COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71608 SACRIFICIAL MISSIONARY BAPTIST: CHURCH : : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION GEORGE L. PARKS, SR., et al. : : Defendant-appellee : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : NOVEMBER 26, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 305,474 JUDGMENT : REVERSED AND REMANDED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: LEWIS EINBUND Attorney at Law 270 Skylight Office Tower 1660 West 2nd Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1498 OSCAR TRIVERS EDWIN KELLY Attorneys at Law Hardiman, Buchanan, Howland & Trivers 1025 Huntington Building 925 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115-1405 (Continued) APPEARANCES (Cont.): For defendant-appellee: MICHAEL J. O'SHEA -2- DONALD G. REIMER Attorneys at Law 1600 Illuminating Building 55 Public Square Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -3- TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J.: Plaintiff-appellant, Sacrificial Baptist Church ( appellant ), appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed its case against, inter alia, defendant-appellee George L. Parks, Sr. ( Parks ) after the trial court determined that the active members of the congregation voted to retain Parks as its pastor. The record reflects that on June 20, 1992, Parks and appellant entered into a contract of employment whereby Parks was to serve as appellant's pastor. The contract made no provision for the method of terminating the contract other than to require thirty-day notice for either party. On March 14, 1996, appellant allegedly held an election wherein the majority of those present voted to terminate Parks' employment. After Parks refused to leave his position, appellant, on March 25, 1996, instituted suit against Parks and several other defendants.1 The complaint sought injunctive relief alleging that Parks refused to vacate his position as pastor after the congregation voted thirty-nine to one to terminate him, that the trustees continued to pay him his salary, and that he had access to church funds held at the credit union and Society National Bank. Appellant contemporaneously filed a motion for a temporary restraining order requesting that the trial court order Parks to vacate his position at the church and to restrain the 1The other defendants named in the complaint included the congregation's trustee chairperson, Annette Leftwitch; Faith Community United Credit Union and Society National Bank. -4- trustees from continuing to pay Parks. This motion was denied on March 25, 1996. Appellant amended its complaint on April 3, 1996 and added claims against Parks for breach of contract and trespass. Parks filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss appellant's complaint on the basis that the trial court was without subject- matter jurisdiction to hear and determine an ecclesiastical matter such as the instant case. This motion was denied without opinion on July 23, 1996.2 On July 22, 1996, the trial court ordered that a special election take place on August 12, 1996, at which time all members of the congregation as of April 11, 1996 would be eligible to vote on whether to retain Parks as pastor. The order also contained arrangements to vote by absentee ballot for those unable to personally attend this election. Each party submitted several names of members whose membership status was disputed, thereby jeopardizing the effect of their vote. Moreover, the parties disputed which of two church constitutions was valid. The record reflects that both constitutions required that membership status be determined on the basis of the individuals' presence at church services during the immediate ninety-day period or their donations to the church during that same time period. The two constitutions differed, however, in what constituted a majority. The earlier constitution called for a simple majority of the membership; the latter constitution called 2The record does not reflect that Parks answered appellant's complaint, nor did any of the remaining defendants. -5- for the approval of two-thirds of the membership in order to enact any church business. In the hearing that followed to resolve these issues, the trial court determined that the earlier constitution, calling for a majority rule, was the valid constitution. This finding has not been challenged on appeal. The trial court further determined that the votes of both parties' disputed members qualified as members of the congregation as of April 11, 1996 and, therefore, would be included in calculating the results of the special election. Calculating both the absentee ballots with those in actual attendance, the court concluded that the final count was forty-one in favor of retaining Parks and thirty-nine against. As a consequence, appellant's complaint was dismissed. Appellant appeals this ruling and assigns several errors for our review. Subsequent to the filing of its brief, appellant changed counsel, and new counsel for appellant requested, and was granted, leave to file a supplemental brief. In this supplemental brief, appellant raises an additional assignment of error wherein it challenges the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court on the basis that the trial court's ruling ordering the special election involved an ecclesiastical matter over which a civil court has no jurisdiction. We will address the arguments raised in appellant's supplemental brief as resolution of this issue is dispositive of this appeal. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits state courts from inquiring into religious doctrine, practice or policy. Serbian Eastern -6- Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976), 426 U.S. 696, 708-709, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2380, 49 L.Ed.2d 151, 162-163; Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church (1969), 393 U.S. 440, 447, 89 S.Ct. 601, 605; 21 L.Ed.2d 658, 664. Ecclesiastical matters, including the decision as to who should preach from the pulpit, are generally outside a state court's jurisdiction. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N.A. (1952), 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 154-155, 97 L.Ed. 120, 136-137; Tibbs v. Kendrick (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 35, 41; see, also, Watson v. Jones (1871), 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L.Ed. 666. In following the reasoning of Watson v. Jones, supra, the Kedroff court noted: *** The opinion [in Watson v . Jones, supra] radiates *** a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, and independence from secular control or manipulations in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as part of the free exercise of religion against state interference. Id. Purely secular matters, those not involving church doctrine or church policy, however, are not beyond the jurisdiction of a civil court. Tibbs, 93 Ohio App. at 42; Salzgaber v. First Christian Church (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 368, 372. This is true of hierarchical churches, those churches with an outside governing body, as well as congregational churches that do not have any such outside governing body. The distinction between hierarchical and congregational churches becomes important, however, when reviewing -7- a church's decision as to who shall preach from the pulpit. In this regard, a civil court's jurisdiction over an ecclesiastical decision made by a congregational church is limited to determining whether the decision was made by the proper church authority. Id.; cf. Alexanderv. Shiloh Baptist Church (1991), 62 Ohio Misc.2d 79, 84-85. This is so because a congregational church, unlike a hierarchical church, lacks a higher authority in determining whether such a decision was made by the appropriate church authority. Id. It is undisputed that appellant is a congregational church that is governed by its constitution and by-laws. Appellant's constitution provides that the church has the power to elect or dismiss a pastor and that at any official meeting, the majority rules.3 Here, the proper church authority, the church itself, decided to terminate the services of Parks. At this point, the trial court's inquiry should have gone no further. Despite the trial court's good intentions in attempting to resolve the conflict between the parties, we find that it exceeded its jurisdictional authority when it ordered another election and unnecessarily interfered with the governing structure of the congregation. Because we find that, per appellant's constitution and by- laws, the proper church authority made the determination to 3Both constitutions provide that the church has the power to elect or dismiss the pastor. That the two constitutions differ in what constitutes a majority does not have any impact on our decision today. -8- terminate Parks' employment, the trial court erred in ordering another election and thereafter ordering that Parks remain as pastor as a result of that election. We therefore reverse the decision of the trial court which retained Parks as pastor as a result of the court-ordered election. The case is remanded to the trial court for the determination of whether appellant is entitled to the relief requested in its complaint. -9- This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee its costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, C.J. CONCURS ANN DYKE, J. CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY JUDGE TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .