COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71582 SONDRA V. SULIMAN : ACCELERATED CASE : Plaintiff-Appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION OPEN DOOR WEST, INC., ET AL. : : PER CURIAM Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MAY 15, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. CV-240767 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: ROY M. KAUFMAN (#0018606) 745 Leader Building 526 Superior Avenue N.E. Cleveland, OH 44114-1401 For Defendant-Appellee: JOHN S. KLUZNIK (#0017473) WESTON HURD FALLON PAISLEY & HOWLEY 2500 Terminal Tower 50 Public Square Cleveland, OH 44113-2241 - 2 - PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-appellant Sondra V. Suliman ("appellant") appeals from the trial court's denial of her two motions for a mistrial. Appellant assigns the following errors for review: I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ITS DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL DUE TO AN IMPARTIAL AND TAINTED JURY. II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ITS DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL BE- FORE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE BY HIS STATEMENT THAT HE IS GOING TO DISMISS THE CASE THE NEXT MORN- ING PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF ORAL TESTIMONY AND SUBMISSION OF EVIDENCE. Finding the appeal to lack merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. I. Plaintiff filed a complaint for sexual harassment and wrongful dismissal against Open Door West, Inc., and its president. On October 1, 1996, the case proceeded to trial by jury. On October 10, 1996, the trial court dismissed the jury for the day. As two jurors were leaving, they asked defense counsel how much longer the trial would go on. The jurors stated defense counsel had said the trial only would take a couple of days. Defense counsel responded to the questions and told them the trial would probably be over the next day. The jurors further remarked that they had jobs and families and other responsibilities. At that point, defense counsel directed the jurors to speak to the judge. No further conversation took place between the jurors and defense counsel. - 3 - The next day, appellant's counsel made a motion for a mistrial based on this conversation. The trial judge called both attorneys into chambers to discuss the matter. Defense counsel informed the trial judge that there were no prior conversations between himself and the jurors. He surmised the jurors based their belief on the length of the trial on his statement during voir dire that the trial would go into the next week. The trial court denied the motion. Counsel for appellant made a second motion for a mistrial because the trial court had stated the day before that it intended to dismiss the case the next day. Counsel argued this showed a prejudgment by the trial court that the case should be dismissed before all of the evidence was heard. The trial court also denied this motion. The trial continued with the arguments and jury charge and the jury returned a verdict for the defense. II. In her first assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court should have granted the first mistrial motion because the jury was not impartial and untainted. Appellant argues the jury was influenced by an extrinsic consideration in that it did not want to stay any longer but just wanted to go home. Appellant surmises the jurors' anger at the length of the trial prevented them from properly deliberating in a calm and rational manner and caused the jury to rush to judgment. Appellant also argues the - 4 - jurors' statements imply that there had been a previous conver- sation between the jurors and defense counsel. A trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial will not be reversed upon appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Apaydin v. Cleveland Clinic Found. (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 149, 152. An abuse of discretion is found where a decision is so grossly violative of fact and logic that it demonstrates a perverse will, a defiance of judgment, undue passion, or extreme bias. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon Inc. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87. A motion for mistrial or for a new trial should be granted due to conversations between a juror and a third person when that person is attempting to influence the verdict and the record demonstrates that the decision may have been influenced by the conversation. State v. Hipkins (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 80. However, a judgment will not be reversed because of juror misconduct unless prejudice to the complaining party is shown. Any attempt on the part of the prevailing party, his agent, or attorney, on or over the jury, resulting in an irregularity or misconduct of the jury, would be cause for a new trial; but in a civil action, where the prevailing party is wholly free from fault, and the irregularity or misconduct of the jury, or a juror, is free from intention of wrong, and it has in no appreciable way affected the verdict, it should not be disturbed. Armleder v. Lieberman (1877), 33 Ohio St. 77, 84. In State v. James (August 22, 1994), Stark App. No. 94-CA- 0046, the jury foreman, in the presence of two other jurors, asked defense counsel if he was a public defender. The attorney made no - 5 - reply. The court found no prejudice to the defendant as there was no two-way communication. The statement was merely an innocuous statement by the juror which was not in regard to a pending matter. There was no need for the trial court to question the jury about the incident. Little more is present in the instant case. Although defense counsel did respond it was only to say the trial should be over the next day and to suggest the jurors speak to the judge. There is no evidence the jury was influenced by this conversation in reaching its decision. Indeed, the verdict was for the defense toward whom the jurors' anger supposedly was focused. As there is no evidence showing the conversation affected the jury's deliberations, no prejudice to appellant resulted. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion for mistrial. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. III. In her second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial judge's statement he would dismiss the case was sufficient for a mistrial to have been declared. Appellant contends the statement shows the trial court already had made up its mind about the case and caused appellant's counsel to spend time preparing a response. There is nothing in the record before this court pertaining to the manner in which appellant's counsel spent his time. That portion of the argument must be disregarded. - 6 - Whether the trial judge had reached a decision regarding what the outcome of this case should have been before all the evidence was heard and submitted is immaterial. This was a jury trial. Further, the trial court did not dismiss the case. Appellant was not prejudiced by the statement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion for mistrial. Appellant's second assignment of error lacks merit. Judgment affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATRICIA BLACKMON, P.J. JAMES M. PORTER, JUDGE LEO M. SPELLACY, JUDGE N.B. This is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(B) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22(B). See, also S.Ct.Prac.R. II, Section 2(A)(1). .