COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71551 LUCY MOORE ) ) Plaintiff-Appellant ) JOURNAL ENTRY ) -vs- ) AND ) LUPICA TOWERS, ET AL. ) OPINION ) Defendants-Appellees ) Date of Announcement of Decision NOVEMBER 13, 1997 Character of Proceeding Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas Case No. 295523 Judgment Affirmed Date of Journalization Appearances: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendants-Appellees: MYRON P. WATSON, ESQ. THOMAS J. DOWNS, ESQ. 310 Lakeside Avenue, N.W. 323 Lakeside Ave., West 595 Courthouse Square Bldg. Suite 410 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 2 JAMES M. PORTER, J.: Plaintiff-appellant Lucy Moore appeals from a jury verdict in favor of defendants-appellees Lupica Towers and Associated Estates Management Company arising out of her suit for damages resulting from her fall in an icy parking lot at Lupica Towers. Plaintiff claims the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find no error and affirm. On January 13, 1994, plaintiff, a tenant at Lupica Towers, slipped and fell on ice in the apartment parking lot. Plaintiff claimed that defendants were negligent in failing to plow or salt the parking lot and/or adjacent sidewalks at Lupica Towers located in Cleveland. The apartment had retained a plowing service which would plow and salt when the snow reached two inches. According to the official weather reports for January 12, 1994 and January 13, 1994, the temperature varied from a low of 27. to a high of 39., decreasing the accumulated snow from six inches to approximately two inches, and precipitation was present. The temperature remained above freezing throughout the day on January 13, 1994, until 5:00 p.m. when the temperature fell just below freezing. Plaintiff fell at approximately 5:00 p.m. As the ice was forming, Lucy Moore and her friend, Henry Bass, left the apartment. Mr. Bass walked in front of Ms. Moore and had no trouble crossing the Lupica Towers parking lot. Plaintiff noticed the icy conditions, recognized that they presented a sheet of ice, but proceeded anyway and fell as she attempted to cross 3 the parking lot. Mr. Bass then managed to assist her and walked with her to the car. Plaintiff's sole assignment of error states as follows: I. THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. In White v. Euclid Square Mall (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 536, 539, we stated the difficult burden a plaintiff has in overturning a jury verdict on the weight of the evidence: Our review of a jury verdict as being against the manifest weight of the evidence is extremely limited. The standard for reviewing such a claim is set forth in Karches v. Cincinnati (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 12, 526 N.E.2d 1350. Therein, the Ohio Supreme Court stated: In reviewing the court's judgment, we are guided by the principle that judgments supported by competent, credible evidence going to all the material elements of the case must not be reversed, as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 8 O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578. Every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the findings of facts. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 10 OBR 408, 461 N.E.2d 1273. Finally, if the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, we must give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the trial court's verdict and judgment. Seasons Coal Co., supra; Gates v. Bd. of Edn. of River Local School Dist. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 83, 40 O.O.2d 91, 228 N.E.2d 298; Ross v. Ross (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 203, 204, 18 O.O.3d 414, 415, 414 N.E.2d 426, 428. Karches,, 38 Ohio St.3d at 19, 526 N.E.2d at 1357. Under Ohio law, ice and snow are a natural part of wintertime in Ohio as is the freezing and refreezing of ice and snow. 4 Lopatkovitch v. City of Tiffin (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 204, 206-207. The reluctance to impose liability on property owners for slip and fall cases resulting from natural accumulations of snow and ice was spelled out in Brinkman v. Ross (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 82, 85, as follows: Living in Ohio during the winter has its inherent dangers. Recognizing this, we have previously rejected the notion that a landowner owes a duty to the general public to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow from public sidewalks which abut the landowner's premises, even where a city ordinance requires the landowner to keep the sidewalks free of ice and snow. See Lopatkovich v. Tiffin (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 204, 206-207, 28 OBR 290, 292-293, 503 N.E.2d 154, 156-157. It is unfortunate that Carol Brinkman slipped and fell on appellants' sidewalk. Perhaps appellants should have shoveled and salted the sidewalk as a matter of courtesy to their guests. However, we find that Ohio law imposed no such obligation upon appellants, and we are unwilling to extend homeowner liability to cover slip-and-fall occurrences caused entirely by natural accumulations of ice and snow. To hold otherwise would subject Ohio homeowners to the perpetual threat of (seasonal) civil liability any time a visitor sets foot on the premises, whether the visitor is a friend, a door-to- door salesman or politician, or even the local welcome wagon. Defendants owed no duty to plaintiff to remove natural accumulations of snow and/or ice in the parking lot of Lupica Towers on January 13, 1994. The official weather reports indicated that the conditions of the parking lot were a result of the changing temperature causing the melting and refreezing of ice and/or snow. In LaCoursev. Fleitz (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 209, 210, 211, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that a landlord does not have a 5 duty to clear natural accumulations of snow and/or ice from common areas of the leased premises unless it is shown that the landlord had superior knowledge of the particular danger which caused the injury. The Court reasoned that said accumulations are obvious and apparent so that a landlord may reasonably expect that a tenant will take measures to protect himself or herself against them. Id. at 210, quoting DeAmiches v. Popczun (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 180; see, also, Karcher v. Zeisler-Morgan Properties Ltd. (Dec. 26, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 70199, unreported at 6 (condition of black ice presented open and obvious condition to pedestrian in parking lot warranting summary judgment in favor of landowner); Yanda v. Consolidated Mgmt., Inc. (Aug. 16, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 57268, unreported (Tenant's knowledge of slippery condition *** was not inferior to landlord's.). In the case herein, Moore admitted she saw the parking lot was ice covered and proceeded to walk across it anyway. In any event, the issues made by the evidence were submitted to the jury including plaintiff's contentions that defendants were negligent in failing to maintain the parking lot pursuant to its obligations to tenants under its leases. The defendants offered evidence that they were not at fault and plaintiff was negligent in not looking out for herself. These disputed issues were for the jury to decide. The court also submitted full instructions on the parties' respective contentions and special interrogatories for the jury. The jury found no negligence on the part of either party. 6 We can not say that the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We will not disturb its verdict. Plaintiff's sole assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. 7 It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, C.J., and KARPINSKI, J., CONCUR. JAMES M. PORTER JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .