COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71630 JOYCE ZWICK, ET AL. : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiffs-Appellants : : and -vs- : : OPINION CASHELMARA CONDOMINIUM : ASSOCIATION : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OCTOBER 2, 1997 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. 299899 JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCE: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendant-Appellee: RICHARD O. MAZANEC, ESQ. MICHAEL G. CURTIN, ESQ. Reed, Mazanec & Wheeler Keller and Curtin Co., L.P.A. 1801 East Ninth Street 330 Hanna Building Suite 1710 1422 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Cleveland, Ohio 44115-1901 PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.: Joyce Zwick, plaintiff-appellant, appeals the trial court's decision granting summary judgment to Cashelmara Condominium Association, defendant-appellee, in her negligence action. Zwick 2 assigns one error for our review: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS HAVE PRODUCED EVIDENCE FROM WHICH REASONABLE MINDS COULD CONCLUDE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE BREACHED A DUTY AND WAS NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO REMOVE ICE FROM THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, JOYCE ZWICK FELL AND THAT THERE ARE MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE WHICH PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Having reviewed the record and the legal arguments of the parties, we reverse the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. Joyce Zwick and her husband, Peter Zwick, reside in a complex known as Cashelmara Condominiums in Bay Village, Ohio. The Zwicks have been residents of Cashelmara Condominiums since 1988. As residents and unit owners, the Zwicks are members of the Cashelmara Condominium Association ( Association ). The Zwicks pay a monthly maintenance fee to the Association, part of which is used for snow and ice removal from common areas. The By-Laws of the Association provide for the maintenance of common areas. The By-Laws specifically state the Association may elect to assume responsibility for maintaining landscaping and for snow removal within Limited Common Areas ***. In 1993, the Association contracted with Zergott Landscaping, Inc. for snow and ice removal from the common areas for the 1993-1994 winter season. The Zergott Contract stated that [a]ll driveways and walks will be cleared when an accumulation of 1/ inches or more of snow occurs. It was the Association's responsibility to contact Zergott and request snow and ice removal. 3 Kathleen Cahill, the manager of Cashelmara, sent a memorandum directing residents to a certain area to dispose of their Christmas decorations. However, Cahill never inspected said area to determine its condition. According to Cahill, the Association had no specific program for inspecting the common areas for icy conditions. Instead, she relied on others to alert her to poor conditions. Cahill stated she did not contact Zergott for ice or snow removal on the date in question. On January 2, 1994, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Joyce Zwick took Christmas decorations to the designated disposal area. As she turned to return to her unit, she slipped and fell on a patch of ice. As a result of the fall, Zwick fractured her right wrist. On December 12, 1995, Zwick filed a lawsuit in Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. On September 3, 1996, the Association filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing, among other things, that Zwick fell on a natural accumulation of ice. The Association argued it had no duty to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow; therefore, it was not liable for Zwick's injuries. Zwick responded to the summary judgment and attached an affidavit by her husband, Peter Zwick, an engineer, who averred that the ice where Zwick fell was not a natural accumulation of ice. Peter Zwick stated the area had been used for moving in and out of the building and the concrete had become badly cracked by heavy moving vans. According to Zwick, the concrete was further damaged by the freezing and thawing of surface water that collected in the cracks. The ice on which Zwick fell had accumulated in the 4 depressed area of the concrete. Peter Zwick also averred that he informed the Association that sealing concrete cracks and joints on the condominium's roads and common areas was essential to prolonging the life of the concrete areas. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association on October 29, 1996. This appeal followed. Summary judgment may be granted when (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in the favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. Bressan v. Secura Ins. Co. (1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 64997, unreported (quoting State, ex rel. Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 511). This Court reviews the lower court's granting of summary judgment de novo. An appellate court reviewing the grant of summary judgment must follow the standards set forth in Civ.R. 56(C). The reviewing court evaluates the record *** in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. ***[T]he motion must be overruled if reasonable minds could find for the party opposing the motion. Id. (Citations omitted). Zwick's sole assignment of error claims summary judgment should have been denied since a genuine issue of material fact existed. First, Zwick argues the facts clearly show that the 5 proximate cause of her fall was the unnatural accumulation of ice at the designated disposal area. Peter Zwick stated in his affidavit the accumulation of ice was due to the lack of maintenance of the concrete and improper drainage. In her deposition, Cahill confirmed that the area was sloped and lacked drainage. The Association argues the accumulation was natural; therefore, Zwick's claim of proximate cause lacks support. To support its argument, the Association refers to Joyce Zwick's deposition. When asked if she knew who caused the ice to be there, she answered in the negative. She gave the same response when asked if she could exclude the possibility that the accumulation was due to weather conditions. Unnatural accumulation must refer to causes and factors other than the inclement weather conditions of low temperature, strong winds and drifting snow, i.e., to causes other than the meteorological forces of nature. Porter v. Miller (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 93, 95. Plainly stated, unnatural accumulation is man- made. Id. To prevail, there must be some evidence of an intervening act, by man, that aggravates the pre-existing, hazardous presence of ice and snow. Id. An order granting a motion for summary judgment will be overruled where, construing the evidence in the favor of the non- moving party, the record discloses a genuine issue of material fact. Peter Zwick is an engineer and surveyor with over thirty years of experience in design and supervision of construction. He 6 viewed the site shortly after Joyce Zwick fell. Based on his observation he opined that the accumulation of ice at the spot where Joyce slipped was not a natural accumulation of ice, but that the ice got there due to a lack of maintenance of the concrete pavement coupled with a poor design regarding drainage. Peter Zwick's affidavit is sufficient to raise a fact question. An expert who is also a party in a suit may testify to the standard of care of his profession, if he meets the competency requirements of Evidence Rule 601 (D). See Campbell v. Warren Gen. Hosp. (1994), 105 Ohio App.3d 417. Furthermore, Peter Zwick's affidavit is supported by Cahill's deposition testimony; therefore, we conclude there is a genuine question of fact regarding the ice accumulation. Secondly, Zwick also argues that the Association had an express duty to remove ice from the common areas, which was stipulated by contract. Also, Zwick cites to Kline, et al. V. R. M. Landis Management Co. (May 10,1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 56946, unreported, which states a duty arises between a condominium and its residents where the condominium association provides for removal of snow and ice by express agreements. The Association argues it was under no contractual duty to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow. The Association cites cases stating that an owner of property is not liable to invitees for injuries due to natural accumulations of ice and snow. The Association also argues that Kline is factually distinguish- able. We disagree. 7 While recognizing that no one owes a duty to remove natural accumulationsof ice and snow , Kline at 1 (citing Tonelli v. M.H. Hausman Co., et al. (Sept. 28, 1989), Cuyahoga App.Nos. 55951, 55932, unreported at 3, this court held there was sufficient evidence to permit reasonable minds to conclude that defendants had assumed the duty clearing natural accumulations of ice and snow *** if the evidence is construed most strongly in favor of plaintiffs. Kline at 2. In the present case, the Association contracted with Zergott to handle icy conditions when requested by the management of Cashelmara. In her deposition, Ms. Cahill described the weather condition on that day as freeze and thaw. The cycle of freeze and thaw is a well known phenomenon in Northeast Ohio. It is also well known that such cycles create icy conditions. This being the case, reasonable minds can conclude the weather condition on January 2, 1994 was icy, requiring Ms. Cahill to contact Zergott to handle the problem, per the contract. Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the Zwicks, we conclude there exists genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Association had an express duty to have the ice removed from the disposal area and whether the Association negligently breached that duty. Judgment reversed. It is, therefore, considered that said Appellant recover of said appellee her costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. JAMES D. SWEENEY, C.J., and SPELLACY, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsidera-tion with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the .