COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71607 MURAD MUSTAFA : : Plaintiff-Appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION OWEN B. HENEGHAN : : Defendant-Appellee : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION SEPTEMBER 4, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO.CV-276867 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: RICHARD W. DUNSON (#0040259) PATRICK J. HOLLAND (#0055671) DUNSON & DUNSON CO., L.P.A. 21851 CENTER RIDGE ROAD SUITE 410 ROCKY RIVER, OHIO 44116 For Defendant-Appellee: JAMES L. GLOWACKI (#0001733) JAMES J.IMBRIGIOTTA (#0040317) GLOWACKI & ASSOCIATES CO., L.P.A. 510 LEADER BUILDING 526 SUPERIOR AVENUE E. CLEVELAND, OHIO 44115 SPELLACY, J.: Plaintiff-appellant Murad Mustafa ( appellant ) appeals from the decision of the jury awarding him $827.00 in his suit 2 against defendant-appellee Owen Heneghan for injuries appellant received in a motor vehicle accident. Inhis brief, appellant apparently raises six assignments of error which are not argued separately and supported with citations to any law or the record in support of each contention. The last assignment of error is not argued in the brief. See App.R. 16(A). Instead, appellant's argument is divided into two sections which will be treated as appellant's assignments of error for purposes of appeal. Appellant assigns the following errors for review: . THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS SO CONTRARY TO THE NATURAL AND REASONABLE INFERENCES WHICH COULD BE RATIONALLY DRAWN FROM THE EVIDENCE AS TO CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND SAID VERDICT ILLUSTRATED THAT THE JURY EITHER MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS OR WAS INFLUENCED BY BIAS AND PREJUDICE. . THE JURY'S ERRONEOUS VERDICT WAS THE RESULT OF CUMULATIVE AND SEQUENTIAL MISCONDUCT PERPETRATED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL AND WHICH CULMINATED IN COUNSEL'S INTENTIONALLY ELICITING EVIDENCE OF MR. MUSTAFA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE ARABIC MUSLIM FAITH TO AROUSE PREJUDICE AGAINST HIM. Finding the appeal to lack merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. I. On September 15, 1994, appellant filed a complaint against Heneghan alleging Heneghan negligently caused a motor vehicle accident in which appellant suffered physical injuries. The case went to arbitration. The arbitrators awarded appellant 3 $14,500.00. Heneghan appealed the award to the court of common pleas. Trial commenced on August 15, 1996. Appellant testified that on March 11, 1993, appellant's vehicle was struck from behind by one driven by Heneghan. At first, appellant did not believe he was injured but that night he experienced a throbbing pain in his lower back causing him to seek treatment at the emergency room at Kaiser Permanente. Appellant saw a doctor at that facility a week and a half later who recommended physical therapy. Appellant testified he only received physical therapy at Kaiser Permanente once because the therapist was not present on two separate occasions when he was scheduled for therapy. Appellant spoke to his attorney who recommended appellant seek treatment at the Cleveland Therapy Center. Appellant began a course of treatment at the Cleveland Therapy Center with Dr. Theodore Mabini. At that point, appellant testified he was experiencing a throbbing pain in his back and a shooting pain in his thigh to the back of the knee. Appellant's condition was uneven as some days the pain was not as severe as at other times. Appellant was treated at the Cleveland Therapy Center from the end of May throughout August of 1993. Appellant returned to the Center in January of 1994 when he again experienced pain in his back and leg. Appellant testified he missed between five and seven days ofwork at his father's store. Appellant earned approximately $75.00 to $80.00 a day. Appellant had to curtail his duties at 4 the store as he was no longer able to stock the store or bend over or lift anything heavy. Appellant only could work at the register. Dr. Mabini testified by way of video deposition that he treated appellant for lower back pain and pain in his leg. Dr. Mabini diagnosed appellant as having acute lumbral sacral strain, with myofascitis of the paravertebral muscles. In Dr. Mabini's opinion, the injury was the result of the motor vehicle accident which occurred on March 11, 1993. Heneghan did not present any witnesses in his defense but rested after exhibits were entered into evidence. The jury awarded appellant $827.00 in damages. II. In his first assignment of error, appellant contends that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Appellant points out that Heneghan presented no evidence in his defense at trial and that the only evidence before the jury was that of appellant. Because the jury's award was for $827.00 while appellant presented evidence he incurred $3,749.00 in medical expenses and at least $375.00 in lost wages, appellant maintains the jury ignored the evidence and lost its way when rendering its verdict. Appellant argues it was the misuse of his entire medical file from Kaiser Permanente by defense counsel that led to the 5 erroneous verdict. Appellant posits that the defense never presented any medical testimony of its own but misconstrued appellant's medical history in an effort to confuse the jury. Appellant attempted to exclude his medical records from Kaiser Permanente through use of a motion in limine. The trial court denied appellant's motion. When defense counsel used the records duringhis cross-examination, appellant failed to renew his objection to the use of the medical file and it was appellant who asked the trial court to admit the complete Kaiser medical file into evidence. The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence. Shimola v. Cleveland (1992), 89 Ohio App.3d 505. Absent an abuse of that discretion, a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed by a reviewing court. Quellos v. Quellos (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 31. Appellant only objected to the use of the medical records when he made his motion in limine. The disposition of a motion in limine is a preliminary and conditional matter. In order to preserve a claim of inadmissibility for review on appeal, the objections made in the motion in limine must be raised again at trial, permitting the trial court to make a definitive ruling on the admissibility of the objected-to evidence. Fiorini v. Whiston (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 419. Because appellant failed to renew his objection to the complete Kaiser medical file 6 during trial and then requested the trial court admit the record into evidence, appellant failed to preserve the objection for purposes of appeal. Appellant waived any argument with regard to the admission of his medical file from Kaiser Permanente. Appellant next objects to the reference during cross- examination to the police report of the accident. Defense counsel twice asked appellant about what the police report reflects appellant told the investigating officer. In response to one question, appellant did not dispute the statement in the police report that he was not injured. Appellant did not remember telling the police officer that Heneghan was traveling around five miles per hour at the time of impact. The police report was not made an exhibit or authenticated during trial. A police report is a public record for evidentiary purposes pursuant to Evid.R. 803(8). Portions of a police report which contain matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed by law for which there is a duty to report are admissible in evidence. Petti v. Perna (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 508, 513. The observations must be firsthand observations of the official making the report or those of one with a duty to report to a public official. Id. In the instant case, appellant was questioned regarding statements he allegedly made which are recorded in the police report. Generally, cross-examination may embrace matters pertaining to direct examination even if the evidence is not necessarily admissible. State v. Litz (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 7 321. In Litz, a defendant was prejudiced by the reading of a third-party hearsay statement in a police report. Appellant's statements directly pertained to the issue of the extent of the injuries appellant suffered in the automobile accident. Error in the admission of evidence is not a ground for reversal unless substantial rights of the complaining party were affected or it appears that substantial justice was not done. Petti, supra at 14. Substantial justice is denied a party if the trier of fact would not have reached the same decision but for the error. Id. The questions at issue were limited and were directly related to matters brought out during direct examination. The questions were in regard to statements made by appellant. Decisions concerning evidentiary questions, including the scope of cross- examination, are within the discretion of the trial court. O'Brien v. Angley (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 159. Appellant could explain or deny statements attributed to himself. There was no third-party hearsay statement. Although not normally admissible, the questions were permissible on cross-examination. Even if there was error, appellant was not prejudiced as it cannot be said the result of the trial would have been different but for the questions. A reviewing court will not reverse the judgment of a trial court as being against the weight of the evidence where there iscompetent, credible evidence to support the judgment. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279. A verdict will be reversed as against the weight of the evidence 8 only when the verdict is so manifestly contrary to the natural and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence as to produce a result in complete violation of substantial justice ***. Royer v. Bd. of Edn. (1977), 51 Ohio App.2d 17, 20. It is appellant's contention that as the evidence was uncontradicted, the jury erred by returning a verdict which was less than the damages proven by his evidence. However, that evidence is uncontroverted does not necessarily require the trier of fact to accept an argument advanced by a party. GTE North, Inc. v. Carr (1993), 84 Ohio App.3d 776. The assessment of damages is a matter within the province of the jury. Litchfield v. Morris (1985), 25 Ohio App.3d 42. As the jury was free to believe or disbelieve any evidence before it, whether contradicted or not, the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and the jury's damage award will not be second- guessed upon appeal. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. III. In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the jury's award was the result of misconduct by defense counsel. Appellant points to numerous instances which he characterizes as constituting misconduct. Much of the argument relates to the use of the medical records and police report which have already been addressed. Appellant objects to defense counsel's incorrect definition of quiescent and a question regarding why and for how long appellant fasted. Appellant objected to 9 neither of these supposed instances of misconduct at trial and has waived any error. Jones v. Olcese (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 34. Appellant includes what is a patently offensive argument in which he accuses the jury of awarding him a small damage award because he is an Arab Muslim. There is absolutely no evidence to support appellant's insinuations of ethnic and religious bigotry on the part of the jury. Appellant also implies defense counsel misled the jury by implying Heneghan would have to pay for the damages himself although Heneghan's insurance company really would be paying any award. Generally, evidence of liability insurance is excluded asit may influence juries to decide cases on whether money is available from an insurance company. See Piontkowski v. Scott (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 4. There was no misconduct on the part of Heneghan's attorney by not mentioning evidence which would have been excluded. Appellant next argues some of defense counsel's closing argument was prejudicial and was misconduct. Appellant contends defense counsel created false evidence by arguing appellant did not have a back problem when appellant presented uncontradicted evidence to the contrary. Appellant alleges the erroneous argument resulted in the jury awarding him damages which approximately represented his Kaiser Permanente costs and nothing else. Counsel is afforded great latitude in closing argument. 10 Pang v. Minch (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 186, paragraph two of the syllabus. Whether counsel crossed the permissible bounds of closing argument is primarily for the trial court to determine. That assessment will not be reversed upon appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Id., paragraph three of the syllabus. The failure to object to any alleged misconduct of opposing counsel during closing argument waives any error associated with the alleged misconduct. Jones, supra. Appellant has waived any error with regard to defense counsel's closing argument as he failed to object during trial. Appellant's second assignment of error lacks merit. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant his costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment 11 into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, C.J. AND DAVID T. MATIA, J. CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY Judge N.B. This is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(B) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's .