COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71515 LINDA ZOUL : ACCELERATED DOCKET : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION MAJESTIC STEEL SERVICE, INC. : : Defendant-appellee : PER CURIAM : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : MAY 15, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 306039 JUDGMENT : Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Alan Belkin, Esq. Russell D. Hood, Esq. 75 Public Square Conway, Marken, Wyner, Kurant, Suite 920 & Kern Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Pepper Pike Place 30195 Chagrin Blvd., #300 Cleveland, Ohio 44124 -2- PER CURIAM: This matter comes before this court on the accelerated docket. Therefore, pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc. R.25, this court may state the reasons for its decision in brief and conclusory form. Appellant Linda Zoul appeals the order of the trial court granting appellee Majestic Steel Service, Inc.'s motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). As the trial court correctly determined that appellant's complaint failed to state a claim of action recognized in Ohio, we affirm. Appellant was employed by appellee from November 1980 through March 18, 1996, when she was discharged. On April 2, 1996, appellant filed an action in common pleas court alleging she was wrongfully discharged. Appellee thereafter moved for a more definite statement. The trial court granted appellee's motion on June 28, 1996, and on July 16, 1996, appellant filed her amended complaint. Subsequently, appellee filed a motion to dismiss appellant's amended complaint, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The trial court granted appellee's motion on October 2, 1996. Appellant timely filed her notice of appeal. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR In her sole assignment of error, appellant asserts: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THIS CASE PURSUANT TO RULE 12(B)(6), OHIO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT CONTAINED ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF A PUBLIC POLICY TORT. -3- Appellant maintains the court's dismissal of her action was improper. The amended complaint alleges, in pertinent part: 5. Defendant terminated plaintiff in violation of the public policy of the state of Ohio. Defendant improperly accepted and acted upon false rumors that plaintiff had assisted another employee in obtaining benefits from defendant to which that other employee was not entitled. * * * It is well settled that, when considering a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the court must consider all facts alleged in the complaint as true. Doe v. First United Methodist Church (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531. Further, the court in Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 230, quoting O'Brien v. University Community Tenants Union (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, stated: In order for a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Civ. R. 12(B)(6)), it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery. * * * (Citation omitted.) In Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance, supra at paragraph 3 of the syllabus, the court held that Ohio recognizes a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The court permitted an exception to the doctrine of employment-at- will when an employee is discharged or disciplined for a reason which is prohibited by statute. Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance, supra at 234. The doctrine was further clarified by the court in Painter v. Graley (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 377, 384, where the court reaffirmed Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance, and held that a plaintiff may state a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of -4- public policy where the plaintiff alleges facts demonstrating that the employer's discharge of the employee contravened a "sufficiently clear public policy". "The existence of such a public policy may be discerned by the Ohio judiciary based on sources such as the Constitutions of Ohio and the United States, legislation, administrative rules and regulations, and the common law." Id. In the matter, sub judice, appellant argues that two sources in Ohio law support her claim that her complaint states a sufficient violation of public policy: R.C. 2917.32(A)(3) and the common law relating to defamation. R.C. 2917.32 provides, in pertinent part: (A) No person shall do either of the following: * * * (3) Report to any law enforcement agency an alleged offense or other incident within its concern, knowing that such offense did not occur. Appellant does not even assert that appellee reported any action to any law enforcement agency. Thus, appellant's argument that her allegations illustrate a violation of this statute sufficient to demonstrate a "clear public policy exception", has no merit. Appellant next argues that her complaint alleges a violation of public policy pursuant to the common law relating to defamation. However, there are no allegations that appellee defamed appellant. Defamation requires that the plaintiff prove a false and defamatory statement concerning another, unprivileged communication of the statement, fault amounting to at least negligence, and the actionability of the statement. Carlton v. -5- Davisson (1995) 104 Ohio App.3d 636. Plaintiff's complaint does not allege that appellee either made any false statement or communicated any false information. Thus, appellant's argument that the common law of defamation applies to demonstrate a violation of public policy also has no merit. Appellant's assignment of error is overruled. The decision of the trial court is affirmed. -6- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, CHIEF JUSTICE ANN DYKE, JUDGE KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc. App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E), unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A) is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement .