COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA No. 71502 STATE OF OHIO : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-appellee : : AND vs. : : OPINION TERRELL PRICE : : Defendant-appellant : : July 24, 1997 : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS : Criminal appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CR-339219 : JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: For defendant-appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, ESQ. PATRICK E. TALTY, ESQ. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 20325 Center Ridge Road, #512 MARK J. MAHONEY, ESQ. Rocky River, OH 44116-4386 Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center, 8th Fl. 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 -2- PATTON, J. A jury found defendant Terrell Price guilty of one count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, a violation of R.C. 2921.331. The two assignments of error relate to (1) counsel's effectiveness due to his failure to maintain pretrial communications with defendant and (2) the trial court's refusal to appoint new counsel. The indictment arose following two separate high speed chases in which defendant ignored police orders to pull over. The jury found defendant guilty of one count, but could not reach a verdict on the second count. The state voluntarily dismissed the second count and this appeal followed. About one week prior to trial, defendant sent the trial judge a letter in which he asked the court to remove his assigned counsel (the public defender) and appoint new counsel. At the start of the trial, defendant again asked the trial judge to replace appointed counsel. The trial judge would not consider the letter a motion, but did permit defense counsel to make an oral motion for reap- pointment of counsel. Upon questioning by the court, defendant expressed a general dissatisfaction with appointed counsel's attention to his matter: Like the last time I was here I had an epi- sode. I asked him to come back and tell me such and such and such, I want to make a plea, but he didn't want to come back and tell me, so I was stuck. I'm already pleading to something I didn't do. I'm not going to beat it. The trial judge noted that defendant had been offered a plea -3- prior to trial, but refused it. She found that no legitimate basis for replacing counsel, but told defendant she would entertain a future motion if he could show an adequate reason for replacement. I The first assignment of error complains that defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because the record indicates a complete breakdown in communication between counsel and client. Defendant maintains counsel did not speak to him about his trial until the morning trial commenced. Counsel's performance will not be deemed deficient unless it is proven to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable representation and prejudice arises from that performance. State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, paragraph one of the syllabus. Moreover, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Id., at paragraph two of the syllabus. This assignment of error lacks merit. Defendant's argument that counsel did not prepare the case until the day of trial is not demonstrated by the record. Defendant did state at trial that counsel comes to talk to me at the last minute about trial, but the record clearly indicates the parties met at a pretrial in which they engaged in plea negotiations. This fact is substantiated by the trial judge's remark that, you [defendant] come out here and tell the Court you don't want to plead guilty, then your complaint is somehow you are going to trial and not pleading guilty. Given -4- these prior plea negotiations, defendant cannot sustain his argument that counsel did not prepare for trial. Moreover, even had such a deficiency in counsel's performance been shown, defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the deficiency. The state presented overwhelming testimony placing defendant in two separate high speed chases in which he ignored police orders to pull over. The police officer identifications were made with convincing accuracy. While defendant did not testify at trial, that was obviously a matter of strategy which we will not examine in hindsight, particularly in light of a recent assault conviction that gave rise to a violence specification in the indictment. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 689. The first assignment of error is overruled. II The second assignment of error complains that the trial court erred by refusing to appoint new counsel prior to the start of trial. An indigent defendant's right to counsel does not extend to counsel of the defendant's choice, Thurston v. Maxwell (1965), 3 Ohio St.2d 92, 93, and does not mean that any appointed counsel must develop and share a meaningful relationship with his client. State v. Blankenship (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 535, 558, citing Morris v. Slappy (1983), 461 U.S. 1, 13. Grounds for obtaining newly appointed counsel may exist only upon a showing of good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an -5- apparently unjust result. Blankenship, supra, citing State v. Pruitt(1984), 18 Ohio App.3d 50, 57. The decision to appoint new counsel rests within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Dukes (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 263, 265. Our review of the record fails to show us that the trial judge abused her discretion by denying the motion for new counsel. The trial judge reasonably found defendant's complaint that he wanted to enter into a plea bargain self-serving in light of his prior refusal to plead. Importantly, the trial judge left the matter open in the event defendant could show legitimate grounds for substitution.Those grounds did not materialize. We find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable about the trial court's course of action. The second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment is affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate -6- pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. BLACKMON, P.J. NAHRA, J., CONCURS. JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsidera-tion with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .