COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71589 SCHASTE METALS, INC., : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : AND : OPINION TECH HEATING & AIR : CONDITIONING, INC., : : Defendant-Appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : AUGUST 7, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: : Civil appeal from : Common Pleas Court : Case No. 290628 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: James D. Wilson Katherine A. Friedell WALTER & HAVERFIELD 1300 Terminal Tower Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2253 For defendant-appellant: Mitchell A. Stanley STANLEY, STANLEY & FISHER 6500 Rockside Road, #160 Cleveland, Ohio 44131 2 NAHRA, J.: Appellant, Tech Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., ( Tech ), appeals from the trial court's judgment in the amount of fourteen thousand, six hundred and seventy-eight dollars ($14,678.00) to appellee, Schaste Metals, Inc., ( Schaste ). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. This case involves two distinct disputes arising from the manufacture and installation of a heating and cooling system in a local grocery store. Tech served as a general contractor on this specific phase of the project. In this capacity, Tech awarded Schaste the contract to install the system for ninety-eight thousand, five hundred dollars ($98,500.00). Often, as work progressed, the parties became aware that the installation required work beyond their initial contemplation. Generally, when this occurred, Schaste agreed to perform whatever additional work was necessary for a commensurate increase in the contract price. On most occasions, the parties' understanding regarding the additional work was memorialized in a work/purchase order issued by Tech. The first dispute, Schaste's additional work claim, involves the last substantial modification from the original agreement. At some time not clear from the record, the owner of the grocery store chose to expand the system to include an additional section of the store. Schaste completed work on this additional area but no purchase order verifies the existence of an agreement for the work. Schaste billed Tech in the amount of eleven thousand, seven hundred 3 and eight dollars ($11,708.00) for the additional work. Tech refused to pay and claimed that they had no obligation to do so. The second dispute, the premium time claim, involves Tech's obligation to compensate Schaste for hourly labor costs above its typical hourly billing rate. Because the grocery store remained open during the system installation, to minimize disruption of the business, Schaste was required to install the system during off- peak or night hours. While the parties' initial contract did not include a provision for premium time, Schaste nevertheless billed Tech for two thousand, nine hundred and seventy dollars ($2,970.00). Again, Tech refused to pay. Schaste filed this lawsuit alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment and conversion. Appellee abandoned its conversion claim at trial. After a bench trial, the lower court awarded judgment to Schaste in the aforementioned amount. Tech timely appealed and assigned two errors for review. I. Appellant's first assignment of error states: THE JUDGMENT IS NOT SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. As the trial court did not articulate the basis for its decision, we address appellant's assignment of error under both asserted theories of recovery, to wit, breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Our standard of review is well established. A judgment supported by competent, credible evidence going to all the material elements of the case should not be reversed on the ground that it 4 is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Monarch Steel Co. v. Communication Solutions, Inc. (March 20, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 70509, unreported; Corbett v. Ford Motor Co. (Feb. 22, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 69216, unreported. A reviewing court should indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the lower court's judgment. Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 226; Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 10 OBR 408, 461 N.E.2d 1273. Any evidence capable of more than one interpretation should be construed consistently with the lower court's judgment. Gerijo, Inc., supra; Ross v. Ross (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 203, 18 O.O.3d 414, 414 N.E.2d 426. We first examine appellee's claims under traditional contract principles. We find that appellee's evidence does not support the judgment under a breach of contract theory. Essentially, Schaste's evidence consisted of two witnesses and several exhibits. Neither of the witnesses had personal knowledge of any discussion between any Schaste employee and any Tech employee regarding the additional work; neither witness could verify that Tech approved the additional work; neither witness stated that Tech agreed to pay for the work. No exhibit evidenced the existence of an agreement regarding the additional work. At most, appellee demonstrated that the additional work was completed and that Tech was billed for such work. This evidence does not show that the parties mutually assented to any terms regarding the additional work. Accordingly, appellee's breach of contract claim must fail. Cf. Satullo v. Garson (Oct. 22, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 61219, unreported. 5 Despite Schaste's failure to support its breach of contract claim, we hold that the evidence supported the trial court's judgment under the theory of unjust enrichment. To establish liability under this quasi-contract theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) a benefit conferred on the defendant by plaintiff; 2) defendant's knowledge of said benefit; and, 3) circumstances that make it unjust for defendant to retain said benefit without providing compensation to plaintiff. Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 183, 12 OBR 246, 465 N.E.2d 1298; Gibbons v. Stewart (May 5, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65515, unreported. With respect to appellee's additional work claim, the expansion of the system was not contemplated in the initial contract. By performing the additional work, it is clear that Schaste performed beyond the terms of the initial contract to the benefit of Tech. Indeed, on cross-examination, George Hilditch, sales engineer for Tech, testified as follows: . Now, I understand that you say you never approved a PO [sic.] or purchase order in connection with that but you do not deny that Schaste did, in fact, do work on the 26-foot extension; is that correct? . Yes, they did. . You accepted that work, did you not? . Yes, I did. . They provided materials, did they not, on that 26- foot extension? . Yes. Subsequently, on recross-examination, Hilditch stated: 6 . Do you agree that there was some value to the work and the materials that was [sic.] provided by Schaste Metals on the 26-foot extension? . Yes. Accordingly, Schaste provided materials and labor, installed the system, and received no compensation from Tech. Concomitantly, Tech accepted benefits beyond the initial contemplation of the parties and stands to gain said benefit without compensating Schaste. This pattern is present in appellee's premium time claim. While it is not clear when the parties decided that some work needed to be done during off-peak and night hours, Schaste's witnesses indicated that it never specifically agreed to perform during these hours. No exhibit provides a basis for an expectation that work would be performed during off-peak or night hours. Further, the record evidence indicates that such work constituted a benefit to Tech by virtue of its minimizing effect on the disruption of the existing business. Ultimately, the evidence revealed that the parties shared a fluid relationship in which their legal obligations were modified by changing work conditions. As a result, Schaste performed beyond the four corners of the agreement. It did not do so gratuitously. Under this set of facts, it is inequitable for appellant to retain the benefit of appellee's work without providing compensation. Accordingly, appellee was entitled to a remedy based upon unjust enrichment and we affirm the award of judgment to Schaste. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. 7 II. Appellant assigns the following additional error: THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED. Though not expressed in the assignment of error, the instant assignment of error challenges the trial court's computation of damages with respect to appellee's claims. Unjust enrichment, like other quasi-contract doctrines, is derived from the equitable principle that no person ought to retain a benefit which, if retained by him, would result in inequity and injustice. See Hambleton, supra; Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust (1951), 155 Ohio St. 391, 395-398, 44 O.O. 374, 99 N.E.2d 301. Because recovery for unjust enrichment does not rest upon the intentions of the parties, see Shaw v. J. Pollock & Co. (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 656, 662, 612 N.E.2d 1295, jurisdictional motion overruled, 66 Ohio St.3d 1423 (1993), damages for unjust enrichment are calculated differently from damages for breach of contract. A party proving breach of contract is entitled to the benefit of its bargain, e.g., to be placed in as good a position as it would have been had the contract not been breached. Garofalo v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 95, 108. However, unjust enrichment entitles a party only to restitution of the reasonable value of the benefit conferred. St. Vincent Med. Ctr. v. Sader (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 379, 384; Shaw, 82 Ohio App.3d at 662. See, also, Hughes v. Oberholtzer (1954), 162 Ohio St. 330, 335, 55 O.O. 199, 123 N.E.2d 393 ( purpose of the quasi-contract action is 8 not to compensate * * * for any loss or damage * * * but to compensate [plaintiff] for the benefit he has conferred ). Thus, the issue is whether the trial court had competent, credible evidence of the value of the additional work. We hold that appellee presented such evidence. With respect to both the additional work and premium time claims, Schaste's witnesses testified that the combined value of his company's services was fourteen thousand, six hundred and seventy-eight dollars ($14,678.00). Their testimony indicated that this figure represented the actual cost to perform the work and some measure of profit. Such evidence is probative with respect to the value of the benefit conferred upon Tech. See, Wilkin v. Fyffe (Sept. 13, 1996), Greene App. No. 96-CA-03, unreported (evidence of value of benefit conferred was cost of materials and services); Plageman v. Benchmark Technologies, Corp. (Aug. 23, 1991), Lucas App. No. L-90- 283, unreported (discussing valuation of benefit conferred in quantum meruit action); Smith v. Joseph (May 9, 1985), Franklin App. No. 85AP-23, unreported (reasonable market value evidenced value of benefit conferred). Accordingly, given our limited standard of review, we conclude that the amount of the judgment was supported by competent, credible evidence. Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. 9 It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DYKE, P.J., and PATTON, J., CONCUR. JOSEPH J. NAHRA JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R.22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .