek approached appellant. At this time, Officer Nemecek was not conducting an investigative stop . Officer Nemecek did not initially suspect any criminal activity, and appellant was free to leave. In light of these facts, Officer Nemecek's initial stop of appellant was justified at its inception and was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which initially justified the interference. Appellant next challenges the trial court's determination that Officer Nemecek possessed probable cause to arrest her for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. It is not necessary for an arresting officer to actually witness dangerous or illegal driving in order to possess probable cause to arrest for alcohol-related traffic violations. Oregon v. Szakovits (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 271. Probable cause to make an arrest exists where there is a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious person in the belief that the individual accused is guilty of the offense with which he or she is charged. Huber v. O'Neill(1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 28, 30, quoting Ash v. Marlow (1851), 8 20 Ohio 119, paragraph one of the syllabus. For purposes of an arrest for driving under the influence, probable causes exists if, at the moment of the arrest, the totality of the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which the officer had reasonably trustworthy information, were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect had violated R.C. S4511.19(A). State v. McCaig (1988), 51 Ohio App.3d 94. The totality of the facts and circumstances in this case are more than sufficient to establish probable cause for appellant's arrest. Officer Nemecek testified that when he approached appellant at 2:30 a.m. walking westbound on Rockside Road, approximately 1/4 mile from her vehicle, and activated his siren he observed appellant place dirty snow in her mouth. Officer Nemecek further testified that when he approached appellant to determine if she was the owner of the abandoned vehicle, appellant appeared groggy and had a moderate odor of alcohol on or about her person. Finally, Officer Nemecek testified that appellant could not recite the alphabet in letter order and that she performed poorly on the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test. In light of the foregoing, we hold that Officer Nemecek possessed the requisite probable cause to arrest appellant and that the trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to dismiss and/or suppress. Because appellant's arrest was legal, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not operate to exclude evidence obtained as a result of the arrest (ie. the results of both the Breathalyzer test which appellant stipulated to at trial 9 and the field sobriety tests). Accordingly, appellant's second and third assignments of error are overruled. IV. We will now address appellant's first assignment of error alleging that the judgment entered against her was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The credibility of testimony and the weight of the evidence are primarily matters for the trier of fact. State v. Harriston (1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 58, 63. Where the record shows that a conviction is based on sufficient evidence, an appellate court may not reverse the verdict of the trier of fact. Id., citing State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230. A reviewing court must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence on all elements of the offense charged to satisfy reasonable minds of the guilt of the defendant. Sandoffsky v. State (1928), 29 Ohio App. 419. Furthermore, the trier of fact is free to believe all, part or none of the testimony of each witness. Harriston, supra; See also State v. Antill (1964), 176 Ohio St. 61. In the case sub judice, the record reveals that Officer Nemecek observed an abandoned vehicle which had slid into a snowbank. In an attempt to find the owner of the vehicle and offer any needed assistance, Officer Nemecek proceeded westbound on Rockside Road. Officer Nemecek observed a woman walking on the road and proceeded to get her attention in order to inquire whether she was the owner of the car. After activating his siren, Officer Nemecek observed appellant place dirty snow into her mouth. As 10 Officer Nemecek approached appellant, he observed that she appeared groggy and smelled of alcohol. Officer Nemecek asked appellant if she owned the abandoned vehicle, to which appellant responded affirmatively. Officer Nemecek conducted field sobriety tests and appellant's performance was poor. Appellant was subsequently arrested and taken to the police station. At the police station, more field sobriety tests were conducted. Again, appellant performed poorly. Appellant also submitted to a Breathalyzer test which revealed a blood alcohol level of .14%. At trial, appellant stipulated to the Breathalyzer test results. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that appellant's convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. V. Appellant's fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of error will not be addressed on appeal for the reasons which follow. In her brief, appellant sets forth six assignments of error. Appellant, however, failed to provide any arguments regarding her fourth, fifth or sixth assignments of error. App.R. 16(A)(7) states that: (A) The appellant shall include in its brief, under the headings and in the order indicated, all of the following: (7) An argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations 11 o the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies. The argument may be preceded by a summary. Because appellant has failed to provide this court with arguments asserting her contentions with respect to her fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of error in accordance with App.R. 16, this court will not address them on appeal. Accordingly, appellant's fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of error are overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Bedford Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's appeal having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 12 DAVID T. MATIA, P.J. and JAMES M. PORTER, J. CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY Judge N.B. This is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(B) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .